Recognize Pyongyang and Break a Dangerous Logjam : Korea: Our interests lie with the South. Its prosperity and stability will be enhanced by U.S. relations with the North.

It is time for the United States to normalize relations with North Korea. U.S. interests in Korea properly remain grounded in support for the economic prosperity, political democratization and national security of our ally in South Korea. But establishment of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang would be a major step forward in securing those goals.

Since South Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s 1988 declaration calling for a new era of cooperation between North and South, the United States has met 13 times with North Korean diplomats in Beijing. Following Roh’s lead, this dialogue has been designed to help bring Pyongyang out of its self-imposed isolation and into peaceful intercourse with the rest of the world.

The discussions have borne limited fruit. Nonetheless, North Korea has made clear that it would like to upgrade the dialogue. The United States has responded that it would be willing to consider improvements, but first it wants progress on some key issues, most important being Pyongyang’s acceptance of full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. Although North Korea’s signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 obliges it to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Pyongyang has refused to do so until the United States withdraws its alleged deployment of nuclear weapons from South Korea and otherwise stops “threatening” the North with nuclear war.

The door to possible improvement in this logjam was opened in recent weeks by a number of factors, not least among them the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul. Compounding the problems arising from Pyongyang’s flawed economic policies--and thus North Korea’s pressing need for outside economic resources--this diplomatic blow has led the North to open a new, high-level dialogue with the South and to call for normalization of relations with Japan.

Without expecting unrealistic changes in North Korea’s political and economic system, we should adopt an approach that meets each side’s principal concerns while protecting its basic interests. Such an approach might include:

* U.S.-North Korean agreement that normalization is fully consistent with eventual Korean unification, and U.S. endorsement of any unification agreement.

* Reiteration of the American commitment to South Korea, and also a pledge that the United States would neither initiate nor support aggression against the North--along with a North Korean non-agression pledge toward South Korea.

* Affirmation of U.S. willingness to withdraw all its forces from Korea when and if the situation between the North and South permits, and agreement that Washington and Seoul will consider what reductions may be possible in the meantime as North/South tensions subside.

* Reference by the United States to a (by then) announced agreement with South Korea that no nuclear weapons will be stationed or stored in South Korea, and to the South’s longstanding agreement with IAEA on full-scope safeguards.

* Reference by North Korea to (by then) announced negotiations with the IAEA for full-scope safeguards, including effective, comprehensive inspection and reiteration of its policy not to develop, manufacture or otherwise obtain or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into North Korea and its pledge not to employ or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

* A U.S. statement that, assuming fulfillment of the North’s non-aggression and non-nuclear pledges, it had no intention to use nuclear weapons in Korea.

* Support by both sides for negotiations between North and South Korea over military exercises and deployments that seem threatening to the other and over further confidence-building measures, with the United States pledging to cooperate with agreements reached.

* Mutual condemnation of international terrorism and commitment to cooperate with counterterrorist efforts.

South Koreans might be nervous about the prospect of improved U.S.-North Korea relations, and some--but by no means all--American defense officials might object to the proposed position on nuclear weapons. But such an approach may hold the best opportunity to deal with the priority issue of a possible North Korean nuclear weapons program while at the same time drawing North Korea into the world community, reaffirming U.S. commitments to South Korea, placing emphasis on progress in north-south relations as the principal requirement for U.S. force reductions, and underscoring that such reductions are a matter to be agreed between Washington and Seoul, not Pyongyang. It would also make clear to Koreans--north and south--that the United States is not opposed to reunification.

It is far from certain that North Korea would accept these positions. But there is nothing to be lost in the effort, and much to be gained in terms of long-term peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. At a minimum, Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang should all be called upon to give some substance to their rhetoric.