Victory From the Jaws of Fraud : Salinas’ voiding of a favorable election result preserves his ability to reform his party. He must forge ahead.

It took two weeks for the final chapter of Mexico’s midterm election saga to be written, but it provided a stunning conclusion that opens up new possibilities for accelerating political reform.

The decision of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari to annul, in effect, the gubernatorial election in the state of Guanajuato represents the second time since taking office that he has overruled a questionable claim of victory by his own party and made it possible for an opposition party--the National Action Party (PAN)--to take over an important state government.

As the Aug. 18 elections approached, all public-opinion polls pointed to a sweeping victory for the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the balloting for congressional seats and most other offices. The Salinas administration was mainly concerned with two problems: increasing the voter participation rate--which had fallen to 20% to 30% in numerous state and local elections held in 1989 and 1990--and ensuring the credibility of the election results.

The actual voter turnout was higher than in any other non-presidential election since 1961. Sixty-five percent of those who were registered and had received one of the new voter credentials required by the 1990 electoral law--or 61% of all registered voters--cast ballots. Exit polls revealed that large numbers of voters were enthusiastic about Salinas’ economic policies and National Solidarity, the newpublic works and poverty-alleviation program with which he is closely identified.

The goal of credible election returns proved more elusive. The incidence of apparent irregularities in the most hotly contested races was surprisingly high. In Guanajuato, the elections produced tallies that defied all logic, including hundreds of precincts in which the PRI candidate for state governor was credited with more votes than there had been voters. In the state of San Luis Potosi, gross statistical anomalies showed up in the vote totals from rural districts, where opposition poll watchers were less likely to be present.

Ironically, several pre-election opinion surveys, as well as the Gallup exit poll conducted Aug. 18, suggest that the PRI’s gubernatorial candidates in both states could have won election by comfortable margins--without fraud. With so many irregularities, however, opposition charges that the true results were the reverse of what the PRI claimed easily gained credence and provoked large public demonstrations.

How could this happen? The Salinas government had an overwhelming interest in ensuring electoral transparency and tranquility. The elections were the first nationwide test of a new election law designed to curb fraud--a law deservedly cited by Salinas as his greatest accomplishment in political reform. They came just a month after remarkably clean elections were held in the state of Nuevo Leon.

Salinas was determined to keep the midterm elections from generating ammunition for U.S. critics of the North American free-trade agreement being negotiated. Also at stake was the president’s fragile working alliance with PAN in the federal congress.

Under these circumstances, it is highly implausible that top officials in Mexico City had given carte blanche to state and local PRI operatives to do whatever was necessary to win everywhere, regardless of the costs.

A more persuasive explanation for what happened in Guanajuato and San Luis Potosi is that lower-echelon leaders in many parts of the far-flung PRI apparatus no longer automatically obey directives from the center. There is a basic conflict of interest between the party’s entrenched state and local machines, which are concerned with maintaining their traditional share of power and perks, and the modernizing national political elite in Mexico City.

In Guanajuato, central control over PRI operations seems to have broken down. Even after the decision had been made at the highest levels to relinquish control of the state to an interim PAN governor, local PRI militants seized control of the state capitol for 30 hours to block ratification by the state legislature, and most PRI legislators boycotted the vote.

If such situations are to be averted in future elections, Salinas will have to forge ahead with the building of the “new” PRI. Under his prodding, the party has begun to modernize itself. This year, the PRI relied much less on its discredited organizations--especially organized labor--as sources of candidates. A new layer of political leaders is emerging from the community-based National Solidarity program, and they figured prominently in the midterm elections.

But the recurrent need for presidential interventions to guarantee the integrity of the electoral process suggests that these changes have not gone far enough.

--PRI operatives at the state and local levels who refuse to clean up their electoral act must know that they will be punished rather than rewarded for their excesses. Salinas’ reversal of the outcome in Guanajuato has set new limits, but some party militants will continue to challenge them.

--Government officials must resist the temptation to help the PRI by flooding opposition strongholds with patronage, manpower and media blitzes, thereby crushing--not just defeating--the opposition and undercutting the legitimacy of the process.

--The ruling party’s essentially unlimited access to government resources to conduct its campaigns must be curtailed. Greater competition in television coverage of campaigns and elections should be encouraged.

The Salinistas now hold all the cards. Their fear has always been that drastic reform of the PRI would be too divisive and cause it to lose power in too many places--perhaps even at the national level. Now, from a position of great strength, they can accelerate the rebuilding of the party around the new grass-roots leaders that Salinas has been nurturing and create a more level playing field for the opposition without running huge risks. If they choose to move in this way, this year’s midterm elections could be transformed into a crucial catalyst rather than a setback for democratization in Mexico.