PERSPECTIVE ON EL SALVADOR : An Old War Ripe for Resolution : The rebels’ use of high-tech weapons neutralizes the army’s advantage. And the U.N. mediator is primed.

Ten years ago this month, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front launched its “final offensive” against the Salvadoran regime it had decided to overthrow by force of arms. The offensive failed, but it marked the transformation of an essentially political conflict in a terribly violent nation into an actual war with international and regional ramifications. Today, the war is still going on; what’s more, it may be intensifying.

Not that negotiations are moving nowhere. On the contrary, United Nations mediator Alvaro de Soto seems to have taken them further than ever, pinning down key issues and proposing his own “honest-broker” solutions. The progress achieved during the most recent talks between the government and the FMLN, held in a hotel in Mexico City after New Year’s, was encouraging, particularly with regard to the two commissions provided for in De Soto’s proposal for “cleansing” the armed forces. Both parties tended to agree on letting the U.N. secretary general appoint the commission members, with each side reserving the right to veto names that were unacceptable.

Significant as that was, an equally significant escalation of the war also was under way. On the rebel side, it has to do with their use of new arms; on the government (and U.S.-backed) side, it involves what could be called passive escalation. Despite some movement, the Bush Administration remains reluctant to pressure the Salvadoran high command sufficiently to accept a deal on the touchiest issue on the agenda--the so-called “cleansing” of the army--thus encouraging it to hold out and intensify its military activities. Similarly, the Administration’s use of the death of three Americans in a helicopter shot down by the FMLN--two of whom probably were executed--shows scant disposition to promote a political solution. The State Department almost seemed to be waiting for an incident of this sort to unlock $42 million in additional aid that had been tied up by the Congress.

Complicating matters is the situation next door in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas’ electoral defeat last year created many paradoxes. The Nicaraguan army’s Sandinista high command does not seem to have encouraged, or even countenanced, arms deliveries to the Salvadoran insurgents. But sentiment in the ranks is less certain. There is a trade-off: They no longer feel the obligation to respect the hierarchy if the hierarchy no longer supports the Salvadoran guerrillas. It is not surprising then to discover their free-lance dealing (not purely based on bribes and purchases; ideological solidarity goes further than many like to believe) for different types of weapons available in Nicaragua. Among these have been surface-to-air missiles and, almost as important, a newer version of .762-caliber machine guns with far greater range and accuracy, particularly well-suited to shooting down low, slow-flying planes or helicopters.

The FMLN’s acquisition of these weapons has changed the military balance of power. The armed forces’ chief superiority was in the air; the FMLN could not concentrate troops, or take advantage of its greater mobility on the ground, or even mobilize its supporters in the cities, because of the risk and fear of attack from the air. The new weaponry has partially neutralized that advantage: The air force will face the uncustomary and demoralizing risk of being hit with missiles at high altitude, or be forced to fly lower and risk being hit from the ground.

The new equation confirms what many observers have known for some time: The war in El Salvador cannot be won militarily; it must be negotiated. The problem is, this abstract statement of fact has serious concrete implications that have proven difficult to swallow. The most important one has to do with the fate of the two contending armies. Alvaro de Soto’s original proposal was truly path-breaking: “The parties recognize that the ideal of a lasting and stable peace implies progressive and complete demilitarization, the final objective of which is the abolition of the armies that the parties hereby commit themselves to achieve.” This formulation was accepted by the FMLN and rejected by the army. In recent rounds of talks, a different draft was put forth, consisting of the commitment to discuss the issue of the armies’ elimination at a later stage. This is less acceptable to the FMLN, which would like to commit the United States and the Salvadoran government to the principle of abolishing both armies from the outset, even if the how and when are discussed later. Conceivably, this could be put to the Salvadoran people in a referendum.

The war in El Salvador is going to have to end with painful concessions by both sides. On each side, there are sectors in favor of these concessions and parties opposed to them. Within the FMLN, there is a lingering unwillingness to take full advantage of the mediator’s role and accept without reservations proposals that are truly favorable, like the De Soto text on the armed forces. On the government and United States side, there is an evident reluctance to push the army into the type of concessions it will have to make, no matter the consequences on the morale of the high command and on those sectors of the officer corps linked to the right-wing Arena party. But something has to give, and the more responsible parties on each side--the State Department and President Alfredo Cristiani on the one hand, the less militaristic sectors of the FMLN on the other--should begin to force issues. This war has dragged on too long.