U.S. Ponders What to Do With Its Nuclear Arsenal : Strategy: Need for doomsday ‘deterrent’ force questioned. Some say it could encourage proliferation.

The porpoise-shaped, matte-black form of this 560-foot-long Trident submarine is still 71 miles from the U.S. shoreline, but Capt. George W. Jurand gives the order to surface anyway, to reduce the danger of a collision in the coastal sea lanes.

The Tennessee is coming home.

As it has 23 times before, the vessel--loaded with 24 D-5 missiles that could blow up much of Moscow and other key sites in a nuclear war--has just completed a 70-day deployment that took it near the same Cold War targets that the United States has had in its sights for years.

This time, however, the Tennessee is returning to troubled waters. With the Cold War ended and the former Soviet nuclear arsenal being dismantled, the United States is embroiled in a major debate over the role of its strategic nuclear forces, including Trident subs like this one.

The fundamental question, put plainly, is: Why does the United States still need a doomsday “deterrent” force of missiles, bombers and submarines in an age when the major nuclear threat is the proliferation of weapons to countries such as North Korea and Iran?

No less a Cold War hawk than Paul H. Nitze has suggested that Washington re-examine the role of strategic nuclear weapons in the U.S. security arsenal, contending that massive deterrence is unnecessary--and could backfire by encouraging more proliferation.

The Clinton Administration has launched a high-level review of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, with the aim of revamping them to meet the needs of the post-Cold War world. The study, being conducted by the Pentagon, is expected to be completed next month.

In addition, the Defense Department has launched a new “counter-proliferation” program to bolster the military’s ability to detect and perhaps destroy weapons of mass destruction, as well as the plants where nuclear, chemical and biological warheads are made.

The reassessment will address the question of whether the United States should for the first time openly threaten to use nuclear bombs or missiles to retaliate against the use of chemical and biological weapons or to prevent U.S. troops from being overrun by enemy forces.

Part of the pressure for a review stems from the changing nature of the nuclear threat itself: With the Soviet Union out of the picture, Russia no longer is the United States’ main potential adversary. Third World countries such as Iraq and North Korea now pose the biggest threat.

Nitze, for one, contends that nuclear weapons are unlikely to be useful in deterring aggression because most would-be enemies are confident that Washington will not use them. Iraq, for example, invaded Kuwait despite U.S. nuclear strength.

With the precision-guided munitions that performed so well during the Persian Gulf War, Nitze argues, the United States will soon have the ability to meet any military challenge using conventional forces only. He says that Washington would be better off using these as its principal deterrent.

The review is also being driven by budget considerations. The United States now spends $31 billion a year on its strategic nuclear forces--as much as it did at the height of the Cold War--and analysts say that it could cut that cost by $15 billion a year.

Finally, the issue is important in the broader debate over nuclear non-proliferation. Strategists argue that if the United States embarks on a major new bid to modernize its own nuclear weapons, it is likely to spur some smaller countries into acquiring more for themselves.

Indeed, the United States increasingly is taking on a role as guarantor of nuclear stability in potential trouble spots around the world--between Russia and Ukraine, for example, and, potentially, between India and Pakistan and between North and South Korea.

If that role continues, the United States might need to maintain its strategic nuclear force, not cut it back or eliminate it.

To be sure, no one is advocating that the U.S. nuclear arsenal be scrapped. William M. Arkin, a weapons analyst for Greenpeace, concedes that the situation in the former Soviet Union is uncertain and that Washington needs some nuclear arms as defenses.

Nevertheless, the Administration must resolve some fundamental issues in its latest review--and the answers could have a profound influence on U.S. military strategy and global nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

Jack Mendelsohn, deputy director of the Arms Control Assn., a Washington-based research group, cites several critical issues in the Administration’s strategy review:

* How big a strategic nuclear force does the United States really need to mount a credible deterrent--and to maintain an adequate hedge against a possible revival of Soviet-type imperialism?

Under the existing Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Washington will pare its nuclear arsenal to 3,500 warheads by 1997, down from 12,650 at the Cold War’s peak. Should those cuts be speeded up? Should the warhead totals then be reduced further?

* What kind of nuclear forces should the United States maintain?

By 1997, the United States will be carrying half its nuclear warheads on submarines, with relatively few on bombers or in missile silos. Would the force be more effective with more--but somewhat smaller--submarines? How many bombers and silos will be needed?

* How much of the strategic nuclear force must be kept on high alert?

