Boeing Image a Factor in Action on 757 Wake : Aviation: Documents show FAA concern regarding possible effects of safety measures on aircraft maker.
Federal Aviation Administration officials were concerned about the economic well-being and image of the Boeing Co. when they pondered whether to adopt measures to prevent accidents caused by potentially deadly wake turbulence from Boeing 757 jetliners, internal documents show.
In January, as the FAA was deciding what to do about 757 wake turbulence after the phenomenon had been linked to two fatal crashes, agency officials expressed concern about what effect the new safety measures might have on sales of the popular, fuel-efficient jetliner.
“It is probably desirable to coordinate with Boeing before this change is made,” the agency’s then-chief scientist Robert E. Machol wrote on Jan. 12, referring to a proposal to require smaller planes to stay an additional mile behind 757s on final approaches. “It could have an adverse effect on the sale of 757s, and while I am not a lawyer I suppose there is even some possibility that (Boeing) could sue us.”
On a list of pros and cons drawn up in an analysis of possible consequences of the FAA’s taking action, a Jan. 25 chart lists as a con, “Boeing’s perception.”
Contained in thousands of pages of documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, the references involving Boeing appear to reinforce a frequent criticism that the FAA sometimes favors the well-being of the airline industry over public safety in its decision-making process.
Deputy FAA Administrator Linda Hall Daschle said Wednesday that it was “appropriate” for the agency to seek information from all sides of the issue.
“That is what due process is all about,” Daschle said. “What would be inappropriate,” she said, would be to give “greater weight” to Boeing’s view and “that was not done.”
A spokesman for Boeing said that he had not seen the documents and could not comment on whether it was appropriate for the FAA to consider Boeing’s interests on an issue that involved public safety.
“The FAA is the one that determines the regulations,” said Jerry Johnson, Boeing’s communications manager. “Safety is first and foremost our greatest concern on any issue.”
Machol, who retired as FAA chief scientist April 30, said Wednesday that he had expressed concern about the possibility of Boeing suing the FAA because he “thought it was a consideration.”
“I didn’t think it was likely, but I thought it was worth mentioning,” he said.
Machol emphasized that he did not intend to suggest that Boeing should be allowed undue influence over the decision-making process. “I know there’s a feeling out there that the FAA doesn’t consider safety,” he said. “The truth is we try and get along well--and we do get along well, especially with Boeing.”
The previously undisclosed documents, released this week over the objections of some officials within the FAA, also indicate that:
* Beginning as far back as 1988 and continuing until recently, Boeing lobbied against increasing the separation distance for aircraft landing behind 757s, even though aviation officials had pushed for such a measure in the interest of safety.
* The FAA’s Flight Standards Office recognized there was something unique about the 757’s turbulence as far back as 1987.
In addition, in April, 1988, the Air Line Pilots Assn. red-flagged the issue in a letter to the FAA and formally requested that the agency test the sleek-bodied 757 to determine why pilots were reporting that it seemed to produce much stronger wake turbulence than other aircraft in its weight class.
An earlier set of FAA documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act suggested that the agency had only become aware of the 757 phenomenon in mid-1990. The FAA never responded to ALPA’s letter or its request. However, the kinds of tests ALPA sought are now underway.
Contents of the FAA documents suggest that at times concerns within the agency about its image, airport capacity and the threat of lawsuits eclipsed concerns about safety.
“We really have very little choice on this,” Machol wrote on Jan. 14, a month after five people died in a Santa Ana crash after a corporate jet encountered 757 wake turbulence, and 13 months after a similar crash in Billings, Mont., killed eight people. “We are under pressure from the media.”
The FAA’s Daschle said “perception” is a legitimate part of the decision-making process, especially on controversial issues.
While some FAA officials believed that action was unnecessary, others within the agency noted the organization’s lack of response on the 757 issue.
Referring to a list of safety concerns and recommendations promulgated by Machol in October, 1992--before any of the fatal accidents--one official whose identity was unclear scribbled on a route slip, “Shouldn’t we urge/promote implementation of those (recommendations) we know he’s right on, and sponsor research where questions remain?
“I’m a bit nervous just ‘sitting’ on this stuff,” the official wrote.
In February, air crew program manager Glenn Holmbeck wrote to the Office of Accident Investigation in the Recommendation and Quality Assurance Division: “Daily, we are risking the traveling public by not addressing the B-757 wake turbulence problem. . . .
“Any good safety program has got to be proactive (preventive), not reactive. Our customers are the traveling public (taxpayers), who pay our salaries, and not the industry that we are supposed to be regulating.”
The revelations have surfaced in the wake of an internal review that concluded that the FAA might have mishandled reports that 757s cause unusual turbulence, and that the agency should view the 757 issue as a “wake-up call” to reform the way it handles potential safety hazards.
