Los Angeles Times Interview : Anatoly Sobchak : Turning Leningrad Into a Reform Beacon by the Sea

In late May, the citizens of Leningrad, by an overwhelming majority, elected Anatoly Alexandrovich Sobchak as the new chairman of the Leningrad City Council, the top executive position in the great Russian city once known as the “Venice of the North.” A local paper editorialized that his election marked the first time in living memory when “the opinions of the people and those who speak on their behalf coincide.” Others have seen Sobchak’s victory as the beginning of the end of Communist rule in Leningrad and, coupled with the election of Boris N. Yeltsin as Russia’s president and Gavriil Popov as mayor of Moscow, as a sign that democracy can no longer be denied to the Russian people. Sobchak comes to the mayor’s job with solid promise of being able to deliver on both counts.

Born in the Siberian city of Chita 53 years ago and raised in Uzbekistan, he began his lifelong association with Leningrad as a student, then as a professor of law. The author of 12 scholarly books advocated market reforms in his doctoral dissertation, the cause of its rejection for nine years. Until recently, he had also refused to join the Communist Party.

Sobchak burst onto the national scene as a deputy to the first elected Supreme Soviet, gaining national attention through a series of impassioned speeches calling for market reforms, political pluralism and the rule of law. In so doing, he took on the entire Establishment, including conservatives’ hero Yegor K. Ligachev, Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, the military and the KGB. One of his stinging criticisms of Ryzhkov, accusing the prime minister of failing to implement reform, was castigated by Mikhail S. Gorbachev as “undignified . . . tactless and out of place.”

Sobchak has also criticized striking miners for breaking the law and urged severe punishment for instigators of ethnic rioting. Despite numerous detractors in the Establishment and some in the reform movements who consider him overly ambitious, Sobchak’s popularity has soared. Opinion polls consistently rate him one of the most popular personalities in the Soviet Union.

Since his election, he has presided over the proclamation of Leningrad as a free economic zone, conducted separate economic-cooperation negotiations with the Baltic republics and threatened to outlaw the Communist Party in the city and confiscate its property if it continues to advocate the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” A call for any dictatorship, argues Sobchak, is a “call for violence and the overthrow of the existing system” and will not be tolerated.

This is revolutionary rhetoric. But with Sobchak leading the charge in Leningrad and the like-minded Yeltsin doing the same in the Russian republic, it is a brave new world in Russia and one that offers real change at long last.

Question: As the new mayor of Leningrad and one of the leading reformers in the Soviet Union today, you have become a symbol of the struggle to change the ossified Soviet system from below. What are the main obstacles you are facing in your efforts to bring about political democracy and a market economy?

Answer: Though this may sound odd, the greatest obstacle is not opposition from the Communist Party or the hostile bureaucracy but problems within the democratic forces--their general weakness, their inability to unite behind a common platform and their lack of experience. Perhaps the main problem is the absence of organized democratic parties, which leads to a situation in which every deputy speaks on his own behalf.

This is the case also in Leningrad, despite the fact that we have the most democratic City Council in the country and tremendous support from the population. A recent poll showed that only 2.5% of Leningrad’s population has any confidence left in the Communist Party, which is less than the number of party members in the city.

Q: Leningrad is a center of the defense industry, with perhaps two-thirds of the industrial enterprises engaged in defense-oriented work. How do you propose to bring these factories under municipal control?

A: The laws governing a free economic zone stipulate that all enterprises that were under state control--and that includes defense industries--will be transferred to local control. (Defense) industries are currently experiencing great difficulties because of large cuts in military orders. Many of them must either close down, curtail their production substantially, or start producing goods for the civilian market. . . . We have developed a plan to buy such factories from the state with the help of new investment banks, which we hope would be able to attract foreign capital as well. The objective is not just to buy them, but to help them accomplish the necessary restructuring so they can become profitable businesses.

Q: What sectors of Leningrad’s economy do you see as the most attractive and potentially profitable for a Western investor?

