PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOVIET UNION : Growing Demand for Strong Hand : Moscow resonates with rumors of coups. The Soviets face a crisis of survival, amid rampant separatism and secession.

A military coup has been predicted of late in the Soviet Union at regular intervals, first in mid-September, then for Oct. 6, most recently for Nov. 7; even the names of the divisions involved have been mentioned.

Various scenarios have been discussed--that it would first occur in the Far East and then gradually spread to the rest of the union. Some have pointed to the KGB and the MVD, the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, which together have some 1.4 million men under arms (including border guards), serving as the spearhead of a coup. Others have argued that only the army has the political know-how and military clout to engage in a venture of this kind.

The dates have come and gone but a coup has not taken place. Nevertheless, it remains an increasingly likely possibility--not because of the economic situation, bad as it is, but as a result of separatism and secessionism running wild. Separatism is a threat facing many countries, including India and even Canada. But nowhere has the situation gotten out of control to such a degree as in the Soviet Union.

The state of affairs resembles the scenario of “Passport to Pimlico,” a postwar British film. The residents of an inner-London district decide to secede from Britain, establish a restriction-free zone, introduce their own flag, anthem, currency and passports, with their customs officers controlling the underground trains passing Pimlico territory.

“Passport to Pimlico” was a fine comedy; the situation in the Soviet Union is not funny at all. Not only all republics but many smaller regions and districts have staked their claims to full sovereignty, restricting exports of food and consumer goods. One republic, Azerbaijan, bars all traffic to another, Armenia. At a time when the rest of Europe is moving to a single, common currency, every Soviet republic wants to have a currency of its own.

A mass exodus of ethnic Russians from Central Asia has gradually created an Angola-like situation, bringing about a paralysis of the Uzbek and Kazakh economies. Kirghiz have been murdering their Uzbek neighbors and the Uzbeks have killed Meskhetian Turks. The rights of minorities are everywhere in danger, with chauvinist and fascist extremists in Russia--as in other republics--engaging in deliberate acts of provocation. Even in relatively democratic Lithuania, the local government has reintroduced capital punishment and given itself the right to dissolve political parties--at a time when the Soviet government has, however reluctantly, restored this right.

To a large extent this dismal situation is the fault of the central government’s (and its predecessors) not having recognized in time the collapse of its national policy. Government has failed to introduce a new covenant that might have served as a new base of some form of cooperation.

But the present crisis is not about historical responsibility, it is about survival today and tomorrow. A growing number of people have reached the conclusion that the current slide to anarchy must stop, and that dictatorship is preferable to chaos.

There are retarding factors. All republics are deeply split internally, including those like Georgia and Armenia where support for secession is overwhelming. Scores of parties are competing for influence. If Gorbachev should succeed in holding on to whatever power he still wields for a year or two, it is at least conceivable that a more sober mood will prevail in the republics and public support for the extremists, with their unfulfillable and conflicting demands will fade. The current separatist fever cannot last; there is not in the modern world room for all the groups claiming full sovereignty.

Nor does the army command seem in a hurry to take over. The commanders are very unhappy with their diminished status but they also know that a military coup is risky. What if some commander or unit refuse to cooperate? This would mean either civil war or a final breakdown of authority.

Furthermore, the army commanders know full well that they have no answers to Soviet economic problems nor a panacea for national strife. At best they could provide a breathing space to restore public order. Their political instincts are with the platform of the Russian right-wingers, but such a policy would only aggravate tension, further alienate the Ukrainians and bring about, sooner or later, a total collapse of the Soviet Union in the worst possible circumstances.

There is a slightly more hopeful scenario: the emergence of an army- and KGB-supported Committee of National Salvation, a coalition of Gorbachev, Yeltsin and representatives of other leading groups from Moscow and the periphery. It could be too late for this chance. In any case, such a coalition too, would have only a year or two at its disposal to carry out orderly separation as far as some republics are concerned, and to find a new basis for confederation with others who want to maintain some form of contact.

Medieval philosophers endlessly discussed the question of whether or not nature abhors a vacuum. In politics, a vacuum seldom endures for long.

It is also true that the fear of disorder is more strongly felt in some societies than in others. Russians are among those with a pronounced fear of this kind; if there should be a further deterioration in the situation, the demand for a strong hand will be overwhelming. In the absence of a personality in the Napoleonic mold, someone of lesser stature will do.

It would be the ultimate irony if the Soviet government, which for the more than 70 years of its existence has lived in fear of “Bonapartism,” called in the military to assure its political survival. And it would also be the end of Soviet power as we have known it.