De Klerk, Not Mandela, Has the Edge as South Africa’s Most Dynamic Politician : ANC: As the post-apartheid era nears, the African National Congress is having great difficulty transforming itself into a political party.

The “talks about talks” in South Africa are over. By the end of the year, the government and major black opposition groups are scheduled to sit down for a formal, multiparty conference to discuss the transition to a post-apartheid era. The future of the talks, and the future of South Africa, hinge on decisions made by the African National Congress.

The ANC has had great difficulty transforming itself from a guerrilla movement into a political party that can lead the country toward a non-racial future. Membership drives have been a disappointment, and the ANC has had problems constructing a coherent organization. In fact, the congress admits it is doing poorly among the Asian and so-called colored, or mixed-race, populations relative to the ruling National Party--despite the fact that the NP masterminded the apartheid system. Indeed, the ANC has had so much difficulty that President Frederik W. de Klerk reportedly believes he could win a one-man, one-vote election.

The ANC’s travails may come as a surprise to those in the United States who thought Nelson Mandela’s release from prison was the start of an uncontested march to power. Of course, many logistical problems could be expected during the ANC’s transition to legal politics because its leadership, and many of its most important cadres, were dispersed across Africa, Europe and the United States. In addition, a large number of ANC officials had been in exile for a decade or more, and so were not well-informed about developments inside the country.

The ANC faces particular challenges because, in many ways, it was not in full control of the popular opposition to apartheid. The ANC’s guerrilla campaign against the white regime, using fighters based in some countries bordering South Africa, was ineffective. Most of the guerrillas were caught or did limited damage, while the South African military initiated punishing raids against those who provided sanctuary. Rather, it was the massive, uncoordinated township violence, especially between 1984 and 1986, that convinced many white leaders that apartheid could not continue indefinitely. Many protests were led by young people who had dropped out of school and did not recognize any political authority as legitimate. The ANC is only now attempting to absorb many of these young fighters, and those they inspired, into a formal political organization. It is finding party construction at such a late date to be difficult indeed.

The timing of the ANC’s legalization also contributed to its difficulties. The Congress’ leaders were surprised by De Klerk’s early 1990 announcement that they would be allowed back into the country. As a guerrilla movement, the ANC had devoted little attention to developing real economic policies.

In addition, just as the ANC had to formulate real policies, its ideological universe collapsed. The organization had at least a soft commitment to socialism as a rhetoric that provided a broad banner for opponents of the white regime to unite behind; and many members of the organization were, in fact, committed communists. The revolutions in Central Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union meant the ANC could not even rely on its oft-repeated political slogans until it developed real economic policies. While there are creative people in the ANC, the insularity of South Africa should not be underestimated and many within the ranks of the recently legalized movement appear anachronistic because they still believe socialism can work.

Indeed, there has been continual confusion about just what the ANC stands for as it gropes for policies that have the popular appeal of the old slogans but are realistic given the complexity of the South African economy. It had appeared that the collapse of the socialist world had convinced the ANC that radical economic measures, which would put it at odds with the white population and prevent the economy from growing, would be counterproductive. But Mandela recently raised the possibility that the ANC might nationalize mines and other important economic assets. In addition, Cyril Ramaphosa, ANC general-secretary, said a future black government might not honor current debts. Much of the ANC’s economic project is clearly still in flux.

De Klerk has exploited the ANC’s problems to his full advantage. He seems to have realized that, if he moves quickly, he can keep opponents on both right and left off balance and thereby advance his own cause. Unlike Mikhail S. Gorbachev, De Klerk seems committed to staying ahead of the reform curve--so he can harness the forces he has unleashed rather than be devoured by them. As a result, it is De Klerk, rather than Mandela, whom many in South Africa acknowledge as the country’s most dynamic politician.

Mandela’s own actions may also have contributed to the ANC’s organizational problems. During his long struggle in prison, he came to embody the travails of South Africa’s black majority. However, he is also an old man, and his decision to retain much of the day-to-day control of the ANC may have delayed the conclusion of some important ideological battles between members of the younger generation. These must be resolved if the ANC is to act in a definitive manner.

The ANC may eventually resolve its problems. However, as real negotiations proceed, it will face new challenges. Most important, the congress must make constructive contributions in the formulation of an economic bargain that will be the basis of a transition toward non-racial rule. Already, there is a good chance that all the parties will agree on a political formula so that a general election can take place--especially since the National Party perceives its fortunes to be rising.

However, an economic bargain that provides redress to the inequities of apartheid will be crucial to the legitimacy of any future black government. Thus, to win popular support, the ANC must promise a massive redistribution of resources. Yet, there is simply not enough to redistribute to make everyone prosperous, and such an exercise would destroy any prospects for economic growth--the only way South Africa will be able to address the deprivations. Current statements promising quick results through redistribution may haunt a future black government that will have to convince the black population to be patient and wait for the benefits of economic expansion.

The last six months in South Africa have been, in many ways, a preview of the future: a tremendous amount of tumult, economic debate and a slight but perceptible amount of progress toward a political settlement. If there are gains, they will only come at a frustratingly slow pace. However, one benchmark in evaluating South Africa’s prospects is if the ANC can resolve its internal problems so it can play a constructive role in designing the country’s future.