A: Small business, especially in the service sector. But to achieve the privatization of this sector, we would need money . . . our citizens, generally, don’t have the necessary resources. They would need loans to acquire private businesses.

We also have tremendous potential in international tourism. . . . The city has tremendous industrial and scientific resources in shipbuilding, space research and communications as well.

Finally, we would like to refurbish the center of Leningrad, which, though in disrepair, has preserved almost all its magnificent 18th-Century architecture. We would like to count on international assistance in this effort, since we consider our city to be part of the world cultural patrimony.

Q: As you begin refurbishing the city that Peter the Great built, what are the chances that it will revert to its historical name and no longer be known as the city of Lenin?

A: This is not a pressing issue for us. The process of giving Russian cities their old names is well-established. But precipitously changing Leningrad’s may provoke a violent political reaction from people for whom Lenin is still a saint. There is a Russian proverb that is appropriate: “Don’t shake the tree before the apples are ripe enough to fall.”

Q: After staying away from the Communist Party throughout most of your career, when membership would have been a definite career advantage, you joined in 1988, when many already considered it a spent force. Why?

A: I wasn’t interested in party membership because I knew what was going on inside (the party). But after Gorbachev withdrew our troops from Afghanistan, I became convinced that radical change is possible. I also knew that without change inside the party, a radical transformation of our political system would not be possible.

Q: There are many in the West who believe that the economic achievements of perestroika have been negligible. Some blame Gorbachev’s indecisiveness, perhaps caused by his need to maneuver constantly between the conservatives and the radicals. Yet Gorbachev has now accepted Yeltsin’s blueprint for radical economic reform, known as “500 days.” Does this mean that the president has finally cast his lot with the radicals?

A: I think that Gorbachev, as a politician, is a realist and will act as the circumstances demand. He now realizes that the economic plans of Ryzhkov and (Leonid I.) Abalkin are not realistic and have been rejected by the people and life itself.

Q: But why has it taken him so long to realize that?

A: It seems to me that he hoped to change the system with the help of the party, and thus assure its staying in power. This is, of course, an illusion, but he did entertain such hopes.

Q: Wouldn’t Gorbachev’s support for Yeltsin be seen by the conservatives as final proof of his betrayal of socialism and therefore reason to mobilize against the president?

A: Many have believed for a long time that Gorbachev has betrayed socialism, but others still trust him. Gorbachev has been the most important guarantee against a military takeover, though this danger is receding with each passing day. He has also made sure not to alienate important segments of the political spectrum. . . . For instance, the Presidential Council is a representative body on which all the different political opinions are represented and can make their views heard. As an advisory organ, it is not very effective, since Gorbachev is smarter and more knowledgeable than any of his so-called advisers.

Q: Do you believe that the Soviet Union will remain a union and, if so, in what form?

A: I do believe that the Soviet Union will remain an union, but in the form of a confederation. . . . It will be a confederal state, in which treaties and agreements and relations with each of the union republics will be different. For instance, relations between the central government and the Baltic republics may be based on greater independence for the Balts than those with the Central Asian republics.

Q: What if some republics--Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and so on--want to stay in the union. Would this be in the best interests of the Russian Republic, since it probably would have to bear most of the huge economic burden needed to alleviate the terrible conditions in such republics?

A: The Kazakhs make up only 28% of the population in Kazakhstan, the Russians about 60%. . . . (O)ne should not forget the Russian-speaking populations. It is because of this factor that I cannot agree with the notion that it is against Russia’s interests to have these republics remain in the union. Russia cannot build its economy while disregarding the interests of Russians in Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Moldavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and so forth.

At the same time, Yeltsin has developed a very good program for the return of the Russians to Russia, especially to its central region, which have been abandoned and depopulated. When this program succeeds and the problems with the Russian-speaking populations are solved in this way, there will be no difficulties with the secession of these republics, if they so desire.

