South Africa’s Goal of a Democratic, Non-racial Society Grows More Elusive : Negotiations: De Klerk’s overconfidence and Mandela’s weakening position, plus violence against blacks, imperil a peaceful transition.

In early May, a historic settlement that would end white rule in South Africa seemed imminent. Differences between negotiators representing the major players, the National Party gov ernment and the African National Congress, were narrowing. Roughly seven weeks later, South Africa appears to be on the brink of civil war.

Two recent events help explain this abrupt reversal of fortunes. Delegations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, a multiparty negotiating forum aimed at drafting a non-racial, democratic constitution, could not agree on the size of the majority required to approved constitutional provisions. They adjourned. Soon after, the ANC announced it would launch a nationwide campaign to pressure President Frederik W. de Klerk and his government to abandon their efforts to entrench white power in a post-apartheid constitution.

Then, on June 17, 42 residents of Biopatong, a black township south of Johannesburg, were massacred by a group of Zulu men believed to be supporters of the ANC’s main rival, the Inkatha Freedom Party. Reports surfaced that the attackers had been transported to the township by white police officers. The ANC quickly suspended its participation in the negotiations, demanding that the De Klerk government halt the violence.

How could a narrow disagreement over what constitutes a majority percentage set in motion such a dangerous chain of events? An answer can be found in the changes that have occurred since 1989.

Then, white South Africans faced a bleak future. Repression had failed to silence black opposition. International pressure was steadily intensifying. The economy was in a shambles. Government efforts to create a cadre of moderate but credible black leaders willing to participate in negotiations that excluded the ANC had failed. In these circumstances, newly elected President De Klerk concluded that he had no alternative but to release Nelson Mandela and negotiate the demise of apartheid.

His decision paid off handsomely. Most international economic sanctions were lifted. Official South African delegations have been warmly received around the world. Inside South Africa, De Klerk steadily consolidated the National Party’s white political base and successfully reached out to Colored and Indian constituents. In February, white voters dealt a possible death blow to the Conservative Party by overwhelmingly endorsing De Klerk’s reform program. Significantly, De Klerk achieved all these gains without yielding any power to blacks.

In contrast, the bargaining position of the ANC leadership has steadily eroded over the past two years. In 1990, as a precondition to entering into negotiations, they agreed to suspend the armed struggle. Their protests against hasty moves to lift sanctions have been largely ignored. Just as important, ANC leaders have found themselves under a steady barrage of criticism for their ties to the South African Communist Party. In the negotiations proper, Mandela and the ANC have made substantial concessions to white demands on a wide range of economic and political issues--and received little.

Meanwhile, the living conditions of ANC supporters in many townships and rural areas have probably worsened since the ANC began negotiating with the De Klerk government. Violence in the black townships has increased--and Mandela’s supporters have been the principal victims. There is little doubt that some ANC cadres have carried out attacks on rival political groups. But most independent observers have concluded that a preponderant amount of the violence has been fomented either by loyalists of the Inkatha Freedom Party or by shadowy black groups with no obvious political affiliation. It is also clear that some elements in the security forces have tolerated and probably instigated many of the attacks on ANC supporters.

This combination of escalating violence and the failure of the negotiations to produce any tangible returns for most blacks has caused many ANC rank-and-file members to question the wisdom of negotiating with the De Klerk government. When senior ANC figures speak in the townships, they are now besieged with pleas from residents for guns to defend themselves against attackers.

Black anger has also been fueled by militant leaders--such as Mandela’s estranged wife, Winnie--who are now reportedly attempting to organize their own party within the ANC. The young lions of the townships have always held Winnie in high esteem, dismissing or excusing her excesses. Far more important in their minds is her refusal to bend in the face of white pressure and her constant presence in the townships.

The growing self-confidence of De Klerk and the increasingly restive atmosphere in the townships left the ANC leadership no choice but to launch a campaign of protests, strikes and stay-aways and ultimately to break off negotiations. Short of this, they could have quickly found themselves on the political sidelines. It is for this reason that white efforts to blame the ANC for the current crisis are dangerous.

There is a risk that the mass-action campaign will escalate out of control; and it could prove difficult to get the Convention for a Democratic South Africa negotiations going again. But something had to be done to restore the balance of power in the negotiating process. If the bargaining leverage of Mandela and the existing ANC leadership had continued to erode, an even more explosive situation would have been created. As has often happened, white leaders might have achieved temporary victories, only to find their long-term interest in a peaceful and prosperous South Africa gravely threatened by a violent black backlash. It should be remembered that the most serious uprisings in recent South African history have occurred when white confidence was high.

This is a particularly dangerous time in South African history because of the age of Nelson Mandela. He is the only person with the respect and support of all factions within the ANC. He is thus uniquely positioned to bring the ANC back into the negotiations--and he may be the only black leader who will be able to persuade black South Africans to accept the compromises that will inevitably be required for a peaceful settlement. If something happens to him before an agreement is negotiated, the future of South Africa will dramatically dim.

Can the negotiations be rescued? The answer depends on De Klerk. If his critics are right--that he is deliberately using the violence in the townships to undermine the ANC, the talks are doomed. Instead, the cycles of rebellion and repression that have engulfed South Africa in the past will be repeated. But this time the cost in human life is likely to be far greater, and the prospects that South Africa and its people will ever realize their potential greatly diminished.

If De Klerk and his allies are genuinely committed to a peaceful transition to a non-racial democracy and are prepared to accept the fact that they cannot expect to dictate the terms of a transition, there is a good chance the climate of trust necessary for the resumption of negotiations can be established.

Only De Klerk and his closest confidants can know for sure which of these two outcomes is most likely.