Somali Warlord Reportedly Rearmed Under U.N. Noses

Warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid rearmed his militiamen right under the noses of tens of thousands of U.N. peacemaking troops charged with disarming them, apparently using extortion and sympathetic middlemen to build his arsenal during his months-long battle against the United Nations and the United States, according to informed Somali sources and U.N. military officers.

Aidid’s forces may well have employed this arms cache when they shot down two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters and killed 18 American soldiers in their fierce Oct. 3 attack on an elite Army Ranger squad, and in renewed battles with rival clansmen in the war-ruined capital that flared last week for the first time in more than a year.

The Oct. 3 battle, in which Aidid’s militiamen used hundreds of rounds of rocket-propelled grenades and thousands of rounds of automatic-weapons fire against Rangers who had captured two dozen Aidid supporters, altered U.S. policy in Somalia and led to unilateral cease-fires by Aidid and the U.N. force.

In interviews with U.N. military officials here and key members of both of Mogadishu’s two powerful warring clans, sources said Aidid’s Somali National Alliance militia had free rein over a major Somali port and the main road linking it to Mogadishu.

An Italian mercenary in the capital, the sources said, arranged a resupply of rocket launchers, machine guns and small-arms ammunition. This took place during the four months in which Aidid evaded a manhunt by U.N. troops, including U.S. Special Forces.

The weapons allegedly supplied to Aidid’s militia were the same type used in last week’s pitched battles with rivals loyal to warlord Ali Mahdi Mohamed.

That fighting broke out when Ali Mahdi’s supporters marched to a “peace rally” across the so-called Green Line. The line--a gutted zone--has separated Ali Mahdi’s area of control in north Mogadishu from Aidid’s stronghold in the south of the city.

The weapons used in the clan fighting were the same types used to shoot down the two U.S. helicopters in what proved to be a turning point in the costly Oct. 3 battle that also left 77 American troops wounded and a helicopter pilot held hostage.

With public and congressional criticism of U.S. involvement mounting, President Clinton made it clear that the United States would end its lead role in the U.N. hunt for Aidid. The Administration then moved toward negotiations that would permit a peaceful withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Somalia by March 31.

Weapons resupply was crucial to Aidid’s guerrilla campaign against U.N. forces and inter-clan skirmishing. His militia had stockpiled weapons in secret caches around south Mogadishu before the U.S. Marines landed here Dec. 9, opening the American-led U.N. military intervention to end the Somali famine and to pacify and rebuild this heavily armed, lawless nation.

But much of Aidid’s previous arms stores were destroyed in air strikes in mid-June, which Clinton ordered as retribution for the warlord’s suspected role in the ambush slaying of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers June 5.

When the smoke cleared, the President declared the operation against Aidid a success, asserting that the aerial bombardment by U.S. AC-130 Spectre gunships and Cobra attack helicopters had broken Aidid’s military capability.

Aidid’s ability to rearm is testimony both to his effectiveness as a guerrilla commander and to dangerous divisions in U.N. ranks here.

The warlord got new supplies for his Habre Gedir subclan militia at a time when U.N. special envoy Jonathan Howe, a retired American admiral, sought to conduct an aggressive disarmament campaign in the Somali capital.

Howe’s senior commanders, in a U.N. force dominated by U.S. military officers, refused to confirm or deny Aidid’s rearmament efforts.

But there are indications that Howe, who was committed to capturing Aidid and his top lieutenants, took steps several weeks ago to try to halt the flow of arms to Aidid.

On Sept. 30, Howe ordered the arrest and deportation of an Italian businessman who had been living in a villa in an Aidid-controlled area of the capital. U.N. officials gave vague reasons for the deportation, saying that the Italian’s guards had fired on U.N. officers when they approached his gate.

But several well-informed Somalis said the Italian was instrumental in arranging purchases for Aidid of rocket-propelled grenades and rocket launchers. Those conventional, unsophisticated Soviet-made weapons, Aidid’s militiamen learned in mid-September, were effective against helicopters flying below 900 feet.

The Italian, who could not be reached for comment, reportedly carried a U.N. card identifying him as a human rights worker with an Austrian aid agency that runs a hospital in an Aidid stronghold.

But U.N. military officials said the ID card, easily obtained in Mogadishu, was “just a cover.” They confirmed that the Italian was suspected of providing arms and ammunition to Aidid.

“He brought in 50-foot trailers with all these” rocket-propelled grenades, said Abdulkadir Yahya Ali, a Somali and a U.N. political officer with ties to Aidid’s rival in north Mogadishu.

Yahya also confirmed accounts from Aidid loyalists that most of the weapons used against the Ranger helicopters in the Oct. 3 battle were newly acquired rocket-propelled grenades.

U.N. military officials, who said they were surprised by the force Aidid troops displayed in the Oct. 3 fighting, said they were convinced that Aidid had managed to rearm himself under the eyes of U.N. forces.

Yahya and Somali witnesses said the weapons supply routes passed through territory of Aidid supporters, an area for which Italy’s military contingent here was responsible; U.N. sources said they believed the weapons arrived at the central Somali port of Hobyo, long controlled by militia loyal to Aidid.

Sources said the arms then were trucked to the capital through the nearby town of Balcad, also in Aidid turf. They said the arms probably entered the capital at Checkpoint Pasta, a U.N. post near an abandoned spaghetti factory in northwest Mogadishu.

The site was under Italian control until early September, when Italian forces turned it over to Nigerian troops under a compromise that settled one of the most bitter public rifts in the U.N. mission in Somalia.

Rome had sharply criticized the U.N. hunt for Aidid, singling out U.S. military commanders within the mission for pursuing a hard-line campaign against the warlord that the Italians suggested was no different than Aidid’s assaults against U.N. forces.

When Italy threatened to pull out of the 28-nation coalition, U.S. and Italian diplomats negotiated a settlement under which Italian troops left the war-torn capital for the largely peaceful countryside north of Mogadishu.

On Sept. 6, after the Italians had turned over Checkpoint Pasta, the Nigerians were attacked by Aidid forces. Seven Nigerian soldiers were killed, seven were wounded and one was taken captive.

Nigerian officers later described a meeting they had just had with the local Somali elders and militia, who demanded large sums of money. Nigerian officers said local Somali elders told them that Italian forces at the checkpoint had paid as much as $1,000 a night in exchange for promises that they would be safe from militia attacks.

Nigerian and Somali sources said the elders and gunmen around Checkpoint Pasta told them the Italians also agreed not to search any vehicles or confiscate any weapons entering the capital.

The Italians dispute the Nigerian story and deny making any payments or deals.

The Nigerian commander said he insisted he could not make any such payments. That night, the Nigerians were attacked.

After the battle, U.N. commanders abandoned Checkpoint Pasta, which apparently has returned to the direct control of Aidid allies. Italian troops are now deployed in and around Balcad. And the port of Hobyo remains far north of the area designated for the U.N. mission to pacify and reconstruct southern and central Somalia.