PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOVIET UNION : Moscow Falls Back on the Big Lie : The brutal crackdown in Vilnius demands a Western response--but we must consider the miscues that led to this.

The sight of Soviet troops firing on unarmed Lithuanians in Vilnius this week sickened and disheartened anyone who had invested hope in the reforms launched in 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev.

Even more outrageous than the shooting was the resort to the Big Lie by the thugs who perpetrated these crimes: the claim by a “Salvation Front” that the people were demanding the removal of their elected leaders; and the claim by the new interior minister, Boris Pugo, that defenseless Lithuanians provoked the gunfire that killed 13 of them. Had the Kremlin simply announced that it could tolerate no more separatist rebellion and would resort to violence to suppress it, its actions would have felt less like a betrayal, less like a return to Stalinism.

The crackdown in Vilnius demands a Western response. But in formulating that response, it is important to keep in mind the miscalculations that led to the current situation and to devise a response that does not compound those errors.

The first miscalculation was Gorbachev’s. He did not understand that glasnost would lead quickly to dissemination of the truth about how the Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union and the truth of their people’s desire to be free of it. He believed he could have democratization without losing elections to nationalist movements that gave expression to that desire to be free. Obviously, he was wrong.

The Lithuanian leaders also miscalculated. They based their strategy on a precipitous declaration of independence, which they assumed the West would support and force Moscow to accept. They spurned more moderate means--such as holding the plebiscite required by Moscow’s secession law--that could have provided Gorbachev with the political cover he needed for a deal.

The first priority for the Bush Administration is not to add to this history of miscalculation with hasty action. Rash American decisions could lead to Soviet reactions that would damage American interests far more than the events in Vilnius have already done. The Soviets could cut off the flow of Jewish emigration. They could pull back from arms-control deals that are now on the brink of consummation.

While it is unlikely they would immediately reverse their policy and begin siding with Iraq, they could, after the war, revert to their old habits of giving aid and comfort to Arab intransigents, immeasurably complicating the task of building a more stable Middle East.

The United States needs to take the time to answer some fundamental questions raised by events in Lithuania. Did Gorbachev order the violence in Vilnius, or did the army and its allies in the Communist Party take matters into their own hands? Is the reactionary trend in Moscow politics permanent? How much of the Gorbachev reforms do the reactionaries intend to roll back? Can the republic leaders or the progressive forces in the Supreme Soviet do anything about it? The answers to some of those questions will emerge only as events unfold in the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, there is an appropriate forum in which to bring the Soviets to account for their actions: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A CSCE meeting on the peaceful settlement of disputes convenes in Malta today. Member states can raise human-rights concerns that the Soviets are legally bound to answer, and they can demand the right to immediate inspection of unusual Soviet military actions.

In every CSCE forum, the message to Moscow should be that violence of the sort perpetrated in Vilnius has no place in the new Europe that Gorbachev helped create.

In the meantime, it’s important to keep in mind that the repression of Lithuania is not yet irreversible. The United States can still use whatever influence it can muster to try to mediate a peaceful compromise. It would involve a commitment by Moscow that Lithuania’s elected government not be overthrown or suspended, and agreement by the Lithuanians to submit to Moscow’s authority at least to the extent of holding a referendum on independence.

If, in the end, the CSCE process and U.S. mediation are unavailing, there will be time enough for sanctions. And the United States would have laid the right foundation--a multilateral foundation. The United States is by no means Moscow’s biggest trading partner. Trade sanctions will not really bite the Soviets unless Germany, Japan and a host of smaller countries go along with them.

Until recently the Bush Administration, like its predecessor, rightly took a slow, cautious approach in response to the reforms and peace initiatives offered by Gorbachev. The same prudence and caution would serve it well in the more difficult period immediately ahead.