Regional Outlook : Will It Be War or Peace in the Mideast? Each Option Offers Hazards : It is easy to envision how a war might begin. The outcome is impossible to predict.

Sometime in the next month, the Middle East may go up in flames.

It will not be a war brought on by mistake or miscalculation. The conflagration will be the utterly predictable result of a series of deliberate and irrevocable steps over the last six months by President Bush and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

It is relatively easy to envision how the war will begin. U.S. military commanders have been remarkably open in discussing the weaponry they have at their disposal and how it would be employed.

What is impossible to predict, in this conflict as in every other, is when and how it will end.

For one thing, the Iraqis aren’t being nearly so forthcoming about how they would expect to fight a war. Western and other experts, basing their estimates in part on Baghdad’s eight-year conflict with Iran, have made some educated guesses. But they are just that--guesses.

What is clear is that the death-dealing potential involved in any clash would be awesome.

Command Structure Targeted

Unless some diplomatic surprise intervenes, one night this month or early next, hundreds of U.S. warplanes will roar into the sky from a score of air bases and six aircraft carriers stationed around the Persian Gulf with the mission of destroying Iraq’s air defense network and its command structure.

Every relevant weapon in the American aerial arsenal will come into play: F-117 “Stealth” fighters will fly in fast and low to drop laser-guided bombs on command bunkers and missile control sites; F-4G “Wild Weasels,” working in tandem with F-16 and F-15 fighters, will attack antiaircraft batteries with HARM radar-seeking missiles; FB-111 and F-15E fighter-bombers will attempt to take out air defense installations and sever links between central command facilities and field commanders; EF-111, EA-7B, RF-4C and RC-135 electronic warfare and reconnaissance craft will saturate the battle area with radar and radio emissions to jam Iraqi communications and fix the locations of all radar-emitting enemy weapons.

Cruise missiles launched from aircraft carriers and cruisers in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Red Sea will home in on pre-selected, heavily defended targets from the front lines along the Kuwait-Saudi border to the presidential palace in Baghdad. Overhead, the battle will be directed by AWACS command-and- control planes, which will monitor the battle and relay orders from the allies’ central headquarters in Riyadh.

Thousands of tons of ordnance will be dropped in the most intensive aerial bombardment ever conducted. Electronic warfare technology will be employed on a scale never before attempted.

And when the first wave of attacks is completed, a second wave will begin. And a third. And a fourth. And a fifth.

“When we launch it, we will launch it violently. We will launch it in a way that will make it decisive so that we can get it over as quickly as possible and there’s no question who won when it’s over,” Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during a visit to Saudi Arabia late last month.

“We’re going to go deep (behind Iraqi lines) using aerial assets and challenge them in ways seen and unseen he’s (Hussein) never dreamed of,” Powell said.

Missiles and Guns

Iraq has taken steps to protect its military and industrial installations, sometimes with missiles but also with antiaircraft guns. Some of the emplacements are visible in Baghdad itself. Two antiaircraft batteries are perched atop the ceremonial Babylonian-style arch at the entrance to Hussein’s palace grounds. Others are balanced atop mounds of dirt standing out along the city’s skylines. And there are signs that Hussein may try to move critical military and government functions out of Baghdad in anticipation of an allied attack, hoping to prevent a breakdown of day-to-day operations.

Still, diplomats in the Iraqi capital do not seem to doubt the ability of the combined allied air forces to eventually knock out the country’s air defenses. That, say U.S. military men, is when the bombardment will begin in earnest.

Hundreds of land- and sea-based bombers flying thousands of sorties a day will pound the 500,000-man Iraqi army in Kuwait and southern Iraq, attempting to level the elaborate defensive fortifications and isolate units from their commanders and their supply lines. Formations of B-52s will fly high overhead, dropping thousands of 2,000-pound bombs in an effort not just to flatten the Iraqi bunkers, but to terrorize and demoralize the lightly armed soldiers.

Iraq’s armaments factories, weapons depots, missile assembly plants and railroad yards will be smashed. Airport runways will be cratered and littered with cluster bombs that will kill repair crews and further damage the tarmac. Highways, pipelines, dams, power plants, refineries and laboratories will be targeted.

The bombing will continue around the clock for days. And that’s just Phase One.

