The Pentagon Capers : FIGHTING FOR PEACE Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon <i> by Caspar Weinberger (Warner Books: $24.95</i> , <i> paper; 480 pp.; 0-446-51461-0) </i>

Few former secretaries of defense have been willing to explain why they did what they did while they were in the Pentagon. Caspar Weinberger, who for seven years was the undisputed boss of the Pentagon, has no such reservations.

His book, “Fighting for Peace,” is an apt title in one respect. At odds with nearly everyone in Washington, except for a very few old California friends and Ronald Reagan, for whom he had a special reverence, he aggressively and successfully waged war against the Washington Establishment.

Adopting the old Army dictum that the best defense is a good offense, he attacks the Congress, distrusts the media, disdains the bureaucrats at the State Department, castigates the staff at the National Security Council, and scorns military theorists for their lack of knowledge and practical experience.

When it comes to Communists in general and the Russians in particular, Weinberger gives no quarter. The Soviets were, and are, viewed by Weinberger as an implacable foe who can be dealt with only through overpowering military force.

In just five years, he persuaded Reagan and pressured Congress to double military spending from $3 billion a week to $6 billion a week. When, after five years, Congress began to resist his demands for more money for armaments, he simply increased the stridence of his demands. But in the end, his influence waned as U.S.-Soviet relations warmed and spending for the military leveled off.

Implicitly, Weinberger suggests that the Strategic Defense Initiative was really his idea, growing out of a deeply held view expressed to him by President Reagan that something should be done to protect the United States from a missile attack. The joint chiefs of staff, however, were so cool to his scheme that he was forced to establish an entirely new independent organization separate from the Army, Navy and Air Force to begin work on SDI. Few military officers outside the SDI organization have expressed enthusiasm for the project, but because Weinberger lavished billions on it, the project has assumed a life of its own. Spending for the SDI continues to drain away about $4 billion each year from the budgets of the armed forces.

Reveling in his role as No.1 general in the Pentagon, Weinberger regales the reader with detailed descriptions of strategy and tactics employed in the wars he fought. The reader will learn little that is new, but he cannot fail to be impressed with how easy it is for the secretary of defense to initiate and conduct military operations, particularly under a compliant President.

In spite of his rather bellicose rhetoric, Weinberger promulgated a set of six “tests” that he insists must be passed before committing U.S. troops to combat. They have become known as “The Weinberger Tests” and were met with general approval by senior military officers:

1. Our vital interests must be at stake.

2. The issues involved are so important for the future of the United States and our allies that we are prepared to commit enough forces to win.

3. We have clearly defined political and military objectives, which we must secure.

4. We have sized our forces to achieve our objectives.

5. We have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people.

6. U.S. forces are committed to combat only as a last resort.

Unfortunately, he did not always pass his own tests. For example, he opposed, but not sufficiently by his own admission, the sending of U.S. Marines to Lebanon because they were given no clearly defined political and military objectives. When 241 U.S. Marines were killed in a surprise bombing of their temporary quarters in Lebanon, the secretary successfully avoided assuming any responsibility, even though those Marines were under his operational control.

The decision to invade the little island of Grenada in 1983 ignored his own “tests.” With the invasion variously justified on the grounds that U.S. medical students were in danger and that Soviet influence in the Caribbean was expanding, the American public enthusiastically supported the action.

Weinberger enthusiastically supported and personally coordinated the U.S. Air Force and Navy bombing of Libya in 1986 to teach Kadafi that terrorism does not pay. But here again the U.S. military action could not pass most of the tests Weinberger had established; certainly it could not be argued that it was vital to our nation’s security. While justifying the attack on Libya as a retaliatory action for the alleged Libyan bombing of a German discotheque, he appears to have been unaware that the German government’s report on the incident laid the blame at the door of Syria, not Libya.

Very early on, Weinberger was clearly opposed to the sale of arms to Iran for hostages. Although he was aware of what was happening, he failed, as in the situation in Lebanon, to tell the President of his opposition with sufficient vigor to prevent the actions from taking place. He now reveals that his opposition was so strong that he secretly contemplated resigning in protest, but chose instead to remain silent. He could have, had he chosen to do so, blocked the transfer of the weapons to Iran, as they all were purchased by his department.

Of all his actions, Weinberger seems to take most pride in the actions of the Navy in the Persian Gulf, although he cites little or no evidence of what the effect would have been on the supply of oil from the gulf if the United States had not sent the 40 warships to the area. Once again, his recommended actions did not comport with his own criteria. His “personal choice” for secretary of the navy, James Webb, argued on these grounds against the U.S. Persian Gulf operation and ultimately resigned in protest.

The final chapter of “Fighting for Peace” contains a little geography and history lesson on the Persian Gulf. It emphasizes the responsibility of the United States to protect the vital commerce in the area. Slight attention is paid to the Iraqi attack on the U.S.S. Stark, or the mine damage to the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts, or the shooting down of the Iranian airliner by the U.S.S. Vincennes with a loss of 295 lives. All of these actions occurred during the recent Persian Gulf operations, which were supported by Weinberger.

The biggest weakness in Weinberger’s explication of his actions as secretary of defense is not that there are too few details but that there are too many unimportant ones. The trees are there, but the forest never comes into view.

Weinberger’s book is a journal, a chronicle of events, a rationalization of his actions. That may be all he set out to accomplish. If so, he is successful but not entirely credible.

From “Fighting for Peace”:

The military, and certainly I, felt that (National Security Adviser Robert) McFarlane and a few others, with no responsibility for the safety and well-being of our troops, were always eager to use the military for political or “diplomatic” purposes whenever that fitted their personal agendas.

There was considerable ground for those worries of our military about McFarlane. One of the first of his staff’s ideas was that we should encourage Egypt, by offering it “several” (McFarlane was never sure quite how many) American infantry divisions, to invade Libya. Also, on one of his earlier trips to Lebanon as special Lebanon negotiator, he warned Washington that “Beirut was about to fall,” because he experienced one of the more or less normal shellings on that capital of anarchism. He demanded that we commit more troops and military resources, presumably to “save” Beirut. Since Beirut had long since “fallen” as far as it could go, that McFarlane cable became known among the military as “McFarlane’s ‘sky is falling’ ” cable.