Give Congress Horse Races, Not Distracted Lame Ducks : Term limits: The problem is too little competition, not too much longevity.

Many Americans, apparently including President Bush, believe Congress functions poorly. Paradoxically, members of Congress are reelected at astonishingly high rates (96.2% of the House in 1990). A movement has arisen, therefore, that aims to limit constitutionally the number of terms an individual can serve. A majority of the American public, the very people whose votes give members of Congress permanent tenure, support the movement’s goal.

The movement, now supported by the President--he favors a 12-year limit--is unhealthy. Constitutional amendments are often dangerous because their consequences are unpredictable: Even good ones add to the bad habit of treating basic political structures as mere inconveniences to be challenged whenever they give temporary irritation. We should not seriously consider amendments unless they address a deep and evident need that we cannot meet through ordinary political action.

What issue does a limitation on service address? That members of Congress today have been serving too long? Is long service a problem in itself? Length brings experience with all its benefits. It is not obvious that these benefits are simply outweighed by increased possibilities for lethargy and corruption.

What, then, is the real problem? In part, we fear that our congressional representatives are not really being elected at all--not that they are being elected too often. Increasing evidence suggests that the advantages of incumbency are so formidable that we have little choice during elections. The problem is too little competition, not too much longevity, and the potential arrogance resulting from job security that even a civil servant would envy.

How should we increase competition for congressional seats? A number of answers are evident.

-- Campaign finance reform must become reality. Reforms would reduce the effects of narrowly focused and irresponsible political-action committees and increase the influence of parties and local residents. The opportunity to fight elections through a sensible combination of principled debate and local interest would be increased.

-- We should pay more attention to the way the states propose to “redistrict” following this year’s census. Fewer gerrymandered congressional districts might have a salutary effect on congressional competition and honest representation.

-- Congress could substantially reform its franking privilege, a device that peppers constituents with thousands of pieces of propaganda thinly disguised as information. There was much talk of this last year but the franking budget remains too large.

-- Finally, if Congress could discipline itself by following serious rules for debate and legislation, considering all measures and amendments through open discussions and reduce its staff, our legislators would be forced to rely more on their own wit, judgment and principles. This would also allow citizens to see what their representatives are really made of and stand for. The opportunities for choice and competition would increase; so would opportunities for thoughtful legislation.

A term-limitation amendment would do little to increase electoral competition but would have several harmful consequences. One is that the number of lame ducks would increase. Would lame-duck senators or representatives be more attentive or less? More likely to be principled, or more likely to be eccentric? More ready to serve the community from which they come, or more eager to serve the interest by whom they wish to be employed? No one can say with confidence. Why risk an unpredictable change in congressional action to meet a problem that can be dealt with without constitutional change?

More certain is the harmful effect that such an amendment would have on Washington’s power structure. In a government where experience often translates into dominance, most neophyte congressmen would be at the mercy of experienced staff. In fact, congressional staff members would not be the only unelected officials to benefit from this amendment; bureaucrats would also rush in where members of Congress were ill-equipped to tread. The result, in short, would be that almost everyone in Washington with the desire to exercise more power would be better able to do so--except, of course, those elected for that purpose.

Another unwelcome consequence of this amendment would be unnecessary restriction of democratic choice. American political institutions are based on the principle of consent, and consent in large part means choice in the voting booth. Choice, indeed, is often, and properly, “structured” (that is, restricted), as through the Electoral College. This is done to encourage citizens to choose wisely. But how would this amendment make American voters more responsible?

An amendment of this sort also restricts democratic choice in a more subtle way, by making a career of public service less attractive. Men of potential public excellence--the “men of parts” who were predisposed not to enter our public life, as Toqueville observed--might be even less likely to enter if their opportunity for achievement and renown were curtailed. Our goal, after all, is to elect wise men and women.