Fear of Russia’s Ambitions Rising in Eastern Europe : Security: The Russian army is seen as gaining influence over Yeltsin, while the West ignores the deepening problems of the young democracies.

It may seem odd--even irrational--to a visitor from the West that serious people in Warsaw and other Eastern European capitals are seriously talking about the “imperial” dangers posed by Moscow. But they are. Respected pundits charge on radio and television that Poland is the victim of “another Western betrayal.” A front-page headline in the newspaper Zycie Warszawy proclaims that Imperial Russia Is Becoming a Fact!

Justified or not, these fears reflect a growing Eastern European perception of reality, and thus constitute a political fact of life the West should take with equal seriousness. Many Poles, including top foreign-policy experts, see their country directly menaced by a resurgent and nuclear-armed Russia, and they are afraid that unless the West intervenes, Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe will be drawn once more into Moscow’s sphere of influence as a result of the new de facto partition of the continent.

The deepest concern is that neither the United States nor its West European allies seem aware of the immensely grave problems developing in the east because their attention is fixated on the political fate of Boris N. Yeltsin. In the eyes of Poles and other Eastern Europeans, the West--notably, the United States--is subordinating their security interests to Yeltsin’s political requirements in a way that may soon place them on a collision course with Russia’s ambitions. This attitude is likely to further destabilize the region and adversely affect the great efforts made to solidify the post-communist process of democratization.

Ironically, it was Yeltsin’s victory in last month’s confrontation with his extremist foes that added fuel to the tensions between Russia and Eastern Europe. Eastern Europeans are convinced that the Russian president has become so indebted to his military chiefs, who saved him last month, that he has, in effect, turned over to them the formulation of foreign policy. Polish newspapers have reported in detail how top Russian commanders waited until the last moment to move against Yeltsin’s enemies to exact the price for their loyalty. The consensus in Warsaw is that the price includes a traditionally nationalist foreign policy--aimed at Poland, which Russians have always regarded as a threatening Western bulwark.

Polish anxiety over Russia’s intentions intensified when Yelstin recently signed a new “strategic doctrine.” Although the document’s full text was not made public, Defense Minister Pavel S. Grachev stressed that, under the new doctrine, Russian armed forces may cross Russia’s borders in pursuit of territorial aggressors and that they may remain there. Grachev also rescinded Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, a move seen as a warning to Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal.

All this feeds an already nasty mood on both sides. Last month, Poland expelled the Russian military attache on espionage charges; Russia similarly discharged the Polish counterpart. Warsaw newspapers observed that the “Cold War has been replaced by cold peace.” Senior Polish officials claimed in quiet chats with foreign diplomats that the Central Intelligence Agency and the new Russian intelligence service have held secret talks at the highest levels to try to strike a “deal” about Eastern Europe.

None of this can be confirmed, of course. There is no question, however, that the conduct of Russian policy, whose architects are believed to be Grachev and Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev, has appreciably changed since the bloody confrontation in Moscow. A strong nationalist current, represented by the armed forces, seems on the ascendant, with restoration of Moscow’s role in world affairs the ultimate goal.

Thus, Russia forced Georgian President Eduard A. Shevardnadze to join the Moscow-directed Commonwealth of Independent States in exchange for its decisive military support against anti-Shevardnadze rebels, though Russia may have aided the rebels in the first place. Armenia and Azerbaijan had already joined the commonwealth for similar reasons. Grachev also has announced that Russian troops will not leave newly independent Latvia and Estonia until Russian minorities there are granted citizenship rights.

Finally, Moscow sought permission from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to allow it to deploy armored units near St. Petersberg and in the Caucasus above the ceilings established by the 1990 Vienna treaty on conventional forces in Europe. Rumors have been reaching Warsaw that the Russians would like to renegotiate the entire treaty, or to withdraw from it, if their demands are not met. Earlier this month, Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian Defense Ministry’s daily newspaper, reported that the armed forces requested the government to place new production orders at 200 defense plants and to roll over their debts, which total $330 million.

But the most disturbing of all Russian actions was Yeltsin’s policy shift on the question of NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. All three had sought to join the organization because NATO membership includes security guarantees that these Eastern European nations urgently desire in light of the instability reigning in much of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans.

In March, 1992, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner informed Polish officials that “NATO doors are open.” Poland was further encouraged when Yeltsin and Polish President Lech Walesa signed, on Aug. 25, a declaration stressing that Poland’s NATO membership would “not be contrary to Russian interest.”

Then a month later, Yeltsin stunned the West, as well as Eastern Europeans, when he wrote the leaders of the United States, France, Britain and Germany to announce Russia’s absolute opposition to NATO admission of any new members. It was Sept. 30, the day before he disbanded the Russian Parliament and set the stage for the armed confrontation with his foes.

Instead of NATO membership for Eastern European countries, Yeltsin proposed joint NATO and Russian security guarantees for them, an idea that instantly convinced the three NATO applicants that they would be turned into buffer states again. They also strongly believe that Yeltsin was motivated by a desire to secure military support before taking on his opponents in Parliament.

Adding insult to injury was the West’s immediate acceptance of Yeltsin’s demand. In lieu of NATO membership, it offered military cooperation in the form of joint exercises with individual East European countries.

The West has made no secret of its intention to do nothing--such as expanding NATO membership eastward--that would jeopardize Yeltsin’s standing with the Russian military or interfere with Grachev’s new defensive doctrine and his fears that Russia is being encircled.

Such a Western stand on security matters, combined with its reluctance to provide meaningful economic aid and open markets to the region’s farm products, may lead to acts of political desperation by Eastern European governments to protect themselves. Strongly nationalistic groups could reach for power--with extreme conservatives and former communists uniting, as they did in Russia--triggering new turmoil and jeopardizing the nascent democracies.

It would be folly for the West to allow history to take such a course just four years after the walls built by totalitarianism came crashing down.