Collective-Security Force Is a Cruel Illusion : Peacekeeping: Hope is not a method in war. A U.N. military mission lives on little else.

A remarkable trend has developed among the policy-makers and political pundits in regard to the Balkan situation and other recent crisis points. The trend is characterized by one of the most fantastic assumptions to have arisen in the post-Cold War world: that commitment to a collective-security apparatus will spell defeat for chaos, anarchy and the nefarious intentions of some of the world’s ugliest regimes. The fact is, collective security often will require warfare. And the United Nations is far from ready to provide the political support for collective military missions.

This assumption that creating such a force (but not necessarily deploying it) would be an effective strategic tool is a holdover from Cold War grand strategy for a relatively stable bipolar world containing the monolithic threat of nuclear annihilation.

The dynamics of the international arena since 1989 have revealed the stagnation of such strategic thinking and have further exposed a woeful lack of understanding among political leaders about military abilities and implications in a world reoriented to conventional warfare.

Strategic goals, expressed in political terms, must incorporate clearly defined and unambiguous military goals, such as the politico-military relationship that was present in the Gulf crisis.

Herein lies the fundamental flaw in U.N. peacekeeping strategy. Military forces cannot be deployed in a situation where their ability to perform their mission is completely dictated by the whimsy, will and political acumen of their opponents.

We’ve formed numerous U.N. peacekeeping units, deployed them with great fanfare and hope, and then stripped them of political-military support for taking an active role. Their only purpose seems to be symbolic--to represent the censure of the international community; this, it is hoped, will shame the combatants into peace. As for their effectiveness (which is no reflection on the inherent abilities of these handcuffed units), we had a saying in my regiment: “Hope is not a method.”

If this strategy is flawed, what is the alternative? The director of the School of Diplomacy at Georgetown suggests an incremental and escalating approach in the Balkans, starting with observer forces, progressing to punitive air strikes and, finally, “engaging in combat operations.” Deja vu Vietnam. Punitive air strikes? If we could not locate and destroy all of the Scud missiles in Iraq’s desert, how can we target and destroy mobile artillery in the forested mountains of the Balkans?

The professor adds that “it will be difficult to stand by as atrocities take place on international television.” When we start to form our strategic agenda in response to media attention, we’re in serious trouble.

Peace has never been a natural state in our troubled world. It is always the result of dedicated and concerted efforts by a group of nations. More and more lately, the United Nations is presented as the best forum and guarantor of peace. But the interests of the 178 U.N. members are so diverse and so often contradictory that none are quite willing to cede powers to the United Nations that could conceivably intrude on their own interests.

There surely can exist no nobler ideal than the collective security of nations. However, the United Nations is far from being able to confer the collective political (and material) support for ensuring collective security by military means. Suggesting that it can do so in the Balkans is indulging in a cruel illusion.