PERSPECTIVE ON THE AMERICAS : The Sandinistas Shall Return : Nicaragua: The defeated leadership will help the new government achieve stability but attempts to undo their reforms will be met by stern resistance.

The Sandinistas lost the Feb. 25 election because we took up the challenge of free elections under a disadvantageous situation--the continuing threat of a war backed by the United States. In effect, the Nicaraguan people went to the polls with a gun to their heads.

We kept the commitment I made to the other Central American presidents in El Salvador to hold free elections in tandem with the disarming of the Contras. Even though the Contras did not disarm by Dec. 5, 1989, and turn in their bullets for ballots, as called for by the presidents, we went forward with the most supervised election in Latin American history. As a consequence, we lost.

The majority of Nicaraguans, it seemed, voted for the U.S.-backed candidate in order to avoid more war with the United States. Forty-one percent of Nicaraguans voted for peace with dignity. But the majority caved in to U.S. pressure.

Of course, it would have been preferable if the majority had voted for us instead of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. But if their choice can lead to peace, we have all won. The task now is to ensure the peace for which people voted.

Chamorro’s coalition, United Nicaraguan Opposition, has an extremist fac-tion led by Vice President Virgilio Godoy. It views our election defeat not as part of a normal transfer of power, but as a victory of the counterrevolution. Members of the faction want Sandinista heads to roll. There should be no mistake that our stance will be hard-lined, belligerent and combative with anyone who wants to cut off our heads.

By contrast, Chamorro and her team believe that what occurred was a vote of the people within the framework of the Nicaraguan constitution. They view the transfer of power as the basis for strengthening democracy and seeing to its end the complete disarmament of the Contras.

As realists, they know that they must seek agreement with us. They realize that the Sandinistas have not disappeared but remain the strongest unified force in Nicaragua. Chamorro and her team have a constructive attitude and seek national reconciliation.

Our aim after the inauguration is to achieve, with Chamorro, at least a minimum degree of stability for Nicaragua so that we can face our severe economic problem. That stability can only be accomplished if both sides comply with the two accords signed by the outgoing and incoming governments. And that means isolating the extremists of both sides.

The first accord was signed March 27 by Humberto Ortega, defense ministerof the Sandinista government, and Antonia Lacayo, Chamorro’s chief aide. It acknowledges that the new government will respect the social and economic accomplishments of the revolution--especially the land reform that deeded property to individual campesinos and cooperatives--as well as respect the established hierarchy of the army.

The second accord, signed April 19, acknowledges that the Contras will disarm between April 25 and June 10. I don’t know if the Contras will comply, or whether the United States will encourage them to comply. All I know is thatthe United States still has not cut its “humanitarian aid” to the Contras in Honduras.

The fate of the army is a key issue. The constitution says the army belongs to the nation, not to any party. Because of its origins in the movement to overthrow Anastasio Somoza, there is undeniably a very strong Sandinista influence in the armed forces. But because the army belongs to the nation, it is under the authority of the president--now Violeta Chamorro.

We thus feel there is no reason for the hierarchy of the army to be reorganized,Contras or no Contras. This understanding is spelled out in the March 27 agreement; it is this provision that Godoy and his extremists are trying to overlook.

To emphasize our commitment to the agreement, the Sandinista directorate issued a communique Monday calling for anyone in the hierarchy of the army to resign from their leadership position in the Sandinista Front.

The most important gain of the revolution has been the achievement of the right of all Nicaraguans to organize and express themselves freely. The recent election demonstrated a freedom never before known in Nicaragua. Our land reform is another major gain of the revolution. It is the basis for any future economic development in Nicaragua.

Chamorro should not touch the foundations of this reform or she will be asking for trouble. Land reform is deeply embedded in the consciousness of Nicaraguans. They will not allow it to be watered down or taken away. They will not take a step backwards. Privatization attempts will be very dangerous.

Education is also a major achievement of the revolution. In 1979, Nicaragua had 500,000 students. Today we have more than 1 million. Subsidies for teachers and students cannot be cut. We won’t allow this, either.

The respite from power will give us Sandinistas a chance to reflect on our mistakes. For example, as a result of our inexperience, we initially tried to meet all of the expectations for social change that had accumulated for a century. We used all of our foreign aid immediately to subsidize pent-up social demand, without paying attention to the medium- and long-term consequences.

When the war and the U.S. economic embargo came, there was not enough money for subsidies, development and fighting the war. The resulting inflation, and the stringent measures taken to control it in 1989, caused the people to suffer.

As in most governments, there is also a tendency to bureaucratization. While the Sandinista government was hardly the most bureaucratic in the world, the population had learned through the revolution to demand their rights. They expected to be heard. Many began to feel the government was unresponsive.

While acknowledging that our government was better than any in the past, many people still felt disaffected. Along with the yearning for an end to the suffering caused by the war, this disaffection no doubt counted in our election defeat.

The urgent task of ensuring the disarmament of the Contras so that the transition of power can be normalized has not kept the Sandinista leadership from focusing on the longer-term prospects for the next election in 1996. We have to see what happens tomorrow before we think about the day after.

Yet I have no doubt that the Sandinistas will regain full power in Nicaragua one day through electoral means. Of this I am absolutely confident.