NEWS ANALYSIS : United Germany Cautious in Wielding Its New Global Clout

As leaders of the 12 European Community nations committed themselves to their historic first steps toward full political, economic and monetary union, one fact was clear: Germany had become a model.

The German Bundesbank, with its degree of freedom from political control and tough anti-inflationary policies, the experience of Germany’s recent monetary union and the country’s loose federal structure all have emerged as important working examples for those shaping the future of Western Europe.

The extent of this influence within the European Community is part of a new, enhanced political role for Germany that extends far beyond the EC.

It is a power that, so far, has been exercised carefully but which has already become a factor in the European power equation.

It stems from a simple reality: In political terms, the whole of a unified Germany is far greater than the sum of its two halves.

Germany’s larger size, its wealth, the general perception in Europe that German democracy is one of the great success stories of the post-World War II era and a new sense of national confidence that has come with unification have all contributed to this enhanced influence.

A national public opinion poll conducted by the Allensbach Institute that asked the question, “Do you believe Germany will once again be among the most powerful nations of the world?” drew a positive response from 19% to 22% of those polled in surveys conducted in the three decades before unity; it jumped to 56% after unification.

More German power accrues from the diminished strength of a declining Soviet Union and a shrinking U.S. military presence in the European region.

Initially, at least, this added power seems likely to be exercised almost exclusively in Europe--both as an important motor in the newly accelerated drive toward West European economic and political union and in reviving and integrating the Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern Europe into the mainstream of continental affairs.

“Germany is in amazingly good shape to handle these tasks,” said Horst Teltschik, outgoing national security adviser to Chancellor Helmut Kohl. “We’re one of the most stable democracies in Europe.”

With the United States still fulfilling the role as Germany’s nuclear protector, political analysts also expect Bonn to use its new power to back the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an alliance left suddenly without an enemy, yet the most important institution linking the United States with the nations of Western Europe.

But interviews with Germans, in and out of government, leave an impression of widespread reluctance to involve Germany outside Europe in anything other than foreign or humanitarian aid programs.

As an example of this attitude, there has been a lack of any attempt to pick up on an unofficial Soviet proposal to give Germany a sixth, permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.

There is also broad domestic resistance to any early change in the German constitution permitting deployment of military forces outside the NATO area--to Persian Gulf operations, for example.

Although a debate on such a constitutional change could come next year, few believe that the necessary two-thirds majority is present in the new German Parliament elected earlier this month.

“I don’t think it is there,” commented Teltschik, who predicted that if there were a change, it would almost certainly not give future German governments a free hand in non-European troop deployments; it would, instead, limit them to small, U.N.-sanctioned peacekeeping forces.

Juergen Chrobog, a German Foreign Ministry spokesman, winced at the idea of anything more, saying: “It would be very uncomfortable, if the first act of unity would be a constitutional amendment permitting the German military to deploy out of the region. We’ve done enough of that this century. We need to be very careful.”

Analysts believe any such German military involvement would likely come with time but only as part of a joint European effort, possibly under the umbrella of the Western European Union, a security and defense institution of nine nations.

More German influence is expected to be felt almost exclusively in Europe in the next few years, a development determined as much by the country’s Central European location as by history.

Germany is expected to work closely with France in accelerating and shaping its integration in Western Europe.

“Because of its strength and geography, Germany raises a lot of concerns on its own,” Teltschik said. “The way to overcome this is to get Paris as a partner. Franco-German relations are pivotal to the destiny of the Continent.”

Germany feels uncomfortably alone in its attempts to help the Soviet Union and newly freed nations of Eastern Europe. It has already provided more than $13 billion in aid to the Soviets this year, was the first to dispatch food aid and the first to discuss the idea of a bilateral treaty to define a new, more positive relationship.

After talks with Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev late last month in Moscow, Teltschik said his main concern is that the Soviet leadership is counting too heavily on German help.

“They are overestimating our resources,” Teltschik said.

In an attempt to drum up broader support for Gorbachev and his reform program, Germany has already become an active voice in the West, pressing the Group of Seven leading, industrial nations, the European Community and other multilateral organizations to provide Soviet aid.

Lothar Ruehl, a German political commentator and former state secretary in Bonn’s Defense Ministry, talks of “a privileged German-Soviet relationship, with Germany in the role of an honest broker for legitimate Soviet interests.”

“Germany must build a political bridge of understanding between Russia and the West and an economic bridge for trade, economic and technical assistance,” Ruehl said. “We have to draw Russia into Europe. That would be a historic change.”

Germany’s strong support for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is linked to this goal.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Germany last month transferred an existing $600-million credit to Poland into a grant and is expected to announce more aid when the two sign a bilateral treaty early next year; both Czechoslovak and Romanian prime ministers visited Bonn last month hoping for major cash transfusions.

These states see few alternative sources of help; all know that no country would be more damaged by regional instability than Germany.

“Many believed the Germans would submerge for three to five years and work exclusively on getting eastern Germany right,” a Bonn-based Western diplomat commented. “But they haven’t done that. They are steaming ahead on all fronts.”

But as Germany’s profile grows, some Germans worry. “The Germans are like the Americans,” Teltschik said. “We want to be loved. We want to overcome our history and be loved. We get frustrated when we are criticized.

“It will take time for us to become a normal country like France or the U.S.,” he added. “Most Germans are afraid to take responsibility, so the danger of misunderstandings between us and our partners is great.”