Let Japan Be Auxiliary to America’s Global Role : Geopolitics: Its supportive role should not be seen as simply underwriting U.S. policy.

A crisis almost always reveals the reality, and the Persian Gulf crisis revealed the real Japan. In the moment of truth, an economic superpower found itself merely an automatic teller machine--one that needed a kick before dispensing the cash. The notion that economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence turned out to be a materialist illusion. At least many Japanese now seem to subscribe to that view.

Today, Japan’s increased weight and stake in the world has in turn increased the world’s stake and interest in Japanese strategy and policy. But the gap between Japan’s foreign-policy projection and the expectations placed on Japan by other countries has widened to a precarious abyss.

The call for Japan to bear a full share of the burden to sustain the world system has intensified. For Japan, the essential question is now this: For what purpose should Japan assume a larger share of the burden? Japan must now define its objectives and world role more clearly than at any time in the past 40 years. It can no longer merely respond to the international environment and measure itself quantitatively. Such a task will severely challenge Japan’s longstanding strategic premises and policy foundations. But Japan is now a key pillar of the global order itself, no longer merely an actor within it, and Japanese policy must reflect that change.

As part of a new foreign policy Japan also needs to initiate a fuller global partnership with the United States. The U.S.-Japanese “global partnership”--a new look designed at the spring, 1990, meeting between President George Bush and then-Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu--proved to be a non-starter only several months later. Yet the concept should not be abandoned. Rather it must be further defined and developed as Japanese foreign policy matures.

Japan should not believe, however, that this means equal standing with the United States. The United States will be the sole superpower in the 1990s. Its superior military resources and logistics will probably make it the only country in the world capable of being a kind of “lender of last resort” in providing a security blanket in military crises. The relationship between the two countries can best be characterized as mutually supportive.

Yet it is not necessary or desirable that Japan try to gain equal footing in sharing leadership. Japan’s relationship with the United States, as well as its world role, is better defined as “supportive leadership.” Its role should not be primary, but auxiliary, to U.S. global posture and commitment.

The Gulf War may have marked the return of an American unipolar system, but it also demonstrated the need for the United States to exert its leadership as part of a coalition. The Gulf War was but one example of the types of threats the world will confront in the future. Even a confident United States will not always be able to cope with a diversity of threats alone. The United States will be, at least for the foreseeable future, subject to financial limitations.

It will also have to pay more attention to a wider range of issues that now qualify as security matters--its economy, the environment, human rights and drugs. These issues will pose problems for the traditional pattern of U.S. hegemonic leadership, because they require collective leadership and policy coordination. Finally, as Washington gradually disengages militarily from Europe and the Asian-Pacific region, it will likely face isolationist sentiments at home or, at least, milder domestic pressures to turn inward.

Japan’s supportive leadership, therefore, should not be viewed as simply following the United States, neither should it be regarded as financial underwriting for U.S. military actions. It should instead be seen as providing collective goods indispensable in an age of collective leadership. Japan’s major task will be to stimulate U.S. interest in the open global trading system.

It must also manage the dollar so that the United States will be able to overcome its twin deficits while maintaining non-inflationary economic growth. Japan has an “absorber” function as well, principally regarding neighboring Asian-Pacific countries, in reducing the U.S. external trade imbalance and lessening the U.S. burden.

The U.S.-Japanese security alliance should continue to be the underpinning of a dynamic bilateral relationship and an anchor of future Asian-Pacific security. Japan’s alliance with the United States is the third alliance Japan has forged in its modern history. But unlike the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the early part of the century and the Axis alliance with Germany and Italy before World War II, the U.S.-Japanese alliance is not a mere invention of Realpolitik. It is a far more pervasive engagement and a symbol of friendship and stability between two societies. It can continue to function as such and help stabilize the Asian-Pacific framework.

At the same time, Japan’s excessive reliance on its bilateral relationship with the United States should be balanced by strengthening its multilateral (United Nations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), trilateral (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) and regional diplomacies (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). As more constraints are placed on U.S. leadership and as the need for policy coordination grows, both the United States and Japan will need to search for wider options and alternatives to their previous relationship. Japan’s contribution to this task is the essence of supportive leadership.