Will ‘Who Lost Russia?’ Become ‘Who Lost Europe?’

In the wake of the fascist and communist surge in Russia’s December elections and the resignations of prominent reformers, pundits are already asking, “Who lost Russia?” But this is not the right question.

Here’s why: U.S. interests in Russian reform are part and parcel of America’s broader interests in a secure, democratic and prosperous Europe. By focusing on Moscow, to the detriment of our other interests, we run the risk of failing to consolidate democratic gains in Central and Eastern Europe. The fading fortunes of economic reform in countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain have fed an alarming rise in virulent nationalism--even neo-fascism. The nightmare America and her allies must avoid is a fractured and fascist Europe.

Yet, most observers have only noticed the bad news out of Moscow. The twin champions of reform, Prime Minister Yegor T. Gaidar and Finance Minister Boris G. Fyodorov, have resigned--with the latter blasting Strobe Talbott, the State Department’s “Russia czar” and soon-to-be deputy secretary of state. A cast of apparatchiks have seemingly taken control. These events have caused consternation in Western capitals, but talk of a “lost” Russia is wrongheaded, for at least two reasons:

First, Russia has not been “lost.” In microeconomic terms, the economic situation has improved, in many respects, over the last year. More than 75% of Russia’s small businesses and retail shops are in private hands. More than 25% of the labor force is employed in the private sector.

Unfortunately, the growth of the private sector has been accompanied by a rampant increase in organized--and violent--crime. Bribery and corruption are widespread tools of business. Reformers, like Democrats in Washington, need to become as anti-crime as their opponents.

The main risk to reform is on the macroeconomic front. Fyodorov’s efforts had just begun to pay off. Inflation was coming down. Indeed, the chief impediment to bringing inflation under control was--and is--Central Bank Chairman Viktor V. Gerashchenko, a communist holdover and bitter opponent of reform.

That’s why the resignations are so disturbing. Personnel determine policy. With the departure of the reformers and their replacement by “Red managers,” there are few left in Moscow’s upper reaches--other than Boris N. Yeltsin himself--with any tested commitment to reform. These resignations are reminiscent of Eduard A. Shevardnadze’s resignation as Soviet foreign minister in 1990. President Mikhail S. Gorbachev felt he could continue reform without his trusted colleague--only to have his new associates from the old guard attempt to depose him in a coup.

Gains made by Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party--neither liberal nor democratic nor truly a party--in the Dec. 12 elections are a basic cause of much of Russia’s current turmoil. They reveal the extent of popular opposition to Yeltsin’s economic reform program and the people’s willingness to look for simplistic solutions. Yet, the Russian people also approved a constitution giving the government, not the Parliament, power. It is not whistling past the graveyard to say Yeltsin has the tools to accelerate reform. The question is: Does he have the will--and the personnel--to do so?

Second, the West cannot “lose” Russia. Russia can be “lost”--but only by the Russian people and their leaders. Russia is a nation of more than 150 million people, spanning 12 time zones. Great powers are “great” primarily because they determine their own destinies. Ultimately, the choices Russians make will shape their future. Only they can lose a nascent democratic Russia to fascism or communism.

What the West can lose, however, is the opportunity to reshape Europe. While the West’s influence over events in Russia is marginal, our influence over events in the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe can be decisive. But recent events there have been no more conducive to reform than those in Moscow.

In Belarus, Prime Minister Stanislav Shushkevich, another committed reformer, has been ousted by Parliament for pushing reform too aggressively and failing to align Minsk’s foreign policy with Moscow’s. In Kiev, the Parliament has again failed to ratify the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This despite the Clinton Administration’s promise to double aid to the Ukrainian government so it will do the very thing it has promised us twice before it would do. Meanwhile, inflation in Ukraine has reached 100% a month, effectively undermining the people’s economic independence. And in recent elections in the Crimea, a Russian secessionist won 73% of the vote.

