From Russia With Love? : Questions about Moscow’s military advisory role in Baghdad

Moscow has joined with most of the rest of the world to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But it seems fair to ask why among the 7,800 Soviet citizens still in Iraq there are about 200 military experts who continue to provide advice and services to dictator Saddam Hussein’s armed forces.

A Soviet spokesman excuses this with the remark that the experts are “fulfilling their contractual obligations.” In other words, it’s business as usual, even if that business means helping an outlaw state violate the rules of international behavior. At the same time, however, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov has ordered all other Soviet agencies to sever ties with Iraq to comply with U.N. resolutions.

Moscow should rethink its notion that contracts associated with arms deals impose greater legal or moral obligations than do unanimous U.N. Security Council resolutions against an aggressor. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has expressed his revulsion at Iraq’s recent behavior, including its holding of foreign hostages in Kuwait and Iraq. Gorbachev has specifically voiced regret that Iraq’s army and air force carried out their aggression primarily using Soviet-supplied weapons and equipment. This principled position is at considerable variance with Moscow’s apparent determination not to interrupt its military advisory role in Baghdad.

The most generous explanation for all this may be that the Soviets don’t want to rile Hussein while a lot of Soviet citizens remain under his control. The evacuation of those citizens is supposed to begin this weekend. After that, perhaps, the Soviets may try to bring their advisers home.

But meanwhile, how much help are all those experts giving to Iraq’s military? It’s not being alarmist to note that at some point, maybe soon, this military could come into conflict with American and other forces sent to the area to repel aggression. U.S.-Soviet relations would surely be set back if fighting came, and “contractual obligations” found Soviet advisers on the wrong side.