Let Arab Body Politic Try Healing Itself : Gulf: An emerging ‘third way’ would address Iraqi and global concerns, along with older, festering problems that inflame the region.

A salutary outcome of the Helsinki summit is the recession of the military option. This provides a breathing space for the international community to get a better grasp on the overall situation and the reaction to the crisis caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and subsequent developments. This pause should not be construed as a stalemate, but as an opportunity, long overdue, to fashion a settlement that restores the status quo ante and redresses the Iraqi grievances that caused the breakdown of the existing Arab order.

The simultaneous processes to address both issues must be perceived as seeking to reimpose what the international and the Arab communities consider legitimacy in Kuwait while not being oblivious to valid Iraqi claims and concerns. Iraq’s present isolation should not mean its ostracism. This is crucial if we genuinely seek to reverse the collision course while also applying the rule of international law and the objectives of the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

While this “breathing space” is available, it is a worthy opportunity to embolden--and not deride--Arab and other efforts to complement the Security Council resolutions and render their operative parts palatable and achievable.

That is why initiatives such as those undertaken by Jordan, for example, should be correctly evaluated rather than being considered as intrusive.

These Arab efforts are intended to heal a wound inflicted by Iraq on the Arab body politic rather than to amputate an integral part of it. These efforts are intended to persuade Iraq to comply with the international consensus rather than to encourage its defiance. They reflect an authentic popular current running throughout the Arab lands and provide it with a sense of purpose. This popular ferment generated by the gulf crisis must be considered for what it represents rather than be treated as a “gullible and emotional” response of a constituency that is either “ungrateful” or “dangerous.”

This popular wave, which is in a quest for recognition, can play a crucial role by being a credible instrument of reconciliation in the region.

Why? Because it has the making of an Arab “third way.” On the one hand, it is repulsed by the coercive nature of Kuwait’s annexation because it distorts and violates the underlying, albeit dormant, urge for Arab unity. On the other hand, it strongly abhors the flow of foreign, especially American, troops to a vital part of the Arab nation. Never mind President Saddam Hussein’s “historical” claims to Kuwait, and never mind the fact that the injection of U.S. forces is an exercise of the “sovereign prerogatives” of Saudi Arabia. What is at stake for the Arab “third way” is crucial and central for the future of the Arab nation and people.

This popular wave sees in this crisis the opportunity to recover the people’s presence and the potential for active participation in decision-making. The gulf crisis creates the necessary environment for the people to ask questions that were too long shelved, and to scrutinize behavior and policies, which was long considered risky and taboo. The crisis also has opened the gate to a new awareness of a common destiny among the disfranchised and the dispossessed, a reminder that we Arabs are a rich nation and also a poor people.

It is this dynamic Arabism that absorbs Islamic trends into its ranks, not an Arabism sheepishly being overtaken by “Islamic fundamentalism.”

This Arab “third way” is eager to avoid history being made for the Arabs and eager that it be made, to a large measure, by them. For this reason, what is taking place in the gulf--whether the actions by Iraq or the measures against Iraq--is for us all something like an earthquake. Sure, this crisis has jolted us to the core, has divided us, damaged relationships and institutions and brought immeasurable tragedy to many in Kuwait and subsequently to many others, including Palestinians, Lebanese, Egyptians, Jordanians, Asians and the detainees of all nationalities.

But the “third way” also fears that this crisis is an interruption in which Arab national priorities might be submerged and their commitments--Palestinian rights, Lebanon’s unity, recovery of the Golan Heights--shelved if not abandoned. Addressing the explosive gulf crisis obviously takes precedence; but addressing other pertinent issues--such as Palestinian rights, Israel’s withdrawal from Arab occupied territories--is an urgent necessity. The issues might not be linked, but they are definitely interrelated.

To maintain a rational discourse during this period of dangerous volatility, the Arab “third way” must be treated as a catalyst for resolution. In a climate where partisanship is at its peak, the Helsinki summit’s preference for a peaceful settlement gives credence to an Arab catalyst role. This role is bound to be misunderstood at the outset, but it will become appreciated when the need for it is clearer. Whatever the risks, the Arab component in resolving this crisis must become more visible and assertive. For it to become fruitful and persuasive it must project its Arab popular foundation as well as its commitment to legitimacy and the rule of law.

Perhaps it is an Arab’s wishful thinking, but Helsinki gave hope for peace a real chance.