NEWS ANALYSIS : In Hussein, Echoes of Past Arab Failures : History: Iraq’s anticipated loss follows a familiar pattern in the Muslim world--Soviet doctrine and arms going down to defeat.

Although some observers have characterized the Persian Gulf War as a high-tech effort the likes of which have never been seen, the current campaign, in several diplomatic and military fashions, recalls some historical precedents of past Arab failures, analysts say.

Although no Arab leader in modern times has suffered a more total military defeat than what now appears to face Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s present, anticipated collapse follows a familiar pattern that has haunted Arab armies for years.

The scope of Iraq’s expected defeat is far broader than that suffered by Egypt and its partners at the hands of Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. That war traumatized the Arab world for a generation but left Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser with his reputation secure.

It may be no coincidence that the Iraqi and Arab armies, when crushed or on the seeming edge of defeat, relied heavily on Soviet weaponry and doctrine, which has suffered some bruising setbacks in earlier battles with Western-Israeli arms and forces; that they were unable to fight effectively in the skies, and that they often got trapped by their own rhetoric, seeking to manufacture spiritual victories out of crushing military setbacks.

Had Hussein paid more attention to the lessons of history, he might have thought twice before fighting a war he recently said there was “not one chance in 1 million” he could lose.

The allied coalition, which appears to be routing the world’s fourth-largest army after less than 72 hours of ground combat, followed a battle script seemingly drafted in an Israeli war room: The U.S.-led forces established air supremacy. They seem to have outmaneuvered an opposing force whose rigid command structure hindered a creative battlefield response. And they aimed to cut off retreat routes, as the allies claim to have done to the Republican Guard at the Euphrates River; the Israelis did this to the Egyptian 3rd Army in the Sinai Peninsula in 1973.

Then, as now, the Soviets played a diplomatic role, seeking cease-fires for desperate, onetime close Arab allies, then the Egyptians, now the Iraqis.

In the closing days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli troops were moving quickly on the west bank of the Suez Canal to surround Egypt’s 3rd Army on the east bank in the Sinai Desert, just as allied troops are now seeking to surround the Iraqi army, in and around Kuwait.

The Soviets, once they realized the predicament of Egypt--their then-key Arab ally in the Middle East--called for an immediate cease-fire and a halt to Israeli military movement. The Soviets’ forum for seeking the cease-fire was the United Nations.

Similarly, the Soviets recently have been leading the push at the United Nations for a cease-fire that might get Hussein off the hook.

In 1973, the Soviet-sought cease-fire, although it initially failed, eventually was put in force--but not before the Israelis were in a commanding position.

America now is “in a position, as President Bush has indicated, to refuse a cease-fire, and it would be a bad mistake to accept one now, allowing Saddam Hussein to claim victory,” commented a senior Israeli officer who was a battalion commander in the Yom Kippur War and is now with the Israeli Embassy in London.

And, like the Israeli experiences in battling Arab forces in 1967, 1973 and 1982, allied aircraft and pilots have, thus far, proven superior to those of the Iraqis, whose seemingly less-skilled aviators rely on apparently inferior Soviet MIGs.

Israel shot down dozens of Syrian planes without a loss over Lebanon in June, 1982, after Israeli drone aircraft cracked the Syrian tracking system; had the Iraqi air force chosen to fight, Desert Storm’s aviators probably would have scored no less a lopsided victory.

But the Arabs’ longstanding problems with air combat go beyond just equipment concerns. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, Iraq roamed the skies almost at will. Yet its pilots, fearing antiaircraft fire, refused to conduct low-level attacks against Iranian troop concentrations. Instead, they dropped their bombs at 30,000 feet, rendering the Iraqi air force largely ineffective.

Some Arab pilots have shown similar reluctance in Desert Storm. Although British pilots flying Tornado jets attacked Iraqi air fields from altitudes as low as 350 feet off the deck--and lost five planes in the process--some Saudi aviators flying Tornado bombers refused to go lower than 23,000 feet for bombing missions; others returned to home base without releasing their bombs. The high-level bombing did no substantial damage to the intended targets, Western aviation sources said.

The sources, who work with the Saudi air force, said the varying tactics have caused a significant row between British and Saudi commanders. Two Saudi Tornado crews--each consisting of a pilot and navigator--were jailed by Saudi commanders for refusing to release their bombs at the prescribed levels, the sources said.

U.S. commanders said the performance of the pilots should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of the Saudi air force. Many of its pilots, they said, have performed well and some, particularly those with long experience working with U.S. weapons systems, were the equal of American pilots.

But the difficulties displayed by many of the Iraqi pilots also may reflect the different way that many Arabs approach technology.

It may, perhaps, be too sweeping a generalization, and there are many noteworthy exceptions.

But many observers familiar with Arabs note that many of them are not tinkerers, as Americans are with cars and gadgets; many view high-tech equipment with blind faith, without questioning the human dimensions needed to hone its performance. Many of them tend to accept technology but do not show much curiosity about how its performance is related to the knowledge and adeptness of the operator.

“It’s amazing to see those things take off, isn’t it?” a Western businessman remarked idly one day as a Boeing 747 lifted off the runway of a Saudi airport.

“Why wouldn’t they?” replied his Saudi friend without looking up from his newspaper.

Lamb reported from Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and Tuohy reported from London.