PERSPECTIVE ON THE UKRAINE : Army Won’t Be a Loose Cannon : The new state has to cooperate with Russia, and its military independence will enhance nuclear security.

The overwhelming vote on Sunday in support of Ukrainian independence confirms that the Ukraine will soon become a sovereign state. The emergence of this new European country, with a population of roughly 52 million, raises delicate questions for leaders in both East and West.

The Bush Administration, to its credit, said before the vote that it would move “expeditiously” to recognize Ukrainian independence if the referendum proved successful. But the Administration also warned that U.S. aid will be contingent on the Ukrainian government’s willingness to refrain from establishing a full-fledged army.

It is far from clear, however, that the Administration’s concern about a Ukrainian army is well-founded. Any country that wishes to be independent must be able to protect itself, and the Ukraine is no exception. Initially, Ukrainian officials hoped to deploy an army with 420,000 to 450,000 troops. They have drastically scaled back those projections and are now talking about an army of perhaps 90,000 soldiers.

Even the larger number of 450,000 would hardly have meant the “militarization” of the Ukraine. Indeed, that number is a good deal smaller than the 1.2 million troops (of all ethnic backgrounds) from the Soviet army who are still on Ukrainian soil. It is also smaller than the 700,000 Ukrainians who until recently were serving in the Soviet army. And it is much smaller than the 2-million-strong army that the neighboring Russian Republic has talked about deploying.

In fact, even with 450,000 troops, the Ukraine would have encountered difficulty in preparing for external military threats. Officials in several neighboring countries have spoken recently about territory that they hope to acquire from the Ukraine, which indicates the scope of the problems that Ukrainian military planners will confront.

With an army of only 90,000 troops, the Ukraine will have no alternative but to retain cooperative military links with Russia. The newly elected Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, has already indicated that the Ukraine will join with Russia and other former Soviet republics in deploying strategic air defenses. From a budgetary standpoint, that step makes perfect sense, but it certainly will limit the “independence” of the Ukrainian army, and it should further allay concerns in the West about Ukrainian “militarization.”

The Ukraine will also remain dependent on Russia for weapons and other materiel. Initially, Ukrainian leaders hoped simply to inherit weapons left by departing Soviet forces. But the Soviet army has been pulling out its weapons before the Ukrainian government can assert control over them. In any case, an independent Ukrainian army would still need newer weapons later in the decade; and for that it will have to rely, at least in part, on Russia.

The Ukraine does have a large industrial base that could be (and to some extent already is) used for military production. A number of key Soviet military factories are in the Ukraine, including the main attack-helicopter plant, the largest ballistic-missile plant, major shipbuilding facilities, several aerospace production centers and a huge tank-design plant. The Ukraine is the only former Soviet republic other than Russia that could even begin to equip an independent army on its own.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian military industrial base is far smaller than the one in Russia. Although the two republics together account for more than 90% of the military industries in the old Soviet Union, the vast majority are in Russia. Moreover, the military factories in Russia are self-sufficient with respect to components and spare parts, whereas the factories in the Ukraine receive nearly all their components and spare parts from Russian plants.

Another reason for forging cooperative ties with Russia is Ukrainian dependence on Russian oil. Russia possesses more than 90% of the Soviet Union’s oil; the Ukraine has virtually none. Although Ukrainian leaders have stated that they would consider buying oil from Middle Eastern producers if Russian supplies are cut off, this option will be severely limited by the Ukraine’s lack of hard currency.

The many factors compelling the Ukrainian government to seek military cooperation with Russia should negate any concerns American leaders might have about the prospect of an “independent” Ukrainian army. This applies equally to the question of nuclear command authority.

No Ukrainian leader has ever called for sole control over the nuclear weapons based on Ukrainian territory. The only thing Ukrainian officials have advocated is the sharing of control of those weapons--and veto power over their use--until they can be destroyed under international auspices.

The sharing of nuclear command authority in this way should be highly desirable for the West. The more actors that have to consent before any nuclear weapons are used, the more intricate and time-consuming the launch procedures will be; and the more complicated the launch procedures are, the less likely it is that the weapons will be used. That is precisely why the NATO allies in Western Europe have long insisted on sharing control over the tactical nuclear weapons based on their soil.

Furthermore, even if some future government in the Ukraine wanted to gain sole control over the nuclear weapons on its territory, it would not be able to do so. The weapons remain securely guarded, and elaborate safeguards are still in place to prevent unauthorized use. In extreme situations, the elite troops who protect the weapons could blow them up to forestall any capture or diversion.

And so, the creation of an independent Ukrainian army, even one larger than 90,000 troops, should not stir alarm in the West. The army will be a prudent safeguard for the Ukraine against threats from outside, but it will not be “independent” enough to cause undue problems for the Ukraine’s neighbors.