Q: Last spring, you were sharply critical of Gorbachev’s decision to impose an economic blockade on Lithuania. Presently, you are conducting separate negotiations on economic cooperation with the Baltic states. What kind of relations between the Baltic republics and Leningrad do you envision, especially if the former become completely independent?

A: Regardless of the degree of independence the Balts end up having, we should have the closest economic relations with them. In the very near future we will create a common Baltic market and hope to secure much of our food supplies from the Baltic republics.

Q: Who will participate in this Baltic common market?

A: At first, it will be just Leningrad and the three Baltic republics. But later on, Kaliningrad may join, then the Scandinavian countries, Poland and Germany. Ultimately, we may even be able to recreate the old Hanseatic League of great northern European cities.

Q: Several republics have come up with “sovereignty” declarations that go beyond claims for jurisdiction over economic and political matters. They want republican rights over decision-making on military, even foreign-political matters. If this trend should continue, what prerogatives would be left for the central government? Could it be said that Gorbachev is becoming a king without a kingdom?

A: No. The problem today is that the central government is not pursuing its legitimate functions. Gorbachev is presently busy solving such problems as distribution of goods. He should not be doing that. Instead, Gorbachev should act as an arbiter of conflicts between republics and between the central government and republics. For example, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is very much Gorbachev’s business and he, alone, should be responsible for its solution. . . . As the republics acquire independence, the role of the president will become more important and more powerful.

Q: What if, say, the Ukraine follows up its declaration by not allowing its boys to serve outside the republic, or becoming a nuclear-free zone, or setting up its own embassies, or joining independent organizations? Will the president be able to conduct military or foreign policy effectively?

A: The statements and declarations being made are not well thought out. They stem from a lack of political culture and a lack of understanding that an independent army and independent foreign policy for each republic would actually do damage to the republics, weakening them and the union. That’s why I think that this is a temporary phenomenon, a passing affliction.

In the final analysis, questions related to the defense of the country will be left to the central government. All other questions--economic problems, internal security, and so on--will be left to the jurisdiction of the republics.

What is happening today is that not having independence in areas where they really need it, the republics demand total independence, even though, for many of them, it would be impractical to have it. In Leningrad, we have a City Council and rayon (district) councils. The rayon councils are now demanding that we give them the right to distribute land, buildings and other property. We are not going to do that. We tell them to take care of their real responsibilities--street and sewer repair, housing maintenance, trade and services. The question of land and city property is the proper concern of the City Council alone. Jurisdictional conflicts like this are taking place across the country.

Q: What advice would you give President Bush on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union?

A: Bush’s policy toward the Soviet Union has been correct. . . . If he were to ask my advice, however, I would talk about how American aid and subsidies could best be used to help us. This is important, because I do not think that the Soviet economy can achieve rapid progress without aid from America and other countries, and lack of progress could be very dangerous politically. . . . (T)he key problem is how to manage such aid so that it doesn’t end in the pockets of bureaucrats and only serve to consolidate and strengthen the monopoly of the Communist Party.

Financial assistance must be tightly controlled and given only to specific people in specific institutions for specific projects. We are ready to present such concrete projects and name people and organizations with which Western partners should work together.

In Leningrad, we have identified five areas where we could use foreign capital. One, the program of privatization, which emphasizes the development of private enterprise in trade, the service sector, food industry and so on. Two, demilitarization of our industry and the conversion of defense production to civilian uses. Three, housing, where we would like to emphasize private ownership and the development of a private construction industry. Fourth, in attacking the massive ecological problems threatening our city. Last, our program to renovate the historical center of the city. In all these programs, with the possible exception of the last one, (the return on) Western investment could quickly be very profitable.

Western governmental aid must be coordinated with the efforts of private entrepreneurs. One of the best solutions would be to set up an investment bank, with Western government funds, private capital and funds from the Leningrad City Council. Such a joint bank would allow us to work successfully.