PERSPECTIVE ON CAMBODIA : A Fragile Peace Beats a Certain War : Accepting the presence of the Khmer Rouge, and being vigilant about their activity, is the least harmful course for now.

On Oct. 23 in Paris, 19 governments and four Cambodian factions signed a historic agreement designed to bring peace to that long-suffering country. Undertaken two years ago as the longest of long shots, the negotiations that produced this accord exemplify diplomacy at its best.

In spite of this extraordinary achievement, some have criticized the agreement for not rendering absolutely impossible a return to power by the Khmer Rouge. This concern is entirely understandable. Pol Pot was, after all, responsible for the deaths of up to 2 million Cambodians between 1975 and 1978. Chinese and Thai support for his movement after 1979 strengthened it as a potent military force, one that 180,000 Vietnamese troops could not quell.

It would have been best if an agreement bringing peace to Cambodia also exorcised Khmer Rouge influence entirely. But magic spells do not exist in the hard world of international diplomacy. Realistically, the choice concerning Cambodia was between an agreement that included the Khmer Rouge nominally and then marginalized their power--which is what the Paris accord accomplishes--and no agreement at all. It is this latter option, with its continuation of military conflict, that creates the greatest danger for Cambodia, because it plays to the strength of the Khmer Rouge and thus enhances the prospects that they could, over time, battle their way back to power in Phnom Penh.

How, precisely, does the Paris agreement reduce the chances of a Khmer Rouge resurgence?

Externally, the agreement prohibits foreign military support to any of the Cambodian factions, including vital Chinese assistance for the Khmer Rouge. It requires the withdrawal of the remaining Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, thus depriving the Khmer Rouge of the political benefits they have been able to derive from branding the Phnom Penh regime a satellite of Hanoi. And it prohibits neighboring countries like Thailand from providing sanctuary for the Khmer Rogue and any other combatants.

Within Cambodia, the pact requires that all fighters give up their weapons to U.N. peacekeepers; 70% of these forces are to be demobilized before elections are held, with the disposition of the remainder to be decided by the new government. Repatriation of Cambodians on the Thai-Cambodian border will occur under U.N. supervision, and not according to the dictates of the resistance factions. Finally, the United Nations will work to create a neutral political environment in which political parties, including the Khmer Rouge, may run candidates for seats in a constituent assembly.

There is no doubt that the Cambodian struggle for power will continue. Yet the Paris agreement shifts it from the battlefield, where Pol Pot has the long-term advantage, to the ballot box, where his appeal will be minimal at best.

What if there were no agreement? The Khmer Rouge would continue to receive Chinese military aid and Thai sanctuary. They would use the presence of a few thousand Vietnamese troops to play the xenophobia card. They would challenge a regime in Phnom Penh that had lost its Soviet and East European assistance, had little international legitimacy or support and was dogged by charges of corruption and inefficiency. Under those circumstances, there would be a real chance that the Khmer Rouge could ultimately return to power. Even if that did not occur, they would at least have the ability to wage an unending civil war, thereby depriving the Cambodian people of any hope of peace, economic revival, psychological security and political self-determination.

Some claim that it would have been possible to engineer a negotiated settlement that excluded the Khmer Rouge and produced a legitimate government through a Nicaragua-style election held under the aegis of the incumbent regime. Apart from the objectionable advantage that this would confer on the Vietnamese-installed regime, China and Thailand, as well as the other ASEAN countries, have made it clear that they would never accept victory for Hanoi’s proteges. The Khmer Rouge’s patrons would have undoubtedly maintained its military capacity to create havoc and perhaps even win a civil war.

The skeptics are certainly correct in pointing out that the Paris agreement has its risks. The Khmer Rouge will surely attempt to turn their limits into opportunities, as they have done by attempting to forcibly repatriate Khmer civilians they control on the Thai border. To prevent them from using the agreement for their own ends, the international community must be vigilant and react decisively to block such attempts.

The key factor in ensuring the success of the Cambodia accord and containing the Khmer Rouge is the breadth and depth of the U.N. presence during the transition. That will depend on the financial resources available to fund it. Although the United Nations does not yet have a precise price tag, a total of $1 billion to $2 billion, with a U.S. share of several hundred million dollars, is not unreasonable to expect. Mobilizing that kind of money will not be easy, especially as competing priorities proliferate. Yet the moral imperative for doing so is profound.

Cambodia was the first instance of genocide after the destruction of European Jewry during World War II. When it began, the world could be excused for not anticipating the devastation the Khmer Rouge would unleash once it seized power in 1975. And once the shock of realization sank in, it was too late.

This time, there will be no excuse for not guarding against the worst. The U.N.-guided journey out of Cambodia’s lingering state of despair will have to wend its way past Pol Pot’s killing fields, past the economic realities of a ravaged land and past the continuing geopolitical interests and intrigues of China and Vietnam. But that route is far better than the available alternatives. Pretending that there is a better way, particularly in order to justify inadequate funding of the U.N. presence, ill serves the Cambodian people.