AirLand Battle: Next Stage Is Crucial

AirLand battle. For almost a decade that has been the U.S. Army’s fighting doctrine. And when the ongoing allied air campaign against the Iraqi armed forces has done its damnedest, the next stage, as Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff keeps emphasizing, will not be a ground campaign. It will be yet another phase of the AirLand battle.

“It is called AirLand battle in recognition of the inherently three-dimensional nature of modern warfare,” says Field Manual 100-5, the Army’s basic war-fighting regulation. “All ground operations above the level of the smallest engagements will be strongly affected by the supporting air operations of one or both combatants.”

First codified in August, 1982, and revised again in May, 1986, AirLand doctrine sought to prepare the post-Vietnam Army to cope with a variety of situations and challenges, including desert warfare and chemical warfare. It was founded on the basic combined arms team concept that had characterized Army operations since the beginning of World War II--that is, the coordinated use of infantry, armor and artillery.

That combined arms concept was validated most recently during the 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli armor columns, unsupported by infantry and artillery, took heavy losses from Egyptian infantry armed with Soviet-made Sagger antitank missiles. AirLand battle doctrine added another dimension to the combined arms concept--air support from Army helicopter gunships, Air Force close air support aircraft, fighters, fighter-bombers and bombers, and from Navy and Marine combat aircraft as well.

AirLand battle doctrine divides the battlefield into three categories--close operations, deep operations and rear operations. At the operational (that is, theater of war) level in the Persian Gulf today, two of these AirLand battle categories already have been implemented. Rear operations, for example, have been under way since August.

These operations involve establishing headquarters, ports, airfields, base areas and depots; setting up radio and telephone communications; establishing and maintaining road nets from rear areas to the front; setting up hospitals and other medical facilities, and putting into operation all the other thousands of administrative and logistic details necessary to support the more than half a million U.S. and allied forces deployed in the region.

Much of this rear operation required the mobilization of many reserve medical, transportation, supply, postal and other such units, as well as military police units to provide for their security.

And deep operations against the enemy began almost a month ago when, on Jan. 17, the coordinated allied air campaign against Saddam Hussein’s military machine was launched. These air strikes have been an almost perfect textbook operation. “The first consideration in employing air forces is gaining and maintaining the freedom of action to conduct operations against the enemy,” says FM 100-5. That objective was accomplished in the first phase of the air campaign when air supremacy was quickly achieved.

And in the second phase of the air campaign, the efforts are concentrated on yet another objective of the AirLand battle--”to influence . . . where, when, and against whom future battles will be fought.” That’s exactly what the ongoing allied air interdiction sorties against the Republican Guard and other Iraqi combat formations are designed to do.

But there is more to deep battle than air interdiction. Also involved are electronic warfare efforts to disrupt the enemy’s command and control of his front-line forces. Then, there are deception operations--raids, feints, demonstrations and the like--to confuse the enemy and cause him to react, thereby exposing his forces to allied air and artillery bombardment.

Marine amphibious exercises, such as those recently conducted in the northern Persian Gulf, are part of such a campaign, and we can expect to see more of this type of activity.

But the heart of AirLand battle doctrine is close operations. “At the operational level, close operations comprise the efforts of large tactical formations--corps and divisions--to win current battles,” says FM 100-5. “At the tactical (i.e., fighting) level, close operations comprise the efforts of smaller tactical units to win current engagements.”

Four basic tenets are involved here, says Col. Ralph Allen, chairman of the Department of Military Strategy, Plans and Operations, at the Army War College--initiative, agility, depth and synchronization.

Initiative means setting or changing the terms of battle by action. “In the attack,” emphasizes FM 100-5, “initiative implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of the attack. This requires surprise in selecting the time and place of attack, concentration, speed, audacity, and violence in execution, the seeking of soft spots; flexible shifting of the main effort, and prompt transition to exploitation.

“Agility--the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy--is the first prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. . . . In the end, agility is as much a mental as a physical quality. Our Army has traditionally taken pride in its soldiers’ ability to ‘think on their feet’ and to see and react rapidly to changing circumstances. . . .

“Depth is the extension of operations in space, time and resources . . . . In conjunction with air and naval operations, (Army commanders) employ maneuver, (air and artillery fire), and special operations to attack enemy units, facilities and communications throughout the theater and to force the enemy to fight battles on their terms.

“Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space and purpose to produce maximum combat power at the decisive point.” Among other things, this means the coordination of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine fire support, including aerial bombardment and naval gunfire support, to facilitate the movement of infantry and armor maneuver units on the ground.

Though such operations are not new to warfare, nor to the American military, AirLand battle doctrine as such never has been tested on the battlefield. So far, rear operations and the deep battle seem to be progressing according to plan. But the real test will come when and if the close battle is joined.