The Rain of Horror

The Iraqi army has never before been subjected to such punishment. The Iranians had virtually no air force after the first year of their eight-year war against Hussein. Their artillery was seldom massed to bring concentrated firepower to bear on Iraqi positions.

How will the Iraqi soldiers and the Iraqi leadership react to this unceasing rain of horror?

“We know what it takes militarily to destroy targets, but there’s no way to calculate the point at which these forces will break politically,” says Anthony H. Cordesman, a former intelligence officer now on the staff of Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.). “The only way to know how dedicated they will be to their leadership is to fight.

“I don’t think this war will be decided by attrition, the capture or destruction of Iraqi forces,” Cordesman says. “It will be decided by how long and which troops will fight for Saddam Hussein.”

U.S. officials and Israeli strategists alike say Iraq, faced with an overwhelming disadvantage in air power, might try to change the parameters of the conflict.

One way would be to bring Israel into the war by launching a missile toward Tel Aviv, the country’s largest city which has a far smaller Arab population than Jerusalem, as Hussein has threatened to do in the first hours of the war. Object: To fracture the multinational force arrayed against him, calculating that the Syrians and other Arabs now allied with the United States would drop out or even switch sides rather than fight in tandem with the Israelis.

Hussein could also introduce chemical or even biological weapons into the battle, which would have limited military effect but which Hussein might believe would frighten American soldiers into disorganized flight.

“In the first 24 hours,” comments an Israeli strategist, “the Iraqis will do as much damage as they can--gas-fueled bombs, a big missile shoot against Saudi air bases and oil installations, hitting allied ships in the gulf.” The idea, he adds, would be to surprise and dismay the allies with quick and unexpected major losses.

The Iraqi leader could also unleash a wave of terrorism against allied targets in Europe, the United States or behind U.S. lines in the Middle East. He could turn again to the thousands of Kuwaitis and foreigners living in occupied Kuwait, using them as human shields against further U.S. attacks.

Or Hussein could say, “enough” and agree to withdraw all--or at least most of--his troops from Kuwait.

“Saddam Hussein historically has backed down in the 59th minute of the 11th hour, but he may not this time,” says Cordesman, who has written extensively about the Iran-Iraq War. “If he tries to be a bit too clever--say, a partial withdrawal--there will still be a major war. And at the end, there will still be an Iraq, but it won’t be anything like the Iraq there is today.”

Expanding the Battle

Unless Hussein capitulates, U.S. commanders plan to expand the battle to another dimension--close-in attacks against his ground formations and his defenses in and around Kuwait city.

That would involve the use of the hundreds of combat helicopters assembled in the region, low-flying A-10 “tank-killer” jets, bombardment from naval guns and continuous strikes from artillery and multiple rocket launchers. While the main Iraqi force would be pinned down by concentrated fire, a large mechanized U.S. force would likely attempt a flanking maneuver around the western edge of Iraq’s forces in an effort to encircle and cut off the main force from its supply lines and reinforcements.

Then comes the hard part.

“Air power is going to be overwhelming, and we expect it will have a devastating effect,” Powell told his old unit, the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, during a visit to Saudi Arabia last month. “But in the final analysis, as has been the case in every war, you’ve finally got to send an infantryman in there to take it over and raise the flag of victory.”

Current plans call for punching through the fortified Iraqi lines at weak points, using a range of weapons and engineering techniques. Bulldozers and tanks towing exploding “line charges” would be employed to clear minefields. Mobile bridges would span the deep trenches that the Iraqis have dug along the border. Continued B-52 strikes would attempt to clear minefields and to create gaps in the Iraqi defenses.

The full panoply of U.S. advantages over the Iraqi army would be brought to bear--electronic and satellite intelligence, night-fighting technology, helicopter-borne assaults, rockets, communications, maneuver and battlefield initiative.

For their part, the Iraqis are deployed in the same kind of static defense positions that they used during their relatively low-tech war with Iran.

A recent traveler from Kuwait in Baghdad described waiting on a street corner for a taxi and noticing a large, sandy mound behind him. At first he thought it was just rubble. Then he noticed a couple of slits. And finally a helmeted Iraqi soldier popped his head above the sand.

“I discovered there was a tank behind (the mound),” the traveler recalled. “It was well-hidden. You could barely see the top of the turret. Really dug in.”

