Islam, the West’s Imaginary Menace : Muslims: They are a presence in many matters troubling to the West, but the causes are social and economic, not religious.

Now that the Cold War is over and communism is collapsing, what more is there to fear? For many Western commentators, the answer is Islam. They see its rise as the new principal threat to Western security and values, a menacing force in an area extending from Yugoslavia to the deserts of Central Asia--the so-called Crescent of Crisis.

This view is as wrongheaded as it is popular.

There is no doubt that, for some time, Islam has been a potent political force. The disintegration of the Soviet empire is unleashing forces in Muslim Central Asia that could be destabilizing. And large-scale Muslim migration to Europe is proving to be disruptive. For some areas, then, the Islamic “menace” is close indeed.

Yet it is both false and facile to attribute all new instability in Central and South Asia to Islam, or to explaining European problems with immigrant communities in terms of their Islamic character.

It is simply incorrect to contend that recent troubles in Azerbaijan, Kashmir and in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo were all caused by Islam. In Kosovo, a part of the Serbian republic, the primary causes of strife are ethnic differences and resentment over Serbian dominance. Azerbaijan’s dispute with Armenia is basically over territory and is only one element of a national crisis stemming from rancor over two centuries of Russian/Soviet imperial domination. Even Kashmir’s troubles are due more to nationalism than to Islam, as most Kashmirians seek independence from India rather than merger with Muslim Pakistan.

Similarly, Europe’s problem with Muslim immigrants derives primarily from the economic and social crisis of their native countries. Even if these people were not Muslims, many European countries would find the mass influx of poorly educated, untrained peoples stressful; witness the longstanding tensions over non-Muslim African and Caribbean immigration.

In most instances, it is also not true that the Islamic movement is intolerant or exclusionary. Muslims in Lebanon, for example, are not guilty of intolerance because they refuse to continue accepting Christian dominance; nor are Palestinians because they demand part of their ancestral homeland; nor are Soviet Muslims because they reject Russification and state-ordained atheism.

For the past 200 years the Islamic world has been largely a passive recipient of foreign cultural influences, often resulting from imperial expansion. This passivity led many Western Orientalists to disdain Muslim societies as fatalistic, gripped with inertia, lacking in dynamism.

But during the past two decades there has been a steady rise in Muslim cultural consciousness, leading many intellectuals to question the wholesale adoption of foreign value systems and to reach into their Islamic culture for new models. An outward manifestation of this movement has been the insistence of many Muslims, including immigrant communities in Europe, on adherence to a strict dress code. This phenomenon recently led to the widely publicized head-scarf controversy in France, when the government prohibited Muslim schoolgirls from covering their hair. In this case, parochialism was on the Europeans’ side, reflecting limits of Western tolerance regarding peoples who resist total assimilation and a European desire to maintain domestic culture free from foreign influence.

In general, for the first time, Western societies have to face what the Islamic world has undergone in a much more extensive and systematic way for nearly three centuries: an assertive penetration of their societies by an alien religion and culture. The West finds this difficult to accept.

To be sure, there is an extremist dimension to the Islamic resurgence, but it affects only a small part of a large movement. Moreover, it derives primarily from political, social and economic factors other than Islam. Once stripped of their Islamic symbolism, the extremists’ political views and agendas, both domestic and international, closely resemble other secular radical movements in the Third World. Even if Islam were to disappear, popular grievances and aspirations would incite radicalism.

In short, the problem that both the West and the Soviet Union face in dealing with the Muslim world does not derive from Islam the religion. It is rooted in the social and economic crises of most Muslim countries, exacerbated by a population explosion, and in the Muslims’ rising political and cultural assertiveness. If the West would see the Islamic phenomenon for what it is--essentially social, economic, cultural and political--the best approach becomes obvious: The West should use such tools as economic assistance to help Muslim countries create better living conditions for their citizens, which would serve European interests by helping to limit emigration; and it should be sensitive to Muslim desires for political and cultural autonomy.

Of course, Muslim extremism must be countered. But considering Islam to be the West’s new enemy, lapsing into a medieval parlance of Crusade and Jihad, or imposing Western values on Muslims is no answer. It can only benefit Muslim extremists.

Above all, there is critical need for an ecumenical Christian-Muslim dialogue, to lay the foundation of a future relationship based on mutual respect for the beliefs, values and legitimate concerns of both communities.