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PERSPECTIVE ON MIDEAST PEACE : Winning Over the Palestinians : Arafat can succeed if he keeps the peace process advancing and suppresses terrorism and radical opposition.

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<i> Barry Rubin, a professor at Tel Aviv University, is the author of a forthcoming history of the PLO, "Revolution Until Victory?" (Harvard University Press); Judith Colp Rubin is a journalist</i>

For the Palestine Liberation Organization, 30 years of armed struggle against Israel is over, but what lies ahead may be just as difficult.

In a remarkable turnabout, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s historic deal with Israel has made him at least momentarily more popular in Washington than in Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Anti-Arafat criticism is particularly prevalent in Gaza, a bleak, economically depressed area occupied by Israel since 1967.

Although Gaza is due to be given self-rule within weeks, radical and Islamic fundamentalist opponents of Arafat’s move called a strike to make Monday a day of mourning. Their view was summed up by Zuhayr Rayess, a PLO charter member: “This is a surrender to the Israelis. I am not ready to give up any part of Palestine.” But Arafat’s supporters staged a demonstration, too.

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The reaction here is evidence of the problems the PLO will encounter as it seeks to change its structure and role. The majority of Palestinians here are hopeful and fearful, waiting to see if anything will really change. Arafat can deliver on his promise to end the conflict but it will be a battle all the way to mobilize support and avoid a civil war.

Those supporting Arafat and the agreement include his own Fatah group plus a large majority of independent activists; arrayed against him are five smaller PLO member groups--most important the Democratic Front and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--along with the non-PLO Islamic fundamentalist Hamas, which is especially strong in Gaza.

Even more worrisome, though, are conflicts among the interests of three different Palestinian constituencies. Indigenous residents of Gaza and the West Bank are the biggest beneficiaries of an end to the occupation, since their homes and homeland will be in the same spot.

But the majority in Gaza--and a large proportion in the West Bank--are refugees from places that became Israel in 1948. Today, most of them still live in camps, having refused resettlement offers. They are poorer and less moderate than the Palestinians who stayed on their historic land, tending to be suspicious of the Israel-PLO agreement.

“I’m afraid of the future,” says Hamdi Farraj, who was born and lives in one of the largest, most militant camps at Dahaisha on the West Bank. “It is not the time to take our rights. We know we will stay in the camps.”

Even more skeptical are the other refugees from 1948 who live outside the land--roughly half of all Palestinians--mostly in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and other Arab countries. The fact that the PLO leadership comes almost completely from this last group was a key element in the organization’s radicalism. They could return home only if Israel were destroyed. But now the refugees not living in the West Bank and Gaza fear betrayal by their compatriots, leaving them stranded abroad.

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Another tricky matter will be the relationship between the returning PLO leadership and local authorities in the West Bank and Gaza. The last straw for Arafat in deciding to make a breakthrough was his desire to avoid a prolonged autonomy period under local Palestinian supervision, which might displace him. And those street activists who regard themselves as heroes of the intifada-- the uprising against Israel that has lasted nearly six years--may soon find themselves being shoved aside.

Arafat must defeat his rivals to win support for the new arrangement and to avoid terrorism that might wreck it. He will have to deliver material benefits to West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, while reassuring Palestinians abroad that they might someday be able to return to a Palestine-ruled territory, though not to their old hometowns inside Israel.

Arafat can succeed only if he keeps the peace process with Israel advancing. To protect himself, he must suppress terrorism and radical opposition. To win popular support, he must deliver improved living standards, self-rule, steps toward ending occupation and the return of deportees.

“People have to taste the fruits of peace to be convinced that this peace is genuine,” says Radwan abu Ayyash from Ramallah, a leading pro-PLO West Bank figure. “Once we get busy building the homeland, changing the old stereotypes and old psychology, (opponents) will feel the difference and see that it is not just talks and slogans.”

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