Los Angeles Times Interview : Kofi Annan : The Soft-Spoken Economist Who Runs U.N. Peacekeeping Forces

The United Nations does no more vital work these days than peacekeeping. The official in charge of the Blue Helmets and Berets--as peacekeepers are known--might be expected to be a blustery general renowned for his valor or cunning in some great battle. But it is Kofi Annan, 56, an unassuming Ghanaian economist and financial manager who is undersec retary-general in charge of peacekeeping, who heads the operations.

Annan is the fifth U.N. peacekeeping chief--and the first from the Third World. None, however, had an empire to compare with his. With the Cold War ended and the Security Council no longer paralyzed by Russian and U.S. vetoes, the numbers of peacekeeping missions have mushroomed. Annan now runs 17--with 70,000 troops and police at an annual cost of $3.2 billion.

His biggest problem these days, however, is putting together missions in the wake of Somalia and President Bill Clinton’s Policy Directive 25. The debacle in Somalia--with 18 U.S. Rangers dying in a single raid during the manhunt for warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed--made many countries, especially the United States, wary of peacekeeping.

And the policy directive insists that the United States will not support a peacekeeping operation unless it meets a half-dozen conditions--including a timetable for withdrawal, a cease-fire in place, an acceptable level of risk and a clear goal. The directive implies that the most powerful member of the United Nations has little enthusiasm for peacekeeping.

Although U.S. policy now cramps Annan, he is popular among Americans, and U.S. officials encouraged Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to put him in charge of peacekeeping in 1992. Annan speaks softly, barely above a whisper, but it is worth straining to hear him. He is a clear-minded, thoughtful man with a reputation throughout the United Nations for speaking frankly.

He infuriated several African ambassadors, for example, when he told the French newspaper Le Monde in late May that he has had trouble recruiting African peacekeepers because African governments “probably need their armies to intimidate their own populations.”

Annan, married with three children, was educated at Ghana’s University of Science and Technology, Macalester College in Minnesota, the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His entire career has been with the U.N. system, working in various administrative jobs in Addis Ababa, Geneva, Cairo and New York.

Annan works in a spacious office on the 37th floor of the Secretariat building in U.N. headquarters, one floor below the secretary-general. Annan’s office, where he recently sat down to talk about his work, is decorated with a few select pieces of African sculpture, notably from the Ivory Coast and Senegal.

*

Question: You’re having more and more trouble getting troops for peacekeeping. Can you explain what the problem is?

Answer: Yes, we are encountering considerable difficulties in finding well-trained and equipped troops for the assignments that the (Security) Council has given us. This is partly due to perceived dangers the governments see associated with these operations, which are supposed to be peacekeeping but . . . where there’s really no peace to keep . . . .

Here I am looking at situations like Bosnia and Rwanda. I think that, as hesitant as everybody is about going in, nobody says don’t do anything. And yet, when you turn around and ask, “How many troops would you give?”--each one is prepared to volunteer the other person’s army, the other country’s army and, if necessary, to make some financial contribution. It’s a problem that we need to try and resolve quickly.

Q: Everyone says that since Rwanda is Africa’s concern, we should get African troops. But when you spoke to the Senate recently, you said if you wanted troops quickly, the Organization of African Unity was not the place to go. What did you mean?

A: Basically, what I meant was that we had a situation that required immediate and urgent action. What was required in that situation was a quick and rapid reaction force . . . . The presence of that force--determined to protect vulnerable groups of people--would have made a difference in the violence. We were not dealing with a group of well-organized and well-trained armies. The militias are using machetes and other weapons to kill. The presence would have made a difference, and we could have saved some people . . . .

But that kind of force is not available to any of the African countries. The only African country . . . that does have that force is South Africa and it was too soon--it was immediately after their independence (to ask them).

Q: And you never got the quick reaction force in there.

A: We never got the quick reaction force, and every day that the governments examined whether to contribute troops or not--and here I’m talking about both Western and African countries--more people lost their lives. And as late as it is, we can still make a difference if we can go on in. . . . We have offers from Ghana, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Ethiopia and Nigeria. But they don’t come with the requisite equipment. So now we are passing the hat around, looking for equipment. We are talking to the U.S., the French, the British and the South Africans. Trying to marry the men and equipment does take time--as we have learned through our attempt to get German equipment for the Pakistanis before they go to Yugoslavia. That has taken about nine months to a year. I hope this doesn’t take that long.

Q: Are you slowed down in recruitment by President Clinton’s new directive?

A: I think the role and the attitude of the U.S. always has an effect. It has a leadership role. It is the only superpower now . . . . You saw in Somalia--when the U.S. went in, lots of other governments followed. In the Gulf, when the U.S. led, lots of others followed. In Somalia, when the U.S. left, they left, too. And even in Bosnia, the European governments are saying if there is a cease-fire and we have to put in a force of about 75,000, we would want the U.S. to lead it . . . . So when the country with that dominant role and position takes a back seat and begins to hold back, it has an impact on the attitude of other nations.

But that having been said, nobody would disagree with . . . the U.S. . . . when they say there should be some guidelines for the council to determine when they take on a crisis and when they do not--provided it’s applied in a flexible and practical manner.