Dug in is the phrase used most to describe Iraqi preparations to repulse any allied attack to free Kuwait. Observers describe fortifications large and small dotting Kuwait city and stretching westward beyond the Kuwaiti border along Iraq’s boundary with Saudi Arabia--trenches, mines, artillery and tanks. There are even reports of plans to fill trenches with burning oil to halt the enemy’s approach.

“Some of this might be fanciful,” says a Western diplomat in Baghdad. “Blood and fire are poetic notions in the Arab world.”

Fanciful or not, however, Iraq has poured a huge amount of manpower into the so-called “Kuwait Theater of Operations”--about 530,000 men, or half its total military force, are said to be in or on the way to positions in and around Kuwait.

“It’s a primitive kind of warfare. They imagine the Americans will come straight in like the Iranians,” says the Western diplomat. “You throw in as many people as there’s room for, put up lots of firepower and make it hard for tanks to charge.”

Some military analysts have compared it to a clash between World War I and World War III, presuming that the high-technology gear of the U.S. military of the 1990s must surely prevail.

“I will do everying in my power to apply maximum power in minimum time to make it the highest op (operating) tempo battle ever recorded,” says Lt. Gen. John J. Yeosock, commander of U.S. Army forces in the gulf. “It will be, compared to other operations, a very violent, fast battle.”

Adds Powell: “If we go in, we go in to win, not fool around.”

A Subjective Victory

But then, defining victory may be subjective, at best.

“If the Iraqi troops can survive (the first few days of a war), even with great losses, and do damage to Saudi oil fields and the U.S. military, they can claim political victory,” says Joseph Alpher, deputy head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Hussein could then call for a cease-fire with his power intact, having enhanced his reputation in the Arab world for having stood toe to toe with a superpower, in this scenario. Meanwhile, Iraqi officials in Baghdad say that high casualties would erode support in the United States for the war.

Diplomats in the Iraqi capital raise another question: Would the “victorious” Americans help rebuild Iraq after a war? “If food is needed, who will repair the airfields so that transport planes can land, and who will secure them?” asks a European envoy. “Are we talking about occupation after the war, or what?”

Unpredictable Enterprise

War is, indeed, an unpredictable enterprise, conceded Powell. It’s not inconceivable that a gulf conflict could last six months or longer, he said, adding: “War is a nasty business. People get killed in war.”

U.S. officials expect that a war would last about a month--10 days to two weeks of intensive bombing, a multi-pronged ground and amphibious assault and a mopping-up operation. Outside experts estimate total U.S. casualties at between 10,000 and 20,000, with about 1,500 to 3,000 killed. Casualties on the Iraqi side would be many times higher, analysts say.

The entire scenario is chilling, but the risk that neither side will find it in its interest to yield grows greater every day.

“We’re getting down to the point,” Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said after his recent trip to the gulf, “where we’re going to get this matter resolved one way or the other.”

Times staff writers William Tuohy, on assignment in Jerusalem, and Daniel Williams, on assignment in Baghdad, contributed to this story.

