Manila Tells Uncle Sam to Take a Hike--but If He Does? : Philippines: The Aquino government, eyeing ’92 elections, plays to domestic politics. But an early U.S. pullout could be damaging.

All of Manila’s 28 dailies bannered the news that the Philippines had served notice on the United States that the 43-year-old Military Bases Agreement would be terminated on Sept. 16, 1991.

The move surprised most Filipinos, as it did the U.S. panel headed by special negotiator Richard L. Armitage. Even by the usual Philippine interpretation of the bases agreement, the notice of termination was not due until September this year.

The Filipino spokesman for the “exploratory” talks now going on in Manila did not fail to play up the significance of the gesture. “Today, 15 May, 1990,” he declared, “marks a historic moment for all Filipinos. We have taken that first step in terminating an agreement that was executed in 1947 during the days of lingering U.S. colonialism in the Philippines.”

The wording of the announcement was clearly tailored to address the sharpening nationalist sentiments of the domestic audience. Outside the Central Bank building, where the negotiations are being held, anti-bases militants have been holding daily demonstrations.

On the eve of the talks, guerrillas of the New People’s Army gunned down two U.S. servicemen in the vicinity of Clark Air Base. Dissident soldiers affiliated with the clandestine Young Officers Union announced plans to undertake military actions against U.S. forces should the process of American withdrawal from the bases fail to commence this September.

In the Philippine Senate, where a majority expressed unwillingness to ratify a new treaty extending the tenure of the U.S. military facilities, opposition Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile called not only for the termination of the bases agreement but the abrogation, as well, of the Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.

The approaching expiration of the Military Bases Agreement governing the stay of U.S. military facilities in the Philippines coincides with a critical period in this nation’s politics.

General elections are scheduled for mid-1992. In the run-up to that decisive contest, both conservative and radical political forces opposing the Aquino government have been trying to tap the widening nationalist current in an increasingly exasperated electorate.

The public debate over the possibility of extending the stay of U.S. military facilities in the islands has been laced with partisan maneuvering and threatens to polarize opinion deeply. Any indication that the Aquino government is conceding to U.S. demands will be seized upon by opponents and converted into political capital to woo nationalist votes.

In such a situation, Aquino’s administration is not likely to be very attentive when U.S. officials discourse on the “mutuality” of interests in keeping the bases and the role played by these facilities in maintaining regional stability. It is 1992--not the Lombok Strait in Indonesia, site of World War II naval battles, or Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, now being abandoned by the Soviets--that is foremost in the minds of the current Philippine leadership.

Apart from the growing potency of the nationalist vote, Corazon Aquino’s negotiating stance on the bases is conditioned by other factors.

The 1987 constitution, ratified by nearly 80% of the population, specifies the date of termination of the Military Bases Agreement and requires that any further maintenance of foreign troops on Philippine soil be covered by a proper treaty--recognized as such by both parties. Aquino cannot depart from these provisions without incurring great political costs.

Too, the presence of U.S. military facilities in the Philippines is tolerated by a slight majority of Filipinos because of their perceived material benefits to the country. When the terms of the bases agreement were reviewed two years ago, the focus of Filipino public opinion was on the compensation package promised in exchange for hosting the bases.

But the U.S. failure to meet its compensation commitments--Philippine officials estimate a 1989 shortfall of $222 million (the U.S. claims it is $96 million) from a promised $481 million a year in military and economic aid--has dismayed public opinion to an extent that Washington seems to underestimate.

In the course of the “exploratory” talks, Aquino’s negotiators have responded to nuances of the domestic political milieu, rather than to the American arguments.

Last Sunday, Aquino went on nationwide television to affirm her government’s commitment to the constitutional provisions on the bases question--a move intended to calm anxiety, fueled by her critics, that the Philippine government would bend over backwards and mutilate the charter in order to accommodate U.S. demands.

During Monday’s opening session, Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus lectured Armitage and his team on the inequities that have characterized Philippine-American relations--again, a move to appease nationalist public opinion.

Tuesday morning, when the Philippine negotiating team officially informed the U.S. government of Manila’s decision to terminate the bases agreement, the unexpected move broke the momentum of anti-bases agitation sweeping the streets of Manila.

The next day the Filipino side badgered the U.S. team about the shortfalls in the compensation package. That was to appease Filipinos wanting their government to move more decisively in securing what they feel the country justly deserves.

In sum, the Aquino government, consistent with its populist inclinations, has taken the talks as an opportunity to play to the crowd and consolidate its sources of political support--at the expense of the Americans.

Thus far the government has managed to deflect anti-bases agitation, preempt its nationalist critics and prevent the early emergence of an issue that would unite the political forces opposed to it.

But this public-relations blitz also commits the Aquino government to a political trajectory that invites early U.S. military withdrawal and economic dislocation in the communities dependent on base expenditures.

The Legislative-Executive Bases Council, charged with drawing up an economic conversion plan for the areas around the Clark and Subic facilities, is not ready to put enough projects on-stream to contain the adverse effects of an early American pullout.

The dire prospects called up by the current standoff do not seem to impress Filipino strategists. They are, after all, merely prospects. In typical Filipino fashion, the Aquino government seems to have adopted the attitude that future outcomes are future worries.

At the moment, President Aquino’s government is basking in political gains derived from the talks.