Spare-Parts Shortages, Saudi Restrictions Keep U.S. Army Tanks Parked in Desert : Military: Vital maneuvers are put off. In short supply are such things as batteries for night-vision goggles.

A combination of spare-parts shortages and Saudi-imposed restrictions has forced a key Army division here to keep its heavy tanks parked in the sand and has rendered it unable to conduct vital maneuvers and training, Army officials said Wednesday.

The spare-parts problem, persisting more than a month after the tanks were deployed to the front, has been compounded by logistics breakdowns that have left isolated units short of critical components such as batteries for night-vision goggles, field officers said.

In response to inquiries by The Times, commanders of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division said their logistics are “now catching up” to the combat power in the field. Spare parts are said to be arriving in Saudi Arabia “in enormous quantities.”

But the commanders conceded that it could be several weeks before the essential exercises can begin for the approximately 200 big M-1 tanks that form the anchor of the U.S. defense line in Saudi Arabia.

The problems, which military officials acknowledge are more serious than those experienced by other units in the field, raise questions about the overall readiness of a key element in any offensive or defensive action against Iraq’s much larger tank forces.

The lack of maneuver training has left the 24th Division’s tank commanders without direct experience in coping with severe navigation problems that have caused tanks from other units to become lost in the desert for hours, the officials said.

“They say if war comes, then we can move,” one disgruntled M-1 crew member from the 24th Division said in a recent interview, conducted under camouflage netting that had hidden his tank for nearly a month. But with spare parts still limited, he added, “basically, we’re told to stay still.”

In accounting for the division’s largely stationary deployment, which appears to have left it well behind an adjoining Marine armored force in preparation for possible battle, the Army insists that the 24th Division is “now fully prepared to carry out its assigned combat mission.”

At the same time, the officials insist in a written response to questions submitted by The Times that, despite the lag in delivery of spare parts, the division is capable of conducting “full-scale maneuvers both day and night with all assigned forces.”

The Army attributed the delay in the exercises principally to the need to negotiate with Saudi military and oil-industry representatives to determine where such operations could be conducted. A decision on the issue, which is complicated by the need to maintain good relations with Bedouin populations and to avoid damage to roads and oil pipelines, is expected “within a few weeks,” the Army said.

Military officials left no doubt, however, that maneuver training ranks near the top of the division’s objectives for the current phase of the operation. And they said that the division hopes to soon begin its first live-fire exercises--another priority.

The Army statement was issued by the 18th Airborne Corps, which oversees the 24th Division.

Other U.S. officials, however, noting that Marines won permission several weeks ago to begin exercises inside the 24th Division sector, said that spare-parts shortages clearly have contributed significantly to the training delays.

While regarded as adequate in case of combat, stocks of critical parts have been considered too meager to allow division commanders to risk breakdowns in maneuver exercises that would deplete wartime supplies.

Some units within the division on several occasions have found themselves short of critical supplies that are needed for day-to-day operations, including batteries and spare parts for Bradley fighting vehicles.

A Cable News Network television crew that was permitted to spend two nights with one 24th Division company last week heard repeated complaints about the shortages. One soldier said he was forced to equip his night-vision goggles with batteries sent to him by his wife.

“No parts, no roll,” another armored vehicle crew member told the network.

Military officials who have looked into the problem said it appears to have been caused by bottlenecks in the distribution system within Saudi Arabia itself rather than an overall shortfall.

“It’s not so much a case of the stuff not being available,” one Army official said. “It’s just that all the units might not have it in place.”

Another official said the isolated shortages were compounded by a limited number of Saudi truck drivers. The military relies on those drivers for most of its internal distribution in a system that has left large quantities of material stacking up at port-side compounds.

“We’ve got most of what we need,” this source said. “But we’ve got to get better at pushing it forward.”

The 24th Division is among four Army units designated for rapid deployment in case of conflict. The division had devoted extensive planning to the challenge of moving a mechanized unit long distances at great speed.

But even in the early stages of the operation, the unit found that its first wave of combat equipment would require nearly twice as many transport ships as originally envisioned, a surprise that contributed to delays in the U.S. sea-lift operation.

In response to questions about spare-parts shortages that are affecting the division, the Army noted that most of the unit “deployed 7,000 miles in less than 30 days with thousands of armored and wheeled vehicles.”

Emphasizing that priority was given to bringing “combat power into the theater first,” the Army said spare parts are arriving “in enormous quantities by priority air resupply.”

While more severe than others, the spare-parts problems experienced by the 24th Division have not been unique. Most combat units were deployed with 30 days’ worth of supplies and found stocks running notably short at the end of that period.

Officials of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, still the only unit to conduct extensive live-fire practice, said they have had to carefully conserve ammunition until additional stocks can be delivered.

And a spokesman for the Army’s 101st Air Assault Division said the unit was “really sucking wind” at the end of the 30-day period and had run short of tires, lubricant and other supplies until “two big, beautiful ships arrived and we were back in business.”

The Marines, whose equipment was loaded on pre-positioned ships as long as five years ago in preparation for any contingency, have encountered monumental surpluses of equipment designed for cooler climates but some shortages of hot-weather gear necessary for the desert.

And throughout the theater, chronic shortages of sand-colored paint have forced American soldiers to use mud as simulated desert camouflage for their forest-green vehicles.

In addition to the airborne resupply to some units, at least 50 ships are on their way to the region under a continuing U.S. sustainment effort. Many are laden with ammunition, parts and other goods designed to provide a 90-day stockpile for each unit in the region.