IF THE BALLOON GOES UP IN THE GULF REGIONAL STRATEGY * B-52 bombers based on Diego Garcia are to destroy roads, dams, factories; soften up frontline Iraqi troops with saturation bombing raids on their fortifications. * Some believe Saddam Hussein would order a chemical attack on Israel to draw it into the war and possible divide the multinational alliance against him. * More than 200 allied ships, including six U.S. aircraft carriers, are ready to pound Iraqi targets. POSSIBLE TARGETS Initial targets for U.S. and allied warplanes include Iraqi command and communications centers, antiaircraft and missile sites, air bases, chemical weapons factories, and supply lines to Iraqi troops in Kuwait. DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES A multi-pronged allied ground assault is likely if several days of bombing fails to force Hussein’s troops out of Kuwait. A possible battle plan, based in part on a Brookings Institution study for the Defense Department: * An amphibious assault by Marines now aboard U.S. warships in the gulf could assist in the battle to take Kuwait city. * Allied Arab and French forces, backed by a U.S. armored division in reserve, attack the center of the Iraqi line to keep it pinned down. * A main attack by units of the U.S. 3rd Army Corps, land-based Marines now in northeast Saudi Arabia, British and allied Arab troops driving north near the Persian Gulf shore toward Kuwait city and beyond. * Units of the U.S. 7th Army Corps and allied Arab forces attack around the Iraqis’ western flank, supporting the main thrust and attempting to cut off Hussein’s men in Kuwait. * Paratroopers from the 82nd “All American” Airborne and 101st “Screaming Eagles” Airborne (Assault) Divs., as well as other elements of the U.S. 18th Airborne Corps, could drop behind Iraqi lines in Kuwait. THE CASE FOR WAR * To allow Iraq’s sacking of Kuwait to go unpunished would invite further aggression by Saddam Hussein in the Middle East. * It is the only possible way to strip an unpredictable dictator of his chemical and, perhaps, nuclear weapons. * If the United States fails to come to the aid of Kuwait, it will deal a possibly fatal blow to its credibility not only with its Arab allies but allies around the globe as well. * Hussein’s dangerous hand must be moved as far away as possible from the Persian Gulf oil tap so crucial to the industrial world’s economy. THE CASE AGAINST WAR * Despite what appear to be overwhelming technical advantages over the Iraqi military, the U.S.-led multinational force could pay a high price in both men and materiel to drive Hussein out of Kuwait. * Hussein might attack Israel, dividing the multinational force and engulfing the entire region in a war whose political and economic aftermath is uncertain. * Fighting might inflict severe damage on Persian Gulf oil fields, refineries, shipping facilities--and, as a result, the industrialized world’s economy. * With the uncertainty of the Iraqi political situation, someone even worse might replace a deposed Hussein.

ON DANGEROUS GROUND IN KUWAIT U.S. strategists say American forces would try to soften up and dislodge entrenched Iraqi forces on the heavily mined frontier with Saudi Arabia with massive air and sea bombardment and sorties by armored and airborne forces. Behind the minefields and anti-tank fortifications, attacking U.S. forces would encounter perhaps tens of thousands of Iraqi troops massed in classic “pitchfork” formation, a tactic they used successfully in the Iran-Iraq War, backed by tanks and artillery. MINES * Purchased in mass quantities from Soviet Union, France and China. * Anti-tank mines, pressure mines, activated by weight of tank. * Anti-personnel mines, smaller, more sensitive and often activated by trip wires. * Minefield is several hundred yards deep. * During the Iran-Iraq War children were sent into the minefields to set them off and to clear routes for the Iranian troops. Shifting desert sand poses a problem for Iraqi forces in the minefield. When the sand covers the mines too deeply, the mines are often inoperable and will not be as sensitive to the weight of a tank or soldier. ANTI-TANK DITCH BARRIERS * 12 feet deep and 8 to 9 feet wide. * Filled with “dragon tooth” barriers, metal spikes, burned out vehicles and concrete blocks. * 55-gallon drums of napalm that can be detonated by remote control. IRAQI FORCES * 3,000-man infantry brigades in “pitchfork” formations. * 800 to 900-man reserve battalion in each group. Road for armor and mechanized vehicles and self-propelled guns to swiftly travel to battle areas. Behind the lines, hundreds of artillery pieces, including four-gun low-level antiaircraft cannons and rocket launchers as well as tanks and other armored vehicles are firmly dug in to repel any land advances by U.S.-led multinational forces. Troops are dug into deep trenches that are reinforced with concrete-coated steel mesh, wire or reeds.

SOME FACTORS IN PICKING A TIME FOR WAR If either side in the gulf stalemate decides to attack, several factors will go into the decision. For instance, a moonless night and a high tide would be favorable elements for an amphibious landing. However, religious holidays such as the Muslim holy months of Rajab or Ramadan might delay action by either side. But Muslim scholars also consider the 10th day of Ramadan to be a favorable day for attack as Mohammed, the prophet, emerged victorious from battle on that day. Jan. 15: U.N. deadline Jan. 17: Rajab begins End of Jan.: U.S. troop buildup expected to finish in January. Feb. 2: Six months since Iraq invaded Kuwait. Feb. 14: Rajab ends. March: Severe sandstorms begin Mar. 15: Ramadan begins. Mar. 24: Tenth of Ramadan. End of March: Weather begins getting hotter. (Jan-Mar Calendar shows high tides, full moons, moonless nights, Muslim days of prayer, and holidays when for religious reasons, one side or the other may be reluctant to attack.)