Critics argue that one of the most dangerous aspects of the nuclear weapons threat during the Cold War was the fact that both powers had their missiles constantly poised to strike instantly, almost as a reflex action. Should more be done to reduce that tension?

* Given the growing threat from the Third World , is a nuclear deterrent enough?

Some analysts argue that the United States needs to expand its concept of strategic warfare to provide a deterrent against other weapons of mass destruction--such as chemical and biological warfare--including the ability to launch preemptive strikes to wipe them out.

* How far can the United States go in developing antimissile missiles, to defend itself against Scud-type missiles like those used by Iraq during the Gulf War?

Although the Clinton Administration has scrapped the Ronald Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars program, it has embarked on a crash program to develop “theater” defense missiles--a successor to the Patriot missiles of the Gulf War--designed to destroy Scud-type missiles.

But the program has become controversial. Critics argue that the Administration’s current proposals threaten to scuttle the limits imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of the 1970s, undermining the entire rationale for current arms-control treaties.

* Should the United States abandon its longstanding refusal to pledge that it will not be the first to launch a nuclear strike?

The question is more one of diplomatic strategy than of military posture. Although Moscow made such a pledge during the Cold War, the United States refused to match it because Washington wanted to reserve the option of a nuclear first strike if NATO forces were overrun.

Moscow has since abandoned the pledge in favor of eschewing any firm policy at all. Those who favor renewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty next spring argue that the nuclear powers might garner more support for the effort if they sign such a pledge.

The United States has already begun making significant changes in its strategic warfare policies.

Under a 1991 order by then-President George Bush, authorities have started taking the nation’s B-52 bomber and Minuteman missile crews off continuous alert, allowing them to operate at normal readiness levels except for periodic training exercises.

Under the provisions of the START treaty, the Air Force has begun dismantling 241 Minuteman II missile silos at missile-launching sites in states in the Northwest. Another 570 newer Peacekeepers and Minuteman IIIs will be left in operation.

In an accord signed in January, the United States and Russia agreed to “de-target” their nuclear missiles--to point them out to sea instead of at each other. The step, while largely symbolic, is significant as a political statement.

At the same time, the Administration has begun to reshape some U.S. forces to deal with regional conflicts, such as the Gulf War, that are precipitated by Third World countries. Air Force Gen. George L. Butler, former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, said the United States is considering targeting some Third World countries.

*

Huddled with some crew members on the Tennessee’s cramped, cockpit-like bridge, Rear Adm. Winford G. Ellis, commander of Submarine Squadron 16, explains what the Navy’s “boomers” (ballistic-missile-carrying submarines) are all about: to serve as a deterrent--along with Air Force Minuteman missiles and B-52 bombers--by making the prospect of U.S. retaliation so horrible that no potential enemy would ever want to launch a nuclear attack against the United States. Over the last 47 years, he asserts, the concept has worked well. “My guess,” he says, “is that nuclear weapons are going to be around in this world as long as you and I live.”

*

Despite the easing of Cold War tensions, almost all the issues in the nuclear weapons debate are controversial. Even the question of whether the former Soviet states still pose a major threat to the United States is being hotly debated.

Most analysts argue that there have been important changes in the Russian nuclear threat over the last few years. Before the Cold War ended, Soviet armed forces were in a high state of readiness. Their armies were well-financed. The chain of command was absolute.

Today, Russia’s armed forces are out of money and suffering from low morale. Its warships, badly maintained and short of fuel, are largely bottled up in port. And its nuclear forces are in disarray, with many of its key weapons systems in other former Soviet republics.

Moreover, there is widespread concern about possible “leakage” of Russian weapons, either through third-party smuggling or by outright sales to Third World countries by disgruntled Russian military personnel or by hard-hit Russian defense industries.

While Russia and Ukraine have begun moving to disarm some of their nuclear warheads, thousands remain on-line. There is little evidence that the rest of the former Soviet Union will disarm anytime soon.

But those experts who favor maintaining the massive U.S. strategic force of Cold War days argue that, while the situation has changed somewhat, the threat posed by the former Soviet Union has not disappeared.

They note that despite the fall of the Communist dictatorship, the political situation in Russia is uncertain at best. The Russian military is still well-armed with nuclear weapons. Many senior Russian officers are hard-liners who are anti-Western.

Add to that the new Third World uncertainties, and “there’s enough trouble out there that walking away from the ‘deterrence’ doctrine probably is not a realistic option,” said a private nuclear weapons expert who has tracked post-Soviet developments.

