Buthelezi Is the Real Loser in South Africa’s Scandal : Politics: The Zulu chief, never a favorite to the black majority, is sinking under the weight of disclosures that his party was in Pretoria’s pocket.

When I arrived in Johannesburg on July 3, members of the ruling National Party were bursting with confidence. Rumors that Western countries were about to end their isolation of South Africa had created a general feeling of triumph among whites. One Afrikaner academic even boasted that the government “was never close to defeat.”

It was against this backdrop that the Bush Administration lifted economic sanctions and the International Olympic Committee announced that South African athletes could compete in Barcelona, Spain, next year. Adding to President Frederick W. de Klerk’s string of victories was a clean bill of political health from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman J. Cohen: The U.S. government “could find no proof that the South African government entities (were) supporting black-on-black violence.”

Cohen’s optimism was premature. It turns out that the government had secretly funded the largely Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party, and its affiliated trade union, the United Workers’ Union of South Africa, to the tune of 1.5 million rand (about $500,000). Pretoria’s admission that these payments did, in fact, occur has not only damaged the credibility--domestic and foreign--of De Klerk; it has also revived suspicions that his government has had a hand in fomenting violence between the African National Congress ANC and Inkatha forces.

But the ultimate loser in this drama is Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of Inkatha. The Zulu chief has long been popular among certain groups, inside and outside South Africa, for his free-market boosterism and unrelenting opposition to economic sanctions. His accommodating positions on such sensitive issues as land reform, wealth redistribution and nationalization have endeared him to whites fearful of the ANC’s more radical approaches.

Buthelezi counts among his many friends Margaret Thatcher. Conservative groups and think tanks in the United States, Britain and West Germany are reliable allies. Foreign and South African businessmen contribute to his organizations. Many white South Africans have come to regard him as the best black alternative to the ANC.

But among the majority of blacks, Buthelezi has a reputation of being a government collaborator who will use force, if necessary, to achieve his ends. His government in the KwaZulu homeland has been subsidized by Pretoria, and KwaZulu police have been accused of siding with South Africa police against ANC supporters. As a result, most blacks have never considered Buthelezi an independent leader. Indeed, he is widely seen as willing to condone violence if it will get him a seat at the negotiations that will determine South Africa’s future. Many blacks are also disillusioned with his brand of leadership, believing Buthelezi has “stabbed his way onto the national political stage.” Revelations that Inkatha secretly accepted Pretoria’s money-with-strings only confirms suspicions.

Chief among Buthelezi’s worries will be the scandal’s effect on his efforts to transform Inkatha from a mostly regional and ethnic organization into a national multiethnic party. Although Buthelezi’s base of Zulus in Natal will likely remain secure, his ability to recruit new members outside Natal may be further handicapped. A national poll, published in July, found a majority of blacks already rejected his party “on principle.” Other polls consistently show that his support outside his home base barely exceeds 2% of the country’s 27 million blacks.

With such limited popularity, Buthelezi needs to maintain his sources of funding if he is to remain a credible political rival to the ANC. But De Klerk has promised that all secret government funding to political organizations will cease, thus cutting off one source. Private sources, inside and outside South Africa, are now likely to shy away from contributing money to an organization widely discredited. Two British millionaires who have been linked to a secret Inkatha fund have already denied making political donations.

Money from overseas governments may also dry up under pressure from anti-apartheid activists. U.S. officials hint that Buthelezi may not get any of the $10 million set aside by the federal government for black political groups. Other Western diplomats stationed in South Africa generally believe that their governments cannot risk being seen as supporting Inkatha in the wake of the scandal. As a result, Buthelezi may find himself out in the political cold.

Although Buthelezi has himself denied any knowledge of the secret payments from the governments, and has offered to return the money, the damage has already been done. Even the resignation of one of his junior officials will make little difference in restoring Inkatha’s badly tarnished image. In effect, even if Buthelezi didn’t know about the secret payments, the fact that his organization was compromised may be as damning to his political prospects. For the first time since the ANC was unbanned, it now appears to be in a position of strength.

The scandal may help outsiders understand why so many black South Africans have greeted the dismantling of apartheid with a mixture of skepticism and mistrust. For blacks who question the government’s commitment to peace and good-faith negotiations, disclosures of the secret payments to Inkatha have confirmed their worst fears about the much-heralded “new” South Africa.

When I was in Johannesburg, one man told me that the seemingly revolutionary changes are “a big joke.” Another described them as “a shiny package with no substance.” When asked why, the two mentioned the recent bombing of a white school in Pretoria that was supposed to be a home to children of returning ANC exiles, the continued existence of segregated facilities in many cities and towns and the violence in the townships that the government can’t stop. All this daily reinforces the fact that black lives are cheaper than whites’.

The subdued reaction of blacks also stems from unimproved socioeconomic conditions. While black squatter settlements proliferate, available housing in white areas exceeds demand. While black hospital patients have to sleep on concrete floors, beds in white hospitals are vacant. Despite a crisis in black education, Pretoria spends more on educating a white child. And blacks don’t have the vote yet.

Although these and other grievances will not disappear soon, continued lack of progress has created the impression among some blacks that the government seeks to perpetuate apartheid in a different form. Accordingly, until blacks can experience real improvements in their lives, promises of a “new” South Africa will be greeted with skepticism and cynicism. Disclosures of an Inkatha-De Klerk arrangement reinforces such attitudes. But given their past, it would be foolish for blacks to behave differently.