PERSPECTIVE ON THE PERSIAN GULF : Defang the Future Saddam Husseins : Iraq is a test case for how the world will deal--or not--with post-Cold War nuclear proliferation.

The long-range implications of the gulf crisis include several key factors seldom mentioned in the short-range rhetoric of diplomats and politicians.

Saddam Hussein’s savage rape of Kuwait, the seemingly chicken-hearted response of the Europeans and Japanese, and the emergence of knee-jerk anti-war protests in the United States can all be understood better if we analyze the long-term power shifts taking place, rather than focusing on the daily drama they provide.

First, take the issue of oil. While all eyes focus on the price per barrel today, the gulf crisis could subtly change the long-term geo-economic competition among the United States, Europe and Japan.

Until 1956, the predominant outside powers in the Middle East were Britain and France. When Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, the French and British sought to regain control. The United States blocked their effort and took over as the dominant external influence in the region. But U.S. influence was itself frequently neutralized by that of the Soviet Union. Thus, by the 1970s, OPEC had gained enough strength to disrupt world oil supplies and send prices skyrocketing. This brought billions into the coffers of the Middle East nations and weakened the relative influence of all external powers.

Had Middle Eastern nations not been able to play the superpowers off against one another, militarily and diplomatically, the history of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries might have been very different. The United States would have found more pliant regimes in the region, and oil prices would not have skyrocketed.

Since the ‘70s, the most important change in the region has not been the rise of Saddam Hussein or his aggression, but the collapse of the countervailing Soviet influence in the region. This created a power vacuum into which Hussein adventured.

The gigantic American military force now in the region would not have been possible if the Soviets were still a major factor. Today, they need U.S. aid more than the benefits they might derive from their Middle East commitments.

The Middle East could, as some worst-case scenarios suggest, explode into holy war and pan-Arab nationalist frenzy. But the reverse is more likely. Hussein has splintered the cause of Arab unity. Even the Palestinians, his warmest supporters outside Iraq, seem to be having second thoughts. A more likely scenario is the further spread of Islamic fundamentalism as the spear point of resistance to external influences in the region.

In the meantime, however, American influence is greater than ever. And this could give the United States a long-term edge in its hyper-competition with Europe and Japan, both of whom are far more dependent on Middle East oil than America. In effect, the United States stands with its foot on the hose line that carries energy to its chief competitors.

Thus the major oil issue is not whether petroleum countries or companies get rich right now, but who will dominate oil policy long after Hussein is forgotten and what that will mean in the hypercompetition among the world’s three biggest economic powers.

The second factor in this great global game is financial. Ironically, the United States has turned to others to help finance the costs of this projection of military power. Neither the Europeans nor the Japanese relish the thought of Saddam Hussein directly or indirectly controlling world oil prices. With Kuwait in his pocket, and his military machine aimed directly at Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, he could literally destroy the economies of Europe and Japan. Far better to enhance American influence, which is limited in any case, than to allow oil to be monopolized by an irresponsible thug and assassin with megalomaniac dreams of becoming the new Saladin.

Thus, Europe and Japan must contribute to the American effort diplomatically and financially. But that aid can hardly be expected to be enthusiastic. A few votes in the United Nations. A few soldiers and sailors (except from Japan and Germany, which have legitimate reasons, constitutional or by treaty, for not sending boys to the gulf). And a few billion dollars of support for the U.N.-endorsed effort. (Japan’s trivial $4-billion contribution is about the same as what Sony paid for Columbia Pictures.)

In fact, if looked at myopically in terms of oil politics and regional competition, it makes sense for the Europeans and Japanese to rely on American forces in the gulf, while, at the same time, allowing the United States to bleed financially. For whatever competitive edge the United States might gain through increased influence in the Middle East could be offset if the military effort radically weakened U.S. finances. This would drive the dollar down and thus make oil cheaper for the Japanese and Europeans, since oil bills are paid in dollars.

From a narrow point of view, the smartest Euro-Japanese policy is precisely the policy we have seen over the past few months.

All this brings us, however, to the third--and most important long-term issue. And that is the real reason why Saddam Hussein must be defanged. For the gulf crisis is not just about oil, as American doves insist. It is not just about money, either.

Finally, it is not about Iraq or Hussein as such. It is about all the other Saddam Husseins the world will face in the next few turbulent decades. It is about the seepage of nuclear know-how, chemical and biological weapons, and the computerized missiles needed to deliver them into the hands of irresponsible, if not megalomaniac, leaders.

It is about the possibility that break-away Soviet republics could capture nuclear weapons and use them in fanatic pursuit of “sovereignty.” It is about the possibility of civil war in nu1668048225He is a test-case for how the world will--or will not--deal with proliferation nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the post-Cold War era.

No one knows exactly how soon Hussein will be able to detonate mushroom clouds in neighboring nations, or to send radioactive winds spreading over thousands of miles. But there can be little doubt that this man, who has spit in the face of international rules by using chemical weapons against his own population, who seized hostages and played cat and mouse with them, and who cavalierly accepted hundreds of thousands of casualties in his adventure against Iran, would be more than willing to use weapons of mass destruction.

And this is what makes today’s anti-war protests in the United States and elsewhere both myopic and ironic. Myopic because failure to neutralize Hussein’s nuclear and chemical plants today sharply raises the likelihood of nuclear conflict tomorrow. Ironic because today’s peace-loving anti-war activists, many of whom spent decades protesting U.S. nuclear politics, are shortsightedly increasing the risk of nuclear wars tomorrow.

If Hussein is not denuclearized, and we fail to create new, far more rigorous and enforceable rules to control proliferation, the post-Cold-War world will make the Cold-War era look benign and peaceful by comparison. In the absence of anything better, the United Nations might well sanction unilateral military strikes, by individual nations, to eliminate nuclear or chemical facilities after a warning from the world community.

If peace marchers want a less radioactive world, it is necessary to look beyond today’s crisis to the ugly realities that Hussein merely symbolizes.

And that third, nuclear, dimension of the gulf crisis is why Europe and Japan, as well as the poorest regions of the world, where most of tomorrow’s conflicts will be fought, should not permit Hussein to keep the weapons with which he has threatened to scorch his neighbors. Whatever happens to oil, whatever happens to dollars, is less important, in the long run, than what happens to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the hard-to-control knowledge on which they are based.

That is the chief long-range lesson of the crisis in the gulf.