Defense Seeks Mistrial Over Juror : Motion: Lawyers say woman’s comments show she is biased. Wind balks at signing conflict of interest waiver.

Three defense lawyers in the federal trial of four police officers charged with violating Rodney G. King’s civil rights asked for a mistrial Tuesday after a black juror in the case was accused of improper conduct.

U.S. District Judge John G. Davies took the motion under submission and could rule on it as early as this morning.

The accusation about the juror was one of two unexpected snags that arose in the high-profile case, tossing it into turmoil just as lawyers were preparing to deliver their opening statements. The other surprise development was that defendant Timothy E. Wind balked at signing a document needed for the trial to begin.

As a consequence, opening statements, which had been expected to begin today, were postponed until at least Thursday. Selection of three alternate jurors is scheduled to begin this morning.

The issue of the juror’s conduct was raised by Sgt. Stacey C. Koon’s lawyer, Ira Salzman, who recounted statements he received from a prospective juror who was excused at the prosecution’s request.

He told Judge Davies that the dismissed juror--a reserve police officer publicly known only as “Juror 421”--left a message on his office answering machine Tuesday morning, saying that a black woman selected for the jury had discussed the case with him last week.

In a follow-up conversation, Salzman said the dismissed juror quoted the woman, a postal worker, as saying that lawyers for the police officers were responsible for excluding blacks from the jury during last year’s state trial. “She was disdainful in her tone of the defense efforts,” to keep blacks off the federal jury, Salzman said the dismissed juror told him.

Outside the courtroom, Salzman said Juror 421 also said the woman juror told him she believed “the defense is going to do the same thing in this case”--keep blacks off the jury.

“With this new information, I cannot accept this jury as constituted,” Salzman said.

Prospective jurors had been warned not to discuss the case, and Davies was sufficiently upset by the reported conversation to order a special hearing on the matter later in the day.

The woman juror in question is one of two blacks sworn in Monday. The jury also includes one Latino man and nine whites. Salzman said the conversation gave him doubts about whether the woman--whom he previously called “the perfect juror”--could be fair.

Assistant U.S. Atty. Steven D. Clymer accused Salzman of using the conversation in an attempt to have a mistrial declared. He objected to any effort to remove the woman, who said in response to questions during her selection to the jury that she was surprised by the not guilty verdicts in state court, but did not criticize the jurors in that case.

“It sounds to me like they had a hard time making that decision,” she said of the state court jurors. “They did the best of their abilities, as any person would.”

Despite Clymer’s objections, Judge Davies summoned Juror 421 to the courthouse and in midafternoon convened a closed-door hearing on the issue. The judge said he was keeping the public out because the hearing involved extremely sensitive matters.

The possibility that a black juror might be kicked off the panel posed a particularly thorny problem for the judge. There was widespread criticism last year of the fact that there were no blacks on the state court jury that returned not guilty verdicts on all but one of the charges against the four officers.

Late in the afternoon, Davies resumed the public hearing and revealed that defense lawyers had moved for a mistrial, though he did not disclose the reasons for that motion.

Defense lawyers also declined to state specifically what had precipitated the motion for mistrial or discuss in detail what had transpired during the closed hearing.

The lawyers said they foresaw no substantial delay in beginning the trial. Additionally, Stone said he doubted that Judge Davies was going to question the black juror about any comments she made outside the courtroom. The comments indicated that they had been unsuccessful in the attempts to get the judge to dismiss the black juror and that a mistrial motion was their only recourse.

Throwing the proceedings into limbo on another front was defendant Wind’s surprising refusal to sign a waiver saying that he does not believe his attorney has a conflict of interest in the case. Unless Wind signs, his lawyer, Paul DePasquale, may be prevented from representing him. That could force a delay in the trial or even a separate trial for Wind.

At issue is DePasquale’s former law partnership with Stone. During the time that they were partners, the two lawyers could have shared confidential information about their clients, which would make it difficult for them to represent them fairly. No evidence has emerged, however, that they shared any such information.

An angry Davies ordered Wind to contact another lawyer to discuss the matter. After Wind talked to a Santa Monica lawyer, the judge held a conference in his chambers with Wind, the lawyer and a court reporter. Davies emerged at 3 p.m. and said discussions on the issue would resume at 8:30 a.m. today.

“The Supreme Court has ruled that a trial judge must make sure that each defendant has a lawyer unhindered by conflict,” said Laurie Levenson, a Loyola University law professor who is a former federal prosecutor.

She said that DePasquale has a potential conflict on two grounds. The first is that Stone may have information that could be used against his client. The second, she said, is that DePasquale may have information that he is unable to use in the trial.

In January, Davies, in response to a motion filed by Salzman, ruled that Stone did not have a conflict of interest that would prevent him from continuing with the case. However, the judge directed government lawyers to prepare formal written waivers for Powell and Wind to sign before the trial began. Federal prosecutors filed the waiver papers Monday.

The lengthy waiver document poses several questions designed to ensure that Powell and Wind understand that “a possibility exists that due to circumstances which the court is unaware of and cannot foresee, a conflict will arise between” them.

By signing the document, the defendant waives his right to claim he was denied the right to a fair trial because a conflict arose.

On Tuesday, Powell, as he had done in the state case, agreed to waive his conflict rights. But Wind reversed what he did in the state case and refused to sign the waiver. He did not explain his reasons in open court. DePasquale also declined to comment on what might have prompted Wind’s action.