Scripts Show How Israel Can Smash Scuds : Strategy: Restraint has been tested in recent days with escalating rhetoric by Saddam Hussein.

Israeli commandos guided by a Bedouin tracker skulk across the western Iraqi desert in search of camouflaged bunkers hiding Scud missile launchers. They approach a launcher from a safe distance and silently plant a homing device that will direct jet bombing strikes on the position and eliminate a threat to distant Tel Aviv from the erratic rockets.

Their work accomplished, the commandos hike out of the desert to Turkey for the stealthy return home as the planes strike the Scuds.

Seemingly the stuff of GI Joe comics, this is one of the scripts designed by Israeli military experts to show how Israel’s armed forces might put an end to the Scuds more efficiently than can the U.S.-led allies operating out of Saudi Arabia.

Israel’s government maintains that it will refrain from hitting Iraq as long as it is convinced that the allies are working against the Scuds and if the damage to Israel remains tolerably light.

But that attitude has been tested in recent days by escalating rhetoric from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who threatened to unload not only explosive warheads on Israel but also chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. It is increasingly difficult for Israelis to accept Hussein’s threat as mere bluster, despite assurances that at least the biological and nuclear threat is a mirage.

Officials and common citizens alike note that Hussein has generally carried through on his threats:

He said he would blow up oil wells in Kuwait, and he has. He said his troops would eventually come out of their foxholes and fight, and some of them have. And he said he would rocket Tel Aviv. He did, aiming missiles at Israel’s coastal cities on eight separate occasions, causing two deaths and damaging about 1,000 housing units, according to the latest government figures. (Two deaths previously attributed to rocket attacks were linked instead to suffocation and heart failure due to improper use of gas masks.) The latest attack, on Thursday, fell short of the cities, landing harmlessly in the occupied West Bank.

Earlier this week, Defense Minister Moshe Arens said Israel had practiced means of destroying the missiles.

“There are plans,” he added, while his government pressed the United States for approval to strike.

There is a groundswell of military opinion that Israel should go after the Scud missiles, Israeli officials say. Confidence that Israel can succeed stems from its experience in Middle East battle, and the desire to enter the fight derives in part from Israel’s tradition of independent action, and its discomfort at dependence on the United States.

“We know the conditions in the area and we could focus on it, not because we have better equipment, but because it is in fact a local problem,” said Menachem Meron, a retired general and former senior official in the Defense Ministry.

And Mordechai Gur, a former army chief of staff and now a member of Parliament, said: “This is our area. We live here. We have prepared ourselves against some threats from Iraq.”

All the plans floated publicly and in private have serious problems. Israel is not fighting an enemy on its border and would have to cross hostile territory and long distances to engage the Iraqis.

American reluctance to involve Israel is also a hindrance; almost any plan would need U.S. approval, if not open cooperation.

In any case, Israeli suggestions for taking out the missiles fall mainly into three categories. The United States and its allies could put any of them into operation if they were willing to devote resources to the job. Otherwise, Israel claims it has the resources to do it--if the United States is willing to cooperate.

The solutions are sometimes referred to by names that allude to their superficial resemblance to trademark Israeli solutions in past crises: south Lebanon, Entebbe and Suez.

The “south Lebanon” solution refers to the unilateral raids that Israel undertakes against guerrilla bases in Lebanon when Israel’s north border is under attack. Applied to Iraq, it simply means that Israel would dedicate its powerful air force full time against the missile launchers.

The advantage of Israeli action is the country’s clear willingness to focus solely on the Scuds. The anti-Iraq alliance is dividing its attention among various targets.

“It’s a simple case of applying resources correctly,” said Dore Gold, a researcher at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. “Our interest is the Scuds. The allies have a lot of other interests. We want to work fast. They are methodical.”

Israel possesses scores of attack jets, penetration bombs to break up reinforced bunkers and television- and laser-guided bombs for accuracy. Its pilots are considered among the most battle ready in the world. There are estimated to be as many as 15 missile launchers in the Iraqi regions called H-2 and H-3, named after points on an old oil pipeline that runs to the Israeli port of Haifa.

A main drawback to this plan is that the the most direct air route to Iraq, and therefore militarily the most preferable, crosses Syrian or Jordanian airspace. Jordan’s King Hussein has told U.S. officials that he would try to shoot down any foreign warplanes crossing his territory. Washington wants to avoid the wider war that action would imply.

Although Syria currently supports the American-led coalition, its government has said it would join Iraq in a war against Israel.

Israeli planes could conceivably circumvent Jordan by flying south to the Red Sea and then over Saudi Arabia, but this uses up fuel and could eliminate the element of surprise. The United States would also have to provide codes to let its own pilots know that the Israeli craft are friendly. So far, Washington has been reluctant to provide the information.

“Entebbe” refers to the now legendary rescue in Uganda of Israeli hostages taken captive by Palestinian terrorists in 1976. Applied to Iraq, it is a catchall label for a daring undercover raid.

The most commonly heard proposal is for trackers to sneak into Iraq and pinpoint targets electronically. Israel is adept at sending commando units into hostile territory, although its most recent reported actions have been in assaults against specific persons: the 1989 kidnaping of a Muslim leader in south Lebanon and the 1987 assassination of a Palestinian leader in Tunisia.

Getting the commandos into Iraq presents a problem. Neither Jordan nor Syria will cooperate. Turkey is a possibility since it is the only Muslim nation besides Egypt to have full relations with Israel.

The mission would theoretically overcome a main problem in destroying the Scuds: locating the hiding places where they are stored and fueled before being launched against Israel.

Finally, there is the “Suez” solution, which refers to the crossing of the Suez Canal by Israeli troops during the 1973 Middle East War. One goal of the crossing was partly to silence Egyptian artillery. Applied to Iraq, it refers to the occupation of the western Iraqi desert to destroy missile launchers and to keep mobile launchers from being ferried in and out.

This suggestion is most commonly directed at the United States, which has troops and attack helicopters in neighboring Saudi Arabia. Israeli troops would have to be carried a long distance, and if they were using their own helicopters, the logistics would again require passage over Syria, Jordan or Turkey.

Still, Israeli military observers see great benefits to a land-and-air operation.

“Nothing in history has been achieved by air power only,” said Meron, the retired general. “Until you control an area, nothing is finished.”

Said Gur, the former army chief of staff, “Israel has a lot of experience in combined land-and-air operations. It is part and parcel of Israeli strategy all over.”

Any ground action by Israel not only would require military cooperation from the United States, perhaps including air cover. It also would risk the wrath of Arab states that would view Israeli occupation of Arab land as alarming.

“Maybe Israel could improve its security, but is it worth it to break up the coalition?” asked Joseph Alpher, editor of the Jaffee Center’s annual survey of the military balance in the Middle East.

Alpher contends that none of the plans are guaranteed to put an end to the Scud threat and that the danger of a wider Middle East war and damage to the U.S. coalition would outweigh the benefits.

The aggressive mood in Israel has been eased somewhat by recent reductions in Iraq’s ability to attack Israel. Israeli officials were heartened by the withdrawal of some long-range Iraqi bombers from Iraq to Iran. The bombers could deliver chemical bombs with a more lethal potential, but flights from Iran would be of greater distance and more readily defended against.

In addition, Israeli officials indicated that in recent days, U.S. warplanes have knocked out at least three Scud launchers.

U.S.-supplied Patriot antimissile batteries have given a measure of confidence to Israelis because of their success in knocking most incoming Scuds out of the sky. However, there has been some damage to neighborhoods from Scuds that fall to earth after being hit but not destroyed or from flaming debris after an interception. Six Patriot teams are on duty in Israel.