NEWS ANALYSIS : Business Leaders Come to Guatemala’s Rescue : Central America: The executives mobilized to restore order after coups. It wasn’t quite democracy, but it came close.

The business executive in the Ralph Lauren shirt and Rolex watch stood before a collection of flowcharts, graphs and an overhead projector. Steel pointer in hand, like Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf explaining the Gulf War, the executive outlined the battle plan to rescue this country from a dizzying succession of coups and countercoups and to restore it to civilian, constitutional rule.

He described the secret meetings of business leaders, gathered to decide the country’s future. The task forces deployed to contact the armed forces and the U.S. Embassy. The hesitant, calculated inclusion of unions and other groups representing the masses.

In short, he was describing the systematic, sophisticated way in which Guatemala’s business elite mobilized to take charge, enlist the army and resolve the political crisis triggered when President Jorge Serrano seized absolute power and suspended the constitution May 25.

Was it democracy in action? Not exactly. The history of Guatemala has long been punctuated by alliances between the oligarchy and the generals. But the results, this time, bear a certain resemblance to democracy and have given a beleaguered nation unprecedented hope.

Serrano dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court and announced he would rule by decree in an audacious, ultimately disastrous bid to quiet opponents and impose order. Initially backed by the military, Serrano lost that support when the international and domestic fury became insurmountable and the threat of severe economic sanctions became real.

A week after Serrano’s “self-coup,” the army reversed itself and ousted the president. The military high command then supported Serrano’s vice president, Gustavo Espina Salguero, as he tried to seize the presidency. But Congress refused to swear Espina into office, and he was forced to retreat.

Finally, with Guatemala teetering on the brink of chaos, Congress convened to choose a new president. As a stunned nation watched, Guatemala’s human rights ombudsman, Ramiro de Leon Carpio, was the choice.

Instrumental in forcing both Serrano and Espina out--and in bringing along the military--were the business executives.

They were methodical in their mission. They formed anti-coup subcommittees and plotted strategy on charts and graphs.

The whirlwind of events in Guatemala confirmed one thing that is true of much of Central America: Democracy is still quite frail.

Despite seven years of ostensibly democratic rule, Guatemala, like most of its neighbors, continues to be controlled by an elite of landholders, entrepreneurs, bankers and industrialists. And despite a bumper crop of civilian presidents, the army remains the strongest institution.

But the events in Guatemala also pointed to a few illuminating trends in Central America.

When the interests of the elite clash with those of the army, who wins? In this case, civilians--albeit rich ones--were able to force the military to change its course.

There also was a recognition that some effort must be made--however limited and controlled--to include the voices of those traditionally ignored: labor, peasants, the Indians who make up Guatemala’s disenfranchised majority.

Finally, what became clear in the confusion was a universal repudiation of authoritarian rule, and that, say diplomats and political analysts, bodes well for democracy. The goal of returning to constitutional government brought together diverse groups who probably never agreed on anything else.

“This fragile democracy cost us too much to have a dictatorship now,” said Fernando Andrade, foreign minister in Guatemala’s last military government, which relinquished power to a civilian, Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, in 1986. “I never imagined I would see groups with such profound differences . . . unite behind a common objective.”

Perhaps most remarkable in the process was the selection of De Leon as president.

It was generally thought that the armed forces would never accept him as president because of his recent background as a human rights advocate, a position from which he attacked both the military and the government.

But Guatemalan powerbrokers evidently decided De Leon was the person who could hold the country together as it emerges from these last weeks of crisis. Before he became human rights ombudsman, De Leon played a prominent role in one of the main political parties, the centrist National Center Union. At the same time, he enjoys credibility with the left and grass-roots organizations.

Many believe that De Leon has the best chance of any recent leader to negotiate peace with leftist guerrillas engaged in a 32-year-old civil war with the military.

Most Guatemalans also agree on the need to clean up and reform Congress, a corrupt body that inspires little trust.

Serrano, who fled the country and has been granted asylum in Panama, had quintupled his personal wealth during his last year in office, according to Guatemalan news reports. The new government has frozen Serrano’s assets and is seeking his extradition.

The business coalition that led the way in returning Guatemala to constitutional order singled out reform of Congress.

So far, however, there has been little progress toward that goal. Congress is not inclined to purge itself, and De Leon is not making it a priority.

In an interview, he said his new role as president prevents him from interfering with Congress. He said he would rely instead on the work of the business-labor coalition to root out corruption in the 116-member legislative body.

Still, it is De Leon’s relationship with the army that will give him his most tricky challenge. If he is seen as moving too quickly toward reducing troop size, or if he is perceived as making concessions to the guerrillas or the left, he risks a backlash from the armed forces.

So far, the new president’s actions regarding the military have reflected a penchant for compromise. On his first day in office, he fired the defense minister and the general most closely associated with Serrano’s usurpation of power. But he also promoted a combination of hard-liners and more moderate officers in a clear attempt to strike a balance.

“There is no doubt that this is a situation that is not just difficult but strange,” De Leon said in the interview, reflecting on his move from chief critic of the army to commander in chief. “Any ombudsman in the world who does his job well is going to be controversial. At this moment, (my) role has changed, and the army will have to understand.”