Yugoslavia: Mediation Needed : High-level outsiders could negotiate autonomy and thus avoid further bloodshed

There are, said an exasperated U.S. official, no good guys in the Yugoslavia crisis; self-righteous stubbornness and intractable jealousies have provoked first political deadlock and now bloodshed. But if there is a lack of heroes in the confrontation between the central government and the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia, there is certainly no shortage of potential victims. Most of them--as in any civil war--are likely to be innocent bystanders.

Croats, Slovenians, Serbs and others in Yugoslavia’s multiethnic society talk grandly about dying nobly for their respective cultures, territories and ambitions. Others, less emotionally committed and less historically involved, look for a less bloody way out.

Is there a role in Yugoslavia now for international mediation? There is, if the contending parties are willing to welcome it and cooperate sincerely in settlement efforts.

A big if , given the intense animosities in play, but, even so, not an unachievable one. Even the bitterest of enemies are usually capable of standing back for a moment to evaluate where their true self-interests lie, and for the most part the interests of the separate republics of Yugoslavia lie in a mutually supportive federation. That doesn’t mean there should not be far greater regional autonomy and far less power for the central government. There should be, and if that’s to be achieved, outside mediation will certainly be needed.

The European Community is making a stab at that right now, at a moment of tenuous cease-fire in Slovenia. Like everyone else, the EC fears a disintegrating Yugoslavia would threaten stability through much of Europe. The EC mission must be wished luck. But if it fails? In that case the international community should think a bit more grandly.

There’s no dearth of respected elder statesmen--and not only in Europe and America--who might be available for mediating roles, persons whose experience and stature could well elicit the kind of cooperation from Yugoslavia’s contending parties that might be withheld from lesser functionaries. What it all hinges on is the willingness of the leaders of the republics to come to an accommodation. Outsiders can be an emollient in such high-friction confrontations, and the greater the outsiders’ prestige, the more likely their views will be listened to. High-level mediation surely is available. All Yugoslavia has to do is ask for it.