What Mexico Needs Is a Shot of Glasnost : Government: Under Salinas, political reform has not kept up with economic liberalization. Hard-liners within PRI are largely to blame.

In his first eight months in office, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari demonstrated that he is a political risk-taker. He forced one of Mexico’s foremost political “untouchables”--the leader of the teachers’ union--to resign and had another--the head of the oil workers’ union--arrested. He also recognized, in Baja California, the first-ever victory of an opposition party for a state governorship.

But Salinas, as did his predecessor, is now taking fire for having allowed the pace of political reform to fall too far behind the pace of economic change. Under Salinas, economic liberalization has been extraordinarily rapid, but political reform has moved at a snail’s pace, with many reverses. Mexico appears to have “perestroika without glasnost, “ to quote historian Lorenzo Meyer.

One important reason for this imbalance is a divided, poorly institutionalized, non-credible opposition, especially on the left. If more Mexicans recognized a viable alternative to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) at the national level, their impatience with the slowness and incomplete nature of political reform would be much greater.

However, the most fundamental obstacles to political liberalization in Mexico today remain inside PRI. Major pockets of resistance to change riddle the party, especially in the confederations of labor, campesino and “popular” organizations established in the 1930s. The entrenched political bosses who dominate state and local organizations constitute another formidable impediment.

The strong reformist rhetoric of Salinas and PRI Chairman Luis Donald Colosio continues to fall on deaf ears. Even after electoral disasters in 1988 and 1989, many party functionaries are still unconvinced of the necessity for change. Their tolerance for internal debate and self-criticism remains exceedingly low.

To be sure, even reformist leaders within the government and ruling party are not eager to share power or transfer it to an opposition government at the national level (or, for that matter, in most of the states). They want their party to remain “the centerpiece of a more competitive party system,” as Salinas put it this month, commemorating PRI’s 61st anniversary. Some officials genuinely distrust the motives and policy-making competence of the opposition.

What the reformers seem to want is a modernized version of dominant-party rule. They would accept considerably more pluralism and competition, both within and outside PRI, and would welcome a system in which PRI must fight for its own popular support and win elections credibly. Many Mexicans see this as only “half a loaf.” There are, in fact, several more drastic changes that could be made in the political system. Each has a growing constituency, within and outside PRI. They include:

Elimination of government control over the federal and state commissions that run elections and certify results.

A much greater separation of PRI from the government--especially regarding campaign financing--to put all political parties on a more equal footing.

No more dictation from above in choosing PRI candidates for state governorships and lesser offices.

Constitutional reform to strengthen the role of the Congress vis-a-vis the president.

An elected governor or mayor of Mexico City, home to roughly 25% of the population.

Internal democratization of the labor movement and, more generally, a loosening of PRI-government control over organized labor.

In his party-anniversary speech, Salinas appeared to endorse several of these proposals, at least in part. He advocated greater “clarity” in PRI financing sources, more reliance on “democratic mechanisms” in the selection of PRI candidates and more vigorous, open policy debates.

The applause, when evident, was indifferent, a measure of the probable resistance Salinas faces from the party faithful. But as Communist parties in Eastern Europe learned, PRI and its reformers risk being overtaken by events. If PRI’s hard-liners retain the upper hand at the national convention later this spring, Salinas has three options:

He could try to impose more radical reforms on the ruling party. This would force him to confront the anti-reformers within his party and government. Truly open, competitive primary elections to select PRI candidates for municipal, state and congressional offices would have to be introduced throughout Mexico, not just in the current few states. Salinas would have to campaign aggressively for the pro-reform candidates, not just encourage competing PRI factions in each state and municipality to fight it out among themselves. Corrupt officials would have to be hounded out of office. Those who commit egregious electoral fraud would have to be called to account, publicly and systematically.

All this could split PRI into two rival parties, each with its own policy proposals and view of democratization. At a minimum, the rigid party discipline of the past would give way to open debate between competing factions.

Or Salinas could jump ship and let PRI sink, distancing himself and his government from the party’s unpopular leaders and its image of corruption and authoritarianism. In effect, he would choose to govern without PRI.

Salinas could still modernize elements of PRI--for example, by strengthening its territorial bases of organization (neighborhood, municipal, and state-level committees). But having done that much, he would go on to other business. He would remain a popular president, capable of pursuing most policy objectives and even building a popular constituency for them. Under the electoral-law amendments he helped push through Congress last December, PRI candidates need win only 35% of the votes for Salinas to retain control of the Congress.

There is, of course, a third option--”stay the course.” Salinas would continue to nudge PRI candidates to become more effective competitors and gradually reduce the party’s reliance on election fraud. He would also continue to build an alliance-of-convenience with the conservative National Action Party to marginalize the leftist opposition.

But “staying the course” would lead to more political disorder down the road. It would not spare Salinas, in next year’s elections, the protest demonstrations, violent confrontations between party militants and politically motivated homicides that plagued him in 1988 and for much of his first year in office. It would not defuse the probable Cardenista challenge to the next PRI presidential candidate. As he demonstrated in the ’88 presidential election, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas does not need a well-institutionalized party structure to win votes from many urban working-class Mexicans and campesinos.

Foot-dragging on political reform, furthermore, would leave both Salinas and PRI highly vulnerable in the event of an economic setback during the next five years. Survey data shows that Salinas’ current popularity rests mostly on his own actions during his first year as president. If the economic recovery stalls or there is a new burst of inflation, his spectacular blows against corruption in 1989 will be quickly forgotten by the average Mexican.

Many Mexicans doubt that Salinas’ gradualist, low-conflict approach to political reform can get the job done. But Salinas is a pragmatic leader who adapts to changing realities and new opportunities. The rapid fall of one-party regimes around the world has created a great opportunity for reformers in Mexico to press their case. It is also a chance for Salinas himself to seize the historical moment to push through deeper changes in the political system more rapidly.

With Salinas’ presidency greatly strengthened, PRI reformers feel more confident of their ability to liberalize without causing a party collapse.

Salinas also knows the risks: completing essential economic reforms and averting socially disruptive steps like a “maxi” devaluation will depend on avoiding political turmoil. Most private investors in Mexico today seem more concerned about the potential for political instability than the future direction of economic policy. Thus, a fundamental shake-up of the PRI may be the only way to guarantee both political order and the success of Mexico’s economic restructuring program.