A congressional subcommittee is scheduled to take up the agency’s handling of the 757 issue today, as well as the larger issue of the agency’s ability to identify and act upon safety concerns.
Only after five incidents, including two that claimed 13 lives, did the FAA institute measures designed to prevent accidents caused by 757 turbulence. Announced by FAA Administrator David R. Hinson in May, the new program includes an aggressive education requirement for pilots and air traffic controllers, and a requirement that smaller planes flying under instrument flight rules--those being guided by controllers--remain four miles, instead of the standard three miles, behind 757s during landings.
Pilots flying under visual flight rules, which generally call for the pilot to determine how closely he or she follows a leading plane, are urged to keep the same four-mile separation.
Although officials disagree on the level of danger, the 757’s smooth body and wing design appears to make it capable of producing unusually potent wake turbulence--volatile funnels of air with hurricane-force winds that emanate from each wingtip.
The FAA has concluded that until recently there was insufficient evidence to make any changes relating to 757s, and that nothing it could have done would have prevented the 13 fatalities.
“The reality,” Daschle said, “is that up until (a recent crash in) Charlotte, you had 27 months where more than a billion people flew without an accident involving a major commercial airline.”
The FAA for years has resisted efforts to call attention to the 757 issue or increase separation distances because it could potentially decrease the number of flights at major airports, which could cut into airline revenue. By law, the agency is bound to promote the airline industry and ensure public safety, missions that many believe are contradictory.
Daschle acknowledged that the FAA’s twin responsibilities sometimes put the agency in a position of asking itself some “hard questions,” but she maintained that it performs both tasks well.
“We have been able to accomplish the job that Congress gave to us,” she said. “I’ve seen more occasions where safety has come first.”
Among other things, the newly released documents indicate that Boeing has been involved in the 757 decision-making process from early on, and that FAA officials were sympathetic regarding effects of the controversy on the company.
The papers include:
* An October, 1992, memo from Anthony Broderick, the FAA’s associate administrator for regulation and certification, saying: “We will most certainly antagonize Boeing by moving their ‘large’ B-757 into the ‘heavy’ or some special weight category.”
Broderick was referring to the weight classification scheme used to determine separation distances between landing planes. Some safety experts have said the 757 belongs in the “heavy” category, which would mean that smaller planes would have to stay either five or six miles back instead of the current four miles.
Boeing has long opposed such a move, in part because it would place the 757 in a category with much larger airplanes such as the Boeing 747. But the company also has argued against a category change because it is a selling point to have an aircraft that doesn’t require lengthy separations: The shorter the separation, the more planes can land and the more customers can be moved through airports.
* A handwritten report indicating that Boeing officials participated in a wake turbulence meeting in January at which it was decided that the FAA should “avoid” characterizing the wake turbulence hazard as a problem associated with a particular plane, such as the Boeing 757.
* A July 22, 1988, letter from Boeing’s Richard W. Taylor, vice president and government technical liaison, indicating that he had been sent a copy of the April, 1988, letter from the Air Line Pilots Assn. in which the organization relayed pilots’ concerns about 757 wake turbulence and called for testing. Taylor rebutted the report, arguing that any reclassification was unwarranted, and asked the FAA “to keep us informed of future activities in this area.”
* A Feb. 17, 1994, letter written on behalf of a Boeing official identified only as G.R. Mack to Paul H. Strybing, manager of the FAA’s procedures division, which urges the FAA to include Boeing and the rest of the industry in the decision-making process on 757s.
“These tasks can best be addressed through the coordinated efforts of the FAA, NASA and industry,” the letter said.
Daschle said it was appropriate to include Boeing in the process because “this is the manufacturer of the plane involved.”
Most recently, Boeing President R.B. Woodard on July 21 wrote to U.S. Transportation Secretary Federico Pena, pledging the company’s support, but maintaining that “education”--not additional separation requirements beyond the new four-mile limit--was all that was needed until more definitive tests prove otherwise.
As of June 1, the latest figures available, the twin-engine 757 ranked as Boeing’s third-best seller, Boeing spokesman Steve Thieme said.
In recent years, the $60-million plane has become increasingly popular with air carriers because it can ferry upward of 200 passengers and because its engines use substantially less fuel than those of other large passenger jets.
Other memoranda and letters released this week touched on the FAA’s concerns about its own image and potential legal exposure in the context of the 757 controversy.
Machol, the ex-chief scientist who predicted in 1992 that an accident due to 757 turbulence would occur and who issued warnings as early as 1989, took a more pragmatic approach in July, 1993, after the crash in Billings, Mont.
In a two-page letter referring to imminent actions by the National Transportation Safety Board on the 757 issue, Machol urged swift measures and wrote: “We are going to be sued in any case by the survivors of the people killed in that Citation, and if the NTSB says that we should have enforced separations, that might cost us a lot of money.”