Even so, virtually all sides agree that the United States could pare its nuclear arsenal well beyond the 3,500 warheads envisioned by the START treaty. Both the Establishment-oriented Atlantic Council and the liberal-oriented Center for Defense Information, for example, have proposed trimming the number of warheads to 1,000.

Greenpeace’s Bill Arkin contends that the United States “could probably do with only a few hundred” warheads without endangering national security, though he concedes that the move would be difficult politically.

Another issue is the composition of the United States’ strategic nuclear forces. For much of the Cold War years, the United States relied on what is known as the Triad--a combination of missiles, bombers and nuclear submarines.

Although the Triad was mainly a result of interservice rivalry--both the Air Force and the Navy wanted a nuclear role--proponents argue that having three kinds of delivery systems provides the military with an insurance policy in case one is destroyed.

Some analysts question whether the Triad really is necessary. With today’s precision-guided weapons, the underground concrete silos that house the United States’ intercontinental ballistic missiles are especially vulnerable. And B-52 bombers are slow and relatively easy to shoot down.

“It’s clear that we don’t really need the Triad anymore,” said Robert W. Gaskin, a retired Air Force officer and Pentagon strategic planner who is now a vice president of Business Executives for National Security, a defense-oriented research group.

*

The bleak, early morning sky glares inhospitably as B-52 No. 61-031 rumbles across the taxiway at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to begin a simulated nuclear bombing run, and the pilot, Capt. David Knesek, is stoic about the mission. Once the pride of the old Strategic Air Command, the aging B-52s--this one has been in the fleet for 31 years, longer than Knesek has been alive--are either being converted to conventional weapons-carriers or sold for scrap. “I’d like to fly these as long as possible,” he muses, or switch to flying B-1s, which are replacing the B-52s. If not, Knesek has other plans in mind. “Everyone has a Plan B,” he says.

*

To some degree, that issue already has been decided: The United States appears to be preparing to rely on submarines as the foundation of its strategic forces, while Russia seems to be heading for a mostly land-based deterrent, using mobile missiles and silos.

Indeed, much of the existing strategic B-52s and B-1 bomber force is being converted to carry conventional weapons or sent to the scrapheap. The Air Force will end up with about 116 big bombers by 1999--all of them for conventional weapons.

Similarly, under the provisions of START, the Air Force is phasing out many of its Minuteman II missile silos, which are more vulnerable now because Russian ICBMs are far more accurate than they used to be.

The Navy has begun campaigning vigorously to save all 18 of its Tridents--the subs that carry the ballistic missiles--but it is scrapping its smaller attack subs as quickly as it can. By the end of the decade, only 18 will remain on duty.

Another part of the equation focuses on how much of the U.S. strategic nuclear force must be kept on high-alert status.

Bruce Blair, a Brookings Institution nuclear weapons expert, argues that along with cutting back the number of warheads, the most important step that both sides can take is to make it more difficult for the United States and Russia to launch any attack.

Despite the breakup of the Soviet empire, Defense Secretary William J. Perry asserts that the United States must be prepared for “a worst-case outcome”--the possibility that Russia will emerge from its current turbulence as an imperialistic, hostile power.

Defense officials are expected to recommend making the strategic force more flexible, through a “counter-proliferation” program designed to enable the United States to respond to new Third World challenges, such as chemical and biological weapons.

Nukes Going--But Not Gone

The United States and the former Soviet republics have vowed to cut back nuclear arsenals as smaller nations strive to obtain weapons.

Number of Nuclear Warheads

Peak 1994 Projected 2003 Projected United States 12,650 8,380 3,500 Former Soviet Union 10,800 9,663 3,500 France 540 480 465 China -- 435 500+ Britain 350 200 300 Israel -- 200 Unknown India -- 50 Unknown Pakistan -- 15 Unknown

*

UNITED STATES FORMER SOVIET* Based in: Warheads Launchers Warheads Launchers Silos 730 2,240 1,067 5,905 Submarines 336 2,688 520 2,384 Bombers 192 3,452 109 1,374 TOTAL 1,258 8,380 1,696 9,663

* Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus

U.S. and former Soviet Union projection for the year 2003 will hold only if the START I and START II treaties are in force. Both have many more battlefield nuclear warheads besides the strategic weapons listed here.

Sources: The Arms Control Assn., Natural Resources Defense Council