Bill Clinton’s Next Tough Choice in Africa--Angola : Foreign policy: Civil war has resumed after America’s friend lost the election. But Savimbi must be made to face the music and cooperate.

When Bill Clinton takes office, one issue may soon have many of his top foreign-policy advisers quoting Yogi Berra: “Its deja vu all over again.” That issue is Angola.

One of the major choices con fronting the Carter Administration in 1977 was whether to recognize the government in Luanda immediately or to use diplomatic recognition as a bargaining chip to wring concessions from the leaders of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Sixteen years later, with the Angolan civil war heating up again, Clinton will have to make a similar choice.

The MPLA, then a Marxist-oriented movement sponsored by the Soviet Union and Cuba, first seized power in November, 1975. Washington and South Africa backed its two losing rivals, one of which was the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi. President Gerald R. Ford refused to recognize the victors because of their ties to Moscow and continuing reliance on Cuban troops.

Against the better judgment of many of his key aides, a number of whom will soon hold top posts in the Clinton Administration, Jimmy Carter did not reverse Ford’s decision. Instead, he waffled, never establishing criteria for recognition of the leaders in Luanda.

During the Reagan era, to recognize or not became a moot question, since the Republican Administration became more and more directly involved in aiding UNITA, diplomatically and militarily.

In December, 1988, the situation changed dramatically with the signing of a peace accord establishing a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola and clearing the way for Namibian independence. This accord, and the end of the Cold War generally, eliminated the original reasons for U.S. involvement in Angola. By 1991, the Soviet threat had vanished, Cuban troops were headed home and the MPLA had abandoned Marxism. But the United States continued to provide covert military support to UNITA as a means of pressuring the MPLA to agree to an internal settlement.

In May, 1991, a settlement was reached. It imposed an immediate cease-fire and established mechanisms for U.N.-supervised elections and the creation of a united national army. Despite reports of continuing violations of the cease-fire and the failure to integrate the rival armies, the elections went ahead as scheduled in late September, 1992.

To the surprise of UNITA and its supporters in the West, the MPLA won a substantial victory in the legislative elections. In the presidential election, MPLA leader Jose Eduardo dos Santos won 49% of the vote, just below the 50% required to avoid a runoff. Savimbi got 40%.

UNITA immediately protested. But after reviewing the reports of the international teams monitoring the voting, the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Representative for Angola, Margaret Anstee, declared “there was no evidence of major, systematic fraud.” She certified the elections as “free and fair.” The finding was quickly endorsed by the United States.

By late October, UNITA and the MPLA were fighting again, with Savimbi’s forces seizing control of several major towns. In December, the MPLA evidently launched an offensive to retake the towns. Fighting is now under way for control of Huambo, the site of UNITA’s political headquarters. Thousands of Angolans have already died, and Savimbi is threatening to “strike where it hurts.”

Each side blames the other for the resumption of the civil war; each claims a willingness to return to the negotiating table; each calls for stepped-up efforts by the United States and the United Nations to ensure implementation of the ’91 accord. The truth is both parties have behaved irresponsibly, and that neither party is interested in negotiations that will leave them politically weakened.

Which puts Clinton and his advisers in an unenviable position for a new administration. According to the formula adopted by the Bush Administration, recognition would follow the presidential runoff.

There are now serious reasons to doubt that any such formula would apply. Before an election could be held, the U.N. force in Angola would have to be bolstered, and the rival military forces would have to be brought under the control of a unified national command. If this had been done--as it was supposed to have been--before the September elections, a return to civil war probably could have been avoided. It wasn’t, because the United Nations lacked sufficient resources. Today, with its commitments in Somalia and Bosnia, it’s difficult to see where it is going to find the resources to do a better job. UNITA, furthermore, is unlikely to allow its forces to be disarmed.

In any case, it isn’t clear what the real purpose of holding a second election would be. Given the margin of the last election, there is virtually no chance that Savimbi would win. In fact, most observers predict he would do worse. Thus, it makes little sense to squander scarce U.N. and other resources on an effort to supervise an election that would not change the forces that led to a resumption of the civil war.

What’s the alternative?

The new Administration should move quickly to abandon George Bush’s formula and recognize the Angolan government unconditionally on the basis of the results of the September elections. But it should make clear to Luanda that recognition will have little practical meaning unless peace comes to Angola quickly. The Administration should also emphasize that it will judge the government’s behavior according to the same strict standards of human rights and democracy used to judge other countries. At the same time, an international effort should be undertaken to ensure that the flow of arms to UNITA is halted. This approach would achieve several results.

--Savimbi and UNITA would be forced to face up to the reality of losing the elections. The only thing they can hope to achieve by fighting on is to further destroy their homeland. They must now make an irreversible decision to work within the new system.

--Washington could push the MPLA harder on the need for genuine political reconciliation and firm guarantees that the human rights of all Angolans will be respected. But it must be made to understand that if the current fighting continues, there will be no significant inflow of foreign aid and investment. The MPLA must address the legitimate fears of UNITA’s supporters, who comprise at least one-third of the Angolan population.

--It would be easier for us to move beyond the bitter fights that have characterized the U.S. debate over Angola. Both sides have been guilty of exaggerating their party’s commitment to democracy and peace, and both sides have, at times, turned a blind eye toward human-rights abuses committed by their friends.

Nobody’s interest will be served by a return to civil war. But that is precisely what will happen if UNITA’s friends encourage Savimbi to believe he can reverse the September voting or if the MPLA’s friends encourage its leaders to believe that it has a license to run roughshod over its adversaries.