Put a Lid on the Drumbeats for War : Iraq: Arab backing is doubtful and Hussein’s nuclear potential has been curtailed, so why the rush for military action?

The war clouds are gathering again over Iraq. This time, the potential casus belli is Saddam Hussein’s brutal oppression of his Shiite population. This is in addition to the United Nations’ effort to cleanse Iraq of all weapons of mass destruction and the means for making them. No doubt, the Iraqi dictator richly deserves any punishment meted out by the world, led by the United States. But is it wise for the United States to engage in renewed combat in Iraq? That’s far from clear.

There are two strong foreign-policy arguments for holding Iraq to a stiff standard. The United Nations is finally coming into its own. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union (now Russia) began letting the world body assume some of the tasks assigned to it by its charter. This helps to reduce the prospect of the United States having to act virtually alone to reinforce principles of international law.

The Iraqi dictator regularly flouts the will of the United Nations by challenging its mandate to eliminate his ability to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. If the United Nations prevails, it will get a useful shot in the arm. There is immense value in delivering a message that a broad coalition of states is serious in opposing the spread of mass-destruction weapons, nuclear arms in particular. If the point is made in Iraq, even with military force, others are likely to think twice before seeking such weapons.

But if Iraqi compliance can be secured only through the use of military force, there are further risks. The current imbroglio contains another U.S. objective: the removal of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, much of the U.S. focus on reducing Iraq’s military capabilities--and now, belatedly, on protecting the Shiites--stems from a desire to get rid of Iraq’s president. Washington understands that it is one thing to gain international support in order to keep Iraq from getting nuclear weapons or oppressing a minority; it is quite another thing to get backing for economic sanctions or military actions that are designed to drive a foreign leader from power.

This is part of Saddam Hussein’s game. He wants to shift the world’s focus to children being starved by sanctions and also to represent the Bush Administration’s efforts as a struggle between the West and the Arab-Islamic world. For him, the possibility that his provocations could cause Iraq to be bombed contains a bit of Br’er Rabbit and the Briar Patch. A limited military attack on his country could increase his power at home if he can successfully invoke patriotism and argue that the United States and its allies are ganging up on non-Western people.

President Bush must also make a broader calculation. Before he unleashed Desert Storm, he carefully constructed a coalition of more than 30 countries. One key purpose was to prevent Saddam Hussein from getting away with his David-and-Goliath reasoning and to prevent a massive outpouring of sympathy from the “Arab street.” In the main, the tactic worked.

But anti-Western hostility did increase in much of the Arab world, especially beyond the Persian Gulf states that had been placed immediately at risk. The election victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria--subsequently overturned by force of arms--partly stemmed from the Gulf War. Islamic radicalism has clearly increased in the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan. And Turkey and Egypt have expressed fears about a renewed attack on Iraq; their leaders calculate that the potential political damage is not worth the benefits of a punitive strike against Iraq.

At the very least, the United States must have the full support of the U.N. Security Council. But even if it has the votes, it needs to think about the overall advantages. What is the rush? In late 1990, there was serious debate in the United States about whether economic sanctions would be enough to force Iraq to quit Kuwait. That debate ended when the war began, and the balance of evidence since then seems to validate that choice.

But after all the destruction to Iraq’s base for building mass-destruction weapons, it is most doubtful that it could return to its aggressive ways without a major influx of war supplies and high-technology equipment from outside. Certainly, it cannot get nuclear weapons unless economic sanctions are broadly flouted by a variety of the world’s leading nations.

A year and a half after Desert Storm, time is clearly on the side of Saddam Hussein’s opponents, provided they show resolution as well as patience in continuing to quarantine his country.