Two Sides to ‘One China’ Policy

For 10 years the United States has forbidden the sale of most military equipment to Taiwan. But now the Bush Administration is reconsidering that ban--and rightly so. Allowing Taiwan to purchase as many as 180 F-16 aircraft should be encouraged, even though the action certainly won’t help already strained Washington-Beijing relations.

The sale of F-16s, produced in Texas by General Dynamics, would renew the major arms supply relationship between the United States and Taiwan that was broken off after Washington recognized Beijing and severed formal relations with Taiwan in 1979. Taiwan wants the new aircraft to replace its aging Air Force fleet of F-5Es and F-104s to help maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait.

A sale would probably infuriate Beijing, which maintains that the transaction would violate the 1982 U.S.-China communique limiting U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In fact, Washington had been reducing arm sales to Taiwan, despite its 1979 commitment in the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with “arms of defensive character.”

Beijing has repeatedly said it will never renounce the use of force against relatively tiny Taiwan. Even so, it has acquired Russian-made SU27s and MiG31s and plans to co-produce MiG31s in China. The threat is always there.

Bush’s review of aircraft sales to Taipei could be worth billions and many U.S. jobs. But whoever occupies the White House next year will have to address Taiwan’s ambiguous standing with the United States. Taiwan has come of age politically and economically. It has moved toward democratization. Its economy is now the world’s 13th largest trading nation and its $80 billion in foreign exchange reserves is second to none. Its $300-billion public works program is attracting Europe, which--like America--once shunned Taiwan.

Washington, which has quietly helped Taiwan join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group independent of China, supports Taipei’s bid to join another international group: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The theory of the “One China” policy, as outlined in the 1972 Shanghai communique, has two aspects in reality. One is to placate Beijing; the other is to deal with an increasingly dynamic Taipei. For whoever is running U.S. foreign policy next year, that may involve a formal review of the “One China” policy.