How to Win Without a War : Gulf crisis: Hussein can be persuaded to leave Kuwait, through negotiations that settle Iraq’s grievances and the debt incurred by its invasion.

The gulf crisis poses a dilemma: Shall we back down, or shall we go to war? Either choice is awful. Fortunately, there is a third strategy open to us, for success without war.

Backing down, allowing Iraq to seize Kuwait and profit from its oil, would set a terrible precedent. It would throw into question borders all over the world and invite strong countries to invade their neighbors.

Nor should we agree that in exchange for exiting from part of Kuwait, Iraq can keep the rest. We should continue to insist that Iraq get no more than what it should have been able to obtain through peaceful negotiations, or to which it is entitled under international law.

War could be disastrous. Militarily, we would be fighting a ruthless tyrant who could tolerate 100,000 fatalities better than we could tolerate 10,000. Thousands of civilians might die, the city of Kuwait might become rubble, and Saudi oil facilities would be destroyed. The price of oil might double or triple, sending the world economy into depression.

Economically, costs of the war to America alone could make this year’s deficit, collapsed stock market, bankrupt government programs and debate over taxes look like trivia.

Politically, a war would almost certainly destroy the U.N. consensus on Iraq. At the outset, we could expect emergency sessions, complaints about a “trigger happy” President, and calls--perhaps from France, China, Canada and the General Assembly--for a cease-fire and negotiations. The President’s promising new world order based on U.S.-Soviet cooperation and wide U.N. support would be shattered.

Just how probable is this gloomy future, no one can say. But in the gulf today, even “winning” a war could have terrible consequences.

We can, however, avoid the dilemma between backing down and going to war. We are already well-launched on a better strategy, which has the following elements:

Clarity of purpose: “Iraq shall not benefit from its invasion.” Our critical interest is not the date when the Emir of Kuwait is returned to office--whether after three months or three years--but rather that Iraq not profit from its aggression. And we can accomplish that without war. Every day that Iraq gets no benefit from Kuwaiti oil is a victory for the United Nations.

Sanctions: Retain the oil embargo indefinitely. Since our true interest is to prevent successful aggression, all we have to do to win is to maintain indefinitely the blockade on the sale of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil. To avoid a crisis, we should let food, medicine, and other necessities into Iraq. We should accept Saddam Hussein’s suggestion that Iraqi oil come out onto the market, with the proceeds being put into a special escrow account to be released when the dispute is settled. All of us (except oil profiteers) would be better off with more oil on the market and billions of dollars building up in an escrow account that would provide an ever-increasing incentive for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

Timing: Be patient. To keep our forces in Saudi Arabia fit and our allies supporting us may seem difficult today, but both would be far more difficult during a war. Once expectations are set for a long haul, we can consolidate the multi-national forces, air-condition the bases, pre-position heavy equipment, and start rotation and some reduction in military personnel.

Objectives: Keep them limited. Every time we add a new goal, we make success less likely. There is no chance that Saddam Hussein is going to turn himself in for trial as a war criminal. So far as the sanctions are concerned, we should stick to our original objectives: Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and release of foreign nationals. Other objectives we can pursue later.

Open a door: Give Hussein a way out. We cannot hope for him to withdraw from Kuwait if doing so would make him even worse off. Sanctions will influence Hussein to withdraw only if he is confident that upon withdrawal, sanctions will stop. Withdrawal is not encouraged by statements on our part that sanctions might continue in support of demands for compensation, war-crime trials and his overthrow.

Be specific: Make Iraqi withdrawal look tolerable. We need a Security Council resolution making clear that upon withdrawal from Kuwait and the release of foreign nationals, specific things will happen, such as: a) sanctions stop; b) there will be no military attack against Iraq; c) an Arab mediator will seek an equitable settlement of the oil field and island issues; d) fair procedures will be used to settle all frozen-asset and financial claims; e) military restraints will be negotiated with Iraq, permitting multinational forces to withdraw from the gulf; f) Kuwait will announce its plans for becoming more democratic, and g) the Security Council’s permanent members will turn to the Palestinian question.

Each of these items is in our interest. None would set a bad precedent. The territorial matter, for instance, could be settled on the merits of both parties’ claims, with no advantage accruing to Iraq for either its invasion or its withdrawal.

To demonstrate that sanctions are a U.N. effort, such a resolution is best drafted by one of our allies, such as Canada, France, Egypt or the Soviet Union.