One Is Home, Now Back in Our Shell : Hostages: We have done no deals. The hard reality is that we are unwilling and perhaps unable to be too forthcoming.

Robert Polhill is home, but who has the keys to the remaining hostages? The captors certainly. Iran, which finances the Shiite factions in Lebanon and exercises spiritual influence--almost no hostage has come out without Iran’s approval. Syria, whose troops occupy much of Lebanon and through whose lines any hostage, must pass. Do all three keys have to be turned at once? Does Iran have a master key?

U.S. policy is based on the assumption that Iran, if it puts its mind to it, can get the hostages out, but there is uncertainty and debate here. Some see a complex relationship in which Iran’s influence is not absolute. Iran can request, Iran can bribe and Iran can threat, but Iran cannot order the captors to release their hostages. The on-off-on again pattern of Polhill’s release is offered as evidence of the pushing and shoving that goes on between the captors and their patrons in Tehran. But others see the captors as mere jailers, dependent on Iranian support and therefore unable to refuse Iranian order. From that perspective, the Polhill drama was a charade choreographed in Tehran to get credit for its role in the release, but at the same time, protracting the episode to exert continuing leverage over the Americans.

We have no direct communication with the captors. For reasons of policy, the government prefers not to deal with them directly, and the captors have rejected private efforts to initiate a dialogue. Every “offer” by the captors to talk has, upon investigation, turned out to be a hoax or a scam. The kidnapers communicate only when they want. Their demands include the release of those convicted of the bombing of the American and French embassies in Kuwait. They have also demanded the release of several hundred Shiites detained by Israel.

These demands have not been met, yet hostages have come out indicating that other solutions are possible. Some, in fact, believe that the captors now realize that their original demands, at least for the release of the prisoners in Kuwait, will not be met and that the kidnapers only want a face-saving way out.

There may be some frustration and fatigue, but there is no evidence that the captors are eager to let the hostages go. They have powerful incentives to keep them. Holding hostages gives the captors prestige. It makes them important political actors in the Middle East. Nothing can be done without at least taking into account what consequences it will have for the hostages. Hostages also provide the captors with protection against Israeli retaliation, Syrian military pressure, American action. Hostages guarantee continued support from Iran, which likes to use its influence to get hostages out when it suits Iran’s national interests. And, finally, the hostages have paid off as an investment. We may not pay the price--someone does, in Polhill’s case, probably Iran.

Most analysts believe that the Iranians have made up their mind to get the hostages out. The Iranian economy is in shambles. The government confronts open protest at home. Its strategic position is perilous. Iraq, still an enemy, brandishes chemical weapons, and is believed to be developing a nuclear bomb. Events in the Soviet Union have eliminated any notion of playing a Moscow card. So Iran requires foreign investment and loans, which requires improving relations with the West. And that requires getting the hostages out.

However, some in Tehran may see any improvement of relations with the Satans of the West as a betrayal of the Islamic revolution. There has been debate.

Administration officials will claim that U.S. policy on the hostage issue has not changed. In fact, it has, in subtle but important ways. Our loud proclamations of no-ransom were rendered hypocritical by the revelation that the United States had secretly sold arms to Iran in return for the release of hostages in Lebanon.

At his inauguration, President Bush signaled his desire to end the era of hostility between Iran and the United States. He used elliptical language--”goodwill begets goodwill”--but the message was clear. Bush also took pains to explain that the United States had a no-concessions policy, not a no-negotiations policy. Still enmeshed in their own political quarrels, the Iranians were not ready to respond to Bush’s offer, at least not openly and directly. The Administration might claim that the release of Polhill vindicates our policy. We have done no deals. In blunt language that Administration officials cannot use, getting the hostages out is Iran’s problem.

Americans have been held captive in Lebanon for going on seven years. Except for brief spasms of news coverage, like that surrounding Polhill’s release, there is little public interest in the story and virtually no public pressure on the President to bring them home. There are, however, political risks for the President to be seen making a deal with the captors or with the Iranians.

President Bush will be under presure to define exactly what he meant by “goodwill.” He will also have to decide whether--in order to keep things moving--he must offer some expression of it before the last hostage comes out. Expressing goodwill without making substantive concessions will require deft diplomacy. We will not link the release of hostages with the settlement of the financial claims currently being negotiated between American and Iranian officials in the Hague. That would smack of ransom. But some have suggested that we could assign more officials to the task, thus speeding the settlement process.

Israel has helped us before. In the 1985 TWA hijacking, Israel agreed to release 700 Shiites it held and 39 American hostages were released. Everyone denied it was a deal. In a similar “non-deal,” Israel could decide on its own to release some of the several hundred Shiite prisoners it now holds. All this lies perilously close to the limits of what policy permits.

Those who expect or even discern the traces of labyrinthine diplomacy and veiled deals may be chasing mirages in the desert. The hard reality is that we are unwilling and perhaps unable to bring them off. It is not in our interest to be too forthcoming. Our policy does not encourage creative thinking. Our priorities lie elsewhere. Our capabilities are limited.

Moreover, there are too many gaps in our knowledge to be clever. Has Iran made up its mind about the hostages? What do the captors really expect to obtain? We grope in the dark.

When in doubt about what to do, the Administration retreats behind its hard line: reactive, cautious, immovable--an uninspiring approach perhaps, but safe, and given the realities, just possibly correct.