Farther west, in the Balkans, the war winds on--and up, not down. The Bosnian Serbs have instituted a general mobilization. There are reports both Serbia and Croatia are sending regular army units into Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Belgrade on a trip, Zhirinovsky tied these events together when he said, “The retreat has ended, we are launching a general offensive, let all our enemies fear us. . . . Let them squirm in Paris, London, Washington and Tel Aviv.”

Zhirinovsky’s trip to the Balkans symbolizes the danger the West faces. We should take him seriously--both because of what he says and where he says it.

By his words, Zhirinovsky tells us what he opposes. Except for Serbian “ethnic cleansing,” what he supports is unclear. He is against democracy; against free markets; against the West, and against non-Russians and nonwhites--depending on the audience. Anger over Russia’s losses is his driving force, as is resentment against those who allegedly caused them: Westerners, capitalists, Jews.

Zhirinovsky is, plain and simple, a fascist. The nation is supreme, the individual subservient. To him, being Russian is intrinsically good. Being anything else is intrinsically bad--unless for tactical purposes he wants to unite Russians with Serbs in a Slavic brotherhood or Russians with white Europeans and Americans against the “blacks.”

Where he’s been making his pronouncements is equally disturbing. Last week, he found a receptive audience in Serbia. He and Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic are, in many ways, soul mates. Each feeds on a hypernationalism that combines authoritarianism at home with contempt for everything foreign.

The danger is that the Milosevics and the Zhirinovskys will continue to preach their message of intolerance and hate, even conspiring in their efforts, putting pressure on other leaders to “defend” their peoples. Soon, ethnicity, not democracy, could become the organizing principle for the region. History would tell us that’s likely.

Here’s where that could lead. Serbia could extend its ethnic cleansing to Albanians in Kosovo and Sandjak and to Hungarians in Vojvodina. Tensions could increase between Greece and Albania over the Albanians already expelled from Greece and the 60,000 to 300,000 Greeks living in Albania. (So contentious is the issue already that Greece and Albania cannot agree on the actual number.)

These tensions are likely to rebound in Turkey--where there will be calls for defense of the primarily Muslim Albanians, as well as the approximately 800,000 ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. Hungarian nationalists could come to power on promises to protect the more than 4 million ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states.

Of course, this pales in comparison with the potential conflicts over the 25 million Russians living in the “near abroad.” Obviously, the Baltics are a flash point. But so, too, are northern Kazakhstan and eastern Ukraine--where many Russians live and nuclear weapons remain.

In short, U.S. interests in Europe and Eurasia comprise more than who does what to whom inside the Kremlin walls. Not all problems in Europe can be solved via the Moscow-Washington hot line.

In the weeks ahead, President Bill Clinton and his key aides need to ask and answer five questions:

One, how can the West contain the conflict in the Balkans and prevent it from becoming a broader Balkan war? The West may not be able to stop the war in Bosnia at an acceptable cost, but with resolve and foresight, it can prevent one from starting in Macedonia, Albania, Hungary or other neighboring states.

Two, how can the West integrate those Central and Eastern European democracies that meet objective criteria (e.g., Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic) for full membership in Western institutions? The Partnership for Peace is an evasion.

Third, how can we promote the independence of the non-Russian former Soviet states while working to denuclearize them? Clinton missed an opportunity to support democracy when he failed to visit Kyrgyzstan. Under Askar Akayev, this state is moving toward democracy and hasn’t made and then broken promises.

Fourth, what can be done to support democracy and free markets in Russia--now that most reformers have left the government? Let’s hope the West doesn’t panic and cut off support to reformers at the local levels and in the private sector who now desperately need our support.

Finally, what can Washington do to increase West-West coordination and cooperation? If America and her West European allies can’t agree on a course of action, then a Europe whole and free surely will be lost to a Europe fractured and fascist. Then the question will not be, “Who lost Russia?” It will be, “Who lost Europe?”*