Commentary : Perspectives on the Colosio Assassination : Forge a Triumph of Light Out of Dark Tragedy : To honor Colosio and commit to reform, the PRI should choose his successor openly, with input from the public.

The assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio confronts President Carlos Salinas de Gortari with the possibility of forging a major democratic breakthrough out of tragedy. A new presidential candidate must be named by the Institutional Revolutionary Party--the PRI. The choice is expected to be the president’s. But he could instead take this opportunity to open the selection process to a larger number of voices in the party and in Mexican society. If the outcome is the selection of a candidate who can be a true unifying force, an effective promoter of Mexico’s transition to full democracy as well as a guarantor of continuity in the country’s recent economic reforms, what happened in Tijuana on Wednesday could be transformed from a senseless act of violence to the final catalyst--after Chiapas--for a great national renewal.

It is widely known that, within the PRI, Colosio’s candidacy for the presidency was backed most fervently by elements opposed to deeper political reforms that would make elections much more competitive and thus threaten their continued hold on power. Colosio’s designation as PRI’s nominee was seen as a major defeat for the “reform” wing of the party, closely identified with Manuel Camacho Solis--former Mexico City mayor, one of the leading presidential hopefuls and, since early January, Salinas’ unpaid envoy to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Chiapas rebellion.

In sharp contrast to the die-hard, anti-reform elements who seemed to surround him, Colosio on many occasions spoke privately about the need to restructure his party, to reduce its dependence on corrupt labor and peasant organizations and community-level political bosses--precisely the perpetrators of vote fraud, human-rights abuses and economic exploitation who made Chiapas fertile ground for the insurrection that finally erupted on Jan. 1.

Publicly, in accepting the PRI’s presidential nomination, Colosio urged his party to reject “one single vote” that was obtained through means “outside the law.” We will never know now how far Colosio, as president, would have gone to discipline leaders of his own party who refused to play by new rules of democratic competition that are demanded by increasingly large portions of the Mexican population. Like his chief political mentor, outgoing President Salinas, Colosio may have been unwilling to take the political risks, including a Japanese-style split of the ruling party, that translating his reformist rhetoric into reality would have posed.

The conservative forces within the PRI/government apparatus are poised to take advantage of the situation created by Colosio’s untimely removal from the presidential race. They will insist on a tightly controlled selection of their version of a “national unity” candidate to replace Colosio, someone who can be counted upon to keep the opposition parties “in line,” and who can reliably deliver to party apparatchiks the public offices and material perks to which they have long been accustomed. They will appeal to the Mexican public’s deeply ingrained conservative impulses: their fear of uncontrolled political violence, their thirst for “order” and their belief that strong presidential rule, virtually unchecked by legislative or judicial authority, is necessary to keep the economy growing and the government running smoothly.

If these reactionary elements prevail, the outlook is for persistent election-related turmoil, if not violence, with all the negative consequences for investor confidence and advances in social well-being that come with an environment of high political conflict and uncertainty.

Mexican political culture has changed in the last six years. This is illustrated by the wave of popular protests unrelated to the rebellion in Chiapas that have erupted in many parts of the country since Jan. 1. Among the protesters’ demands: the removal of corrupt municipal officials, repeal of increases in public transport fares, the liberation of “political prisoners” arrested for dissident union activities and improvements in low-income housing. Any attempt to keep the lid tightly on this caldron of social unrest and rapidly rising expectations for greater democracy is likely to fail.

On the very eve of Colosio’s death, the Mexican Congress was approving some of the most significant reforms in electoral laws and procedures that have ever been proposed by the government and the opposition parties. Still other changes that would further equalize the terms of competition and safeguard the integrity of the entire voting process may be enacted when the Congress resumes its debate, including a more active role for foreign “visitors” (not officially recognized observers) in monitoring elections.

The most fitting tribute to Luis Donaldo Colosio would be the swift and unswerving implementation of these changes, backed up by a serious effort to cleanse the PRI’s own practices and to ensure that those who represent the party, at every level, are committed to the kind of election that Colosio knew he could win in 1994.