Q: Let me take you back to Somalia. When you look at it now, what do you think was the greatest error in the operation?

A: I think one of the errors was perhaps the decision to attempt to arrest Aideed and, in doing so, to be seen by some as going against . . . Aideed’s troops. In these situations . . . the impartiality of the force and the principle of consent of the parties are crucial. If you are perceived to be fair, you do not run the danger of being engaged. If you are seen as taking initiatives that could change the military balance on the ground and favor one group or the other, the troops who see themselves as disadvantaged might decide you’ve taken sides and declare war on you. And this is what happened . . . .

In Somalia, we did cross that line, and once you cross the line, it’s extremely difficult to turn back to that neutral, consensual approach.

Q: Do you now feel that the Somalia experience, for whatever reason, has crippled peace enforcement?

A: I would say that categorically, without any difficultly, that yes, the Somalia experience has . . . . I don’t think the member states have the stomach for this type of operation. It’s going to be a very long time before the U.N., as an organization, takes on a peace-enforcement mission and manages it itself. My sense is that if there is going to be another enforcement mission, that it’s likely to be the Desert Storm model--where the Security Council would authorize a group of member states to take all necessary means to correct or redress a situation. I don’t think, as an organization, the Security Council will give a mandate to run an enforcement operation for quite a while.

Q: Did you have higher hopes for peacekeeping when you took on this job two years ago?

A: I think we all did. We all had higher hopes for peacekeeping. The Cold War was over. The new consensus in the council permitted agreement on operations that had not been possible. The council was breaking new ground, accepting the fact that the threat to peace is not necessarily a war between two states, but it could start from an internal conflict, which we’ve seen in Yugoslavia, or the Somalia one that throws refugees out and destabilizes its neighbors. Or even Haiti . . . .

In addition, we are also getting involved in situations where there were massive abuses of human rights or desperate humanitarian situations. So it was--we were all expectant. It was thrilling, and we saw possibilities of doing perhaps, as somebody put it, what the organization was expected to do. So we were all excited.

Q: Let me take you to Bosnia and one sensitive matter there. Do you feel Mr. (Yasushi) Akashi, (the secretary-general’s special representative), made a mistake in vetoing the NATO request for air strikes in the Gorazde incident last April?

A: No, I don’t think so . . . . When the cease-fire had not gone into force, NATO requested that we should go in and use air power. Akashi--and here it wasn’t just Akashi--Akashi, Lt. Gen. (Michael) Rose, the commander in Bosnia, and Gen. (Bertrand) de Lapresle, the force commander, unanimously decided that it was the wrong thing to do.

Why did they decide it was the wrong thing to do? They had been sitting with the Serbs negotiating for 11 to 12 hours. And they had the sense that the Serbs would comply, meet the deadline. And that if the Serbs complied, they had arranged to introduce into Gorazde a U.N. force that would monitor the cease-fire line, would get into the city with medical help, to give assistance to the sick and wounded and also be there to verify and monitor the withdrawal of the Serbs. And if one started bombing immediately, this was not going to be possible.

In the end, their predictions were right. The Serbs did withdraw, with some minor problems . . . . We achieved the results we all wanted without fighting. If you don’t have to fight to win, why fight?

Q: But, whether justified or not, did the veto hurt the image of the United Nations?

A: It did hurt the image of the U.N. And I don’t think the discussions and the information should have been leaked. If (the U.N.) had its own air wing, all discussions would have been internal. It is not unusual in a military situation for the commander to discuss all options and the majority of the commanders to say we are not going on this.

It is regrettable that such sensitive matters are discussed openly and get leaked. In fact, in some countries this would be grounds for court-martial. In fact, I made the point that if the Serbs and Bosnian army discussed their strategy openly in the press and in public, it would make the work of (the U.N.) and NATO very easy. (Laughter)

Q: You don’t have a military background. Do you feel at a disadvantage in not having a military background in this field?

A: No, I don’t find it a particular disadvantage. I don’t think it has kept me from carrying on my role. I have learned a lot. I have very good military people with me. And perhaps in some situations, it is even an advantage. You ask questions, you don’t take it for granted, and you don’t know it all. So, in some ways, maybe it helps. It has not bothered me.

It’s quite interesting now that I’ve been in this job for a while. You know the old adage, “War is too serious a matter to be left to the generals.” Now that I’m in this job, I have discovered something else. The generals are saying that use of force is too serious a matter to be left to the civilians. (Laughter)

Q: They are very reluctant.

A: Absolutely, they are very reluctant, because they know the implications. Soldiers like to fight, but they don’t like to declare war. It’s fascinating.

Q: If an American were in charge of U.N. peacekeeping, do you think the United States would be more enthusiastic about going into Rwanda?

A: I don’t think so. I don’t think it would make a difference. What makes a difference is the perception by the leaders as to the popular will. And Somalia did quite a lot of damage.

Having said that, I should also say that this is one area where we in the U.N. are very weak . . . with our public information. We are not able to tell our stories, not even our success stories. Both in Somalia and Bosnia, we had difficulties. But we’ve also made enormous contributions . . . . We know that, unless we can get the public to understand what we are doing and to get public support, we will not get the political will that we expect from the leaders.*