Washington Vexed by Soviet Support of Castro, but the Subsidy Will Continue : Cuba: While the U.S. maintains its harsh policy, Moscow is unlikely to pull the plug; besides, it doesn’t really cost the Soviets that much.

Conventional wisdom in the United States already touts Fidel Castro as the next communist domino to fall. After all, did the Soviet Union not stand aside as communist governments were swept from power in Eastern Europe? And would it not be even more likely to turn its back on Cuba, which is farther away and whose leaders have pointedly rejected perestroika and glasnost?

Probably not. The East European countries wished to disassociate themselves from Moscow. The latter acquiesced. Cuba wishes to retain its ties. Moscow has even more reason to accept that request and to remain in Cuba--at least for now. For one thing, as the United States and the Soviet Union move toward negotiations on deep cuts in strategic weaponry, the huge Soviet electronic surveillance station at Lourdes, just outside Havana, gains increasing importance in monitoring U.S compliance. As one Soviet diplomat summed it up: “As U.S.-Soviet detente expands, the time may come when we will not need such facilities. But for the time being, we need them more than ever.”

In fact, staying in Cuba costs the Soviet Union little. Although aid figures of $5.5 billion are cited by the CIA, careful scrutiny reveals that more than 70% of that figure is in subsidies for Cuban sugar. The Soviet Union acquires sugar at a price set well above the world market. But it does not pay in hard cash. Instead, it extends credits that Cuba barters for Soviet goods--goods that often could not be disposed of elsewhere.

That is the pattern with most of the other so-called subsidies. Moscow shells out no hard currency and, at minimal cost, assures access to the installation at Lourdes and other intelligence facilities, plus the guaranteed supply of Cuban nickel, sugar and citrus products--for all of which there is a genuine need in the Soviet Union. Some would call it a bargain.

Though uninformed pundits here speak of Soviet aid cuts as though they were a reality, they are not. Far from it. Mikhail S. Gorbachev has stated flatly that under current circumstances Moscow will not reduce its aid. So far, he has kept his word. Shipments of wheat and petroleum were delayed earlier this year, but the promised quantities were eventually delivered. Otherwise, there were no shortfalls and none are expected. Quite the contrary, if anything, Soviet aid is increasing. Military assistance continues at previously planned levels, but Moscow and Havana have just signed a new one-year trade agreement--the last of this five-year cycle--with projections 8.7% above those of last year.

All this appears to puzzle the Bush Administration. It insists Moscow should cut Castro adrift and has even suggested that U.S.-Soviet relations might be adversely affected if it does not. As one U.S. official said recently: “The Soviets have no reason to support Castro; he rejects their reforms and criticizes them at every turn. If they continue to support him, it must be in order to make trouble for us, possibly in Central America.”

But it is difficult to see how the purpose of Soviet support could be to fan the flames in Central America. Both Moscow and Havana have terminated military assistance to Nicaragua. Both have expressed their full support for negotiated solutions in the region. Moscow gives no aid to guerrillas there. Cuba still expresses its solidarity with them, but its support is now largely symbolic. Cuban officials say they hope negotiations work in El Salvador and that they will fully respect any terms worked out between the conflicting parties. Further, Cuba has indicated its readiness to sit down with the United States, in either bilateral or multilateral talks, to discuss and resolve the whole question of arms supply to the region. The Bush Administration has ignored the offer, while continuing to express concern over Cuban intentions in the area. But if genuinely concerned, why refuse to talk?

The principal thing that Washington seems not to understand is that while the Soviet Union is undergoing tremendous change and is in a stage of retraction, it remains a great power not without pride. Soviet diplomats insist that their government will not abandon an ally of 30 years standing without firm assurances that the United States will not take advantage of the situation. Washington not only has given no such assurances but indeed has raised tensions with Cuba to their highest level since 1962.

One cannot predict beyond the next few years. There is growing popular pressure in the Soviet Union to cut all foreign aid, and there is debate in particular over aid to Cuba. Some Soviet officials and area specialists see a moral responsibility to continue it indefinitely, and to stand by Cuba no matter what. Others argue that there must be eventual reductions and, as Soviet and Cuban interests diverge, that ties between them should be loosened. But both sides in the debate appear to be in agreement that any Soviet withdrawal should be gradual--and not even begin as long as there is a definable threat to Cuba from the United States.

Ironically, then, the Bush Administration’s policy of increasing pressure against Havana succeeds only in bridging the debate in Moscow and ensuring Soviet withdrawal will begin later rather than sooner.

U.S policy has the same impact on hopes for change inside Cuba itself. Historically, as long as U.S.-Cuban relations are tense, Castro demands greater internal discipline. Only with a reduction of tensions can there be a relaxation that would benefit the Cuban people. Members of the small Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation--whose leader, Elizardo Sanchez, is now in prison--stressed that point to me during a recent visit to Cuba. “This U.S. policy of pressure and threats harms us more than it does the Castro government,” they said. “So long as it continues, there will be no space for groups such as ours to operate.”

The Bush Administration’s Cuba policy is counterproductive to virtually all U.S. objectives. The Administration could accomplish far more by signaling its willingness to discuss outstanding differences between the two countries and by dropping that gratuitous provocation known as TV Marti--which doesn’t work anyway. It could hardly accomplish less than with its current policy. If it wants to get the Soviets out of Cuba, it is proceeding in exactly the wrong way.