PERSPECTIVE ON RUSSIA : A Green Light to Go Wrong : Yeltsin, this step under his belt, may choose to jettison the people’s most precious rights in order to hold onto power.

He seemed so sure, so utterly confident.

But I had my doubts. How could my friend be so certain that it was worth risking everything? Especially since he had been so distracted of late, immersed in his own affairs.

“I think the United States has to strongly support Boris Yeltsin; he is the only hope for reform,” my American friend said flatly.

“Support him against whom?” I asked.

“Against the former Communists in Parliament.”

“Yeltsin is a former Communist himself and most of the people around him are, too. Most of Russia’s elected officials were at one time a member of the party.”

“But these former Communists want to reverse the gains of economic reform. They’re hard-liners.”

“Hard-liners? Not necessarily,” I countered. “Only 10% of the Congress of People’s Deputies is regarded as neo-Communist. The rest are moderates, many of whom have benefited from privatization and some form of business activity. Their principal difference with Yeltsin over economics revolves around the wisdom of imposing economic ‘shock therapy.’ If you think their doubts about the success of ‘shock therapy’ makes them Communists, then you should say that any American who does not believe in Reaganomics is a socialist.”

“Yeah, but this Parliament can’t be a legitimate voice of the people because the deputies were elected during the Soviet era, in rigged elections.”

“Wait a minute,” I said. “They were elected in 1990 in freely contested elections that were monitored and OKd by Western observers. Also, you may remember that Boris Yeltsin’s election as president of Russia was also held during the Soviet era, in the following year. It’s interesting to note, by the way, that it was the current Russian Parliament that voted to establish the popularly elected position of president.”

By now I was gathering some steam: “Yeltsin, in fact, had formally defended the Parliament as Russia’s representative body that must be preserved. That is why he was camped out at the (Moscow) White House during the August, 1991, coup. And why he stood on top of a tank: to protect Russia’s Parliament.”

“OK, maybe that’s true,” my friend said, “but Yeltsin has to break the political impasse in Russia. He has to get reform back on track.”

“What kind of reform?” I retorted. “There are all kinds of reform going on simultaneously in Russia--legal reform, economic reform, defense reform. But if you are talking about democratic reform, I am afraid that something terrible has happened.”

“What do you mean?”

“The West gave Yeltsin the tacit green light to declare the suspension of parliamentary power, which is undemocratic at best and unconstitutional at worst. We should have persuaded him to search every avenue for a compromise. Russia desperately needs the checks and balances of a democracy. Ask Igor here,” I said, looking at my Russian friend who had been listening in gloomy silence. “Igor will tell you that the only difference between democracy and authoritarianism is process. If you abandon the procedures that allow free debate and genuine consensus-building, you don’t have a democracy. And once abandoned, it could be impossible to restore for perhaps a generation.”

“Come on,” my American friend said with annoyance. “You read the same reports that I did. Yeltsin intends to hold a referendum to give the Russian people a chance to decide which power structure should dominate: a presidential system or a parliamentary one.”

So, finally he understood that this was the basis of the crisis, that it was not about reform, per se, but about power.

“Unfortunately, the time for a referendum, if there was to be one, was last year,” I said. “I am worried about the mood of the Russian public. Apathy is so pervasive that Yeltsin would be lucky to get even a mediocre turnout. Even more crucial, the chances for further decentralization and disintegration within the Russian Republic are very much in the cards. Only weeks ago, the president of Tatarstan (an enclave inside Russia) said that his republic would not participate in any referendum. Many other regions would follow suit as a way to gain more independence.”

“Even so,” my friend said, “it would give Yeltsin some moral authority.”

“Maybe, but I doubt very much that Yeltsin has the ability to organize a referendum by April 25. He has no political party of his own and his ‘prefect’ system--his personal representatives in the regions--was recently disbanded for being unconstitutional. Yeltsin would not be able to prepare a referendum without the cooperation of local officials. And that will not happen in enough places to make the plebiscite of any political use. The whole exercise, especially with the likely delay, could actually exacerbate the chaos.”

My American friend sighed, as if such a complex set of circumstances was finally too much to think about, given all the other things on his mind. “Well, the West had to do something,” he said. “We had to support our friend.”

I shook my head. “That is perhaps the most unfortunate part of it all--it could be counterproductive. The Russians are disappointed and resentful over our inability to engage and assist in their transformation. If they see Yeltsin as a puppet of the West--such an accusation has already surfaced--it could be one of the final straws in his tenuous hold on power. And if his power were to erode further, Yeltsin might be impeached, or he might have no choice but to resign. If he were to hang on, however, he might have to consolidate his hold through censorship, control over the media or the use of the military and security forces--if they remain loyal. In any of these scenarios, there always lurks the possibility that a third, truly dangerous force could emerge.”

My Russian friend Igor remarked sadly, “Imagine--those who are in conflict now were on the same side of the barricades in August of ’91. Our only hope is they remember and compromise. If not, those of us who risked our lives will have accomplished nothing.”