Democracy In Peru: Fanning a Faint Ember : Americas: The U.S. cannot restore democracy to Peru, but working with the OAS, much can be done to contest the autocratic regime of Fujimori.

President-elect Bill Clinton’s campaign pledge “to stand up for democracy” in the world faces a stiff challenge in this hemisphere. After a decade of extraordinary political renewal in Latin America--when military regimes gave way to freely elected governments throughout the region--democratic rule today appears increasingly at risk in many places.

On Nov. 27, military officers in Venezuela launched their second coup attempt in less than a year. Both failed, but they revealed wide public antipathy toward the civilian leadership. They also underscored a bitter truth: If democracy could come under siege in Venezuela, with its great oil wealth and more than 30 years of constitutional rule, few governments in Latin America can feel secure.

And it is no easy task to restore democracy once it is overturned by force. Washington has been working with other hemispheric governments, under the mantle of the Organization of American States, for more than a year to revive democracy in Haiti--with virtually nothing to show for it.

A similar OAS effort in Peru, following elected President Alberto Fujimori’s imposition of one-man rule last April--when he suspended the constitution and closed down Congress and the courts--has accomplished far more. But it has not returned democracy to Peru.

It is a tribute to international pressure that Peruvians went to the polls Nov. 22 for a special election that was supposed to restore constitutional rule. But it was Fujimori--not democracy--that emerged the winner. His candidates gained a decisive majority of seats in a newly created constituent assembly, which is charged with redrafting the constitution and serving as an interim legislature.

There are several reasons for skepticism about the democratizing effect of these elections. Fujimori is a man of autocratic tendencies who has built strong ties with the nation’s security forces. His government has not yet resorted to the outright repression that many had feared, but Fujimori has used his special powers to intimidate political adversaries. He has boasted he would shut down the new assembly if he was unhappy with its performance.

Blame for the foundering of democracy in Peru cannot be pinned on Fujimori alone. Opposition political forces have been unable to mobilize any popular resistance to Fujimori’s takeover or offer any other effective challenge. Still discredited by their failures in the 1980s, Peru’s two major parties sat out the assembly elections--not out of principle, but because they faced voter rejection. No opposition candidate secured more than 8% of the votes. Peruvian politics resemble a clear-cut forest with one tree--Fujimori--left standing.

Fujimori is a popular president, with more than 70% support in recent polls--and his popularity is not hard to explain. Before he took office, the nation’s economy was devastated, the brutal Shining Path insurgency was spreading, human-rights abuses were rampant and narco-trafficking was Peru’s leading industry. Although his government has not ended Peru’s prolonged depression, it brought annual inflation down from 8,000% to 50% and captured the head of the Shining Path and most of its senior leaders.

All this does not mean these elections were without consequence. Although the assembly will enjoy limited authority, it will provide an official platform for opposition voices and perhaps some check on otherwise unbridled presidential power. It should also serve as a reminder to Fujimori that authoritarian solutions are no longer acceptable internationally.

The OAS roundly condemned Fujimori’s power grab and called for the prompt restoration of Peru’s constitutional order. The United States immediately suspended most economic assistance, and persuaded other governments and international financial institutions to cut their aid. With his fledgling economic program endangered, Fujimori grudgingly agreed to hold the assembly elections and invited the OAS to monitor them.

Neither the United States nor the OAS sustained its strong initial response. The OAS sent 200 observers to Peru to watch the elections, but appeared to lose sight of the broader objective of rebuilding democratic politics. This may have been a product of a weakening U.S. role.

The U.S. ambassador in Lima was routinely transferred to Washington a month before the vote, while the nomination of his successor languished in the Senate. The remaining embassy staff lacked the authority to swing much weight with the Peruvian government. Only one senior U.S. official was sent to observe the elections. Many Peruvians saw a waning of U.S. resolve and feared the United States was getting ready to declare Peru a democracy again and restore normal relations.

So far, Washington has resisted that temptation, which would signal that U.S. commitment to democracy is largely rhetorical. Without U.S. engagement, the OAS cannot be an effective force for democratic change in Peru or anywhere else. Multilateral initiatives to safeguard democracy in the Americas, which were gaining ground, would be severely set back. And Peru needs sustained international support if it is to have a chance to reconstruct democracy.

What, then, should Washington do?

First, it should make sure Fujimori understands that the United States considers his elections only a modest step toward democratic rule. Relations with the United States will depend on what happens next: whether the new assembly has the autonomy to challenge presidential authority; how the government manages the nationwide municipal elections scheduled for January, and what happens with the elections for provincial leaders, which should be held next year. Satisfactory performance on all these fronts should be a requirement for renewed U.S. economic assistance.

Another crucial requirement should be consistent respect for human rights. The extra-constitutional powers assumed by Fujimori leaves every Peruvian citizen vulnerable--particularly political opponents. U.S. military aid to Peru must be conditioned on the curtailment of human-rights abuses by the armed forces and a willingness of the Peruvian government to prosecute past and present violations.

The United States and other nations should insist on keeping an OAS mission in Peru to monitor events. The mission should actively engage the government and opposition political forces and encourage dialogue between them.

Peru demonstrates how difficult it is for outsiders to protect democracy. The United States cannot make democratic practices take root in Peru--or anywhere else. What the United States can do is place constraints on the authoritarian impulses of Fujimori-style regimes and thus provide greater space for initiative by national democratic leaders. That requires patience, restraint and sustained engagement--qualities that, unfortunately, have not traditionally been associated with U.S. foreign policy south of the border.