The World : Behind Mexico’s Violence: The Rise of Middle-Man Drug Cartels

Once again, the assassination of a politician is raising troubling questions about the power and influence of Mexico’s drug cartels in the country’s politics. In August, a for mer deputy to the Mexican attorney general warned that drug traffickers have forged links with prominent members of the government and police and may have been behind the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio. Now, the slaying of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the deputy leader of the ruling party, seems to add credence to the earlier warning: His brother is deputy attorney general for drug investigations and he was apparently killed by a gunman hired by an in-law of a top lieutenant of the Gulf Cartel.

Both assassinations struck down close associates of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, whose approach to political reform seems to have put his allies at risk. The power of Mexico’s traditional political leaders--from labor boss to regional and local cacique of the Institutional Revolutionary Party--is eroding. Meanwhile, shake-ups in the attorney general’s office have put the heat on drug traffickers, who once could count on a free hand by bribing government officials. With common enemies, and often common interests, corrupt politicians in the PRI’s old guard and police commanders are making common cause with the drug cartels to block Mexico’s transition to democracy.

Underlying the growing political violence is a revolution in the structure of drug trafficking. Before Salinas, the Mexican drug business was largely a domestic affair. Marijuana and opium poppies, grown in the Mexican Sierras, was the primary exports. During the administration of President Miguel del la Madrid (1982-1988), the Mexican army routinely staged spectacular incinerations of impounded marijuana. Yet, no serious attempts were made to seize the drug lords. As illustrated in the case of Enrique Camarena, the Drug Enforcement Agent murdered by Rafael Caro Quintero’s Guadalajara Cartel, collusion between influential members of the government and drug traffickers was widespread.

At the beginning of Salinas’ administration, a number of changes radically altered the drug picture. For one, Salinas moved against the drug kingpins. Quintero was apprehended and imprisoned, along with several lesser-known traffickers. Second, a transformation in the drug business itself was under way. Colombian traffickers, who had relied primarily on Caribbean routes to deliver cocaine to the United States, began shifting their operations westward. With their links in Cuba and the Bahamas under increasing scrutiny, they began focusing on the U.S.-Mexican border. The outcome was the rise to prominence of new cartels, consisting chiefly of middle men engaged in transshipment. At one end of the U.S.-Mexico border, the cocaine trade fed the rise of the Tijuana Cartel, led by the Arellano Felix brothers. At the other end, in Tamaulipas, it fueled the Gulf Cartel, under Juan Garcia Abrego.

The Colombian connection has, in turn, introduced new elements into the relationship between the government and drug traffickers in Mexico. The switch to cocaine has multiplied the amount of money involved by several orders of magnitude, leaving greater sums with which to secure the cooperation of corruptible officials. By raising the stakes, it has also led to the introduction of heretofore unimaginable violence. In the past, hits were confined to rivals and nosy journalists. Now, as in Colombia, the circle of violence has been extended to government officials who are perceived to be threats to what is now Mexico’s most profitable--albeit illegal--business.

The Arellano Felix brothers are wanted in the murder of Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo of Guadalajara. Humberto Garcia Abrego, brother of the Gulf Cartel kingpin, has been arrested in connection with the assassination of Ruiz Massieu. Significantly, neither the Arellano brothers nor Juan Garcia Abrego have been caught. Earlier this year, an attempt to nab a lieutenant of the Tijuana Cartel ended in disaster when a team of federal judicial police was ambushed by state judicial police. The team leader was killed, the mobster escaped. The incident underscored the extent to which traffickers have infiltrated the police. The fact that no serious attempt has been made to seize the Arellanos themselves suggests they may have friends in high places.

Salinas’ reluctance to pursue wider political reforms limited his ability to confront the threat of drug traffickers allied with corrupt PRI politicians. Most notably, he abided by an unwritten rule of Mexico’s political elite: under no circumstances may present and former members of the Cabinet be investigated for corruption. Such impunity has two dangerous consequences. One, it makes it easier for drug traffickers to buy protection from officials who have much to gain and little to lose by collaborating. Second, it enhances the power of well-placed enemies of reform, providing them greater latitude to sabotage change.

All of which confronts the new president, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, with a vexing problem: How to outmaneuver the increasingly dangerous adversaries of reform without jeopardizing the stability of the country. The PRI’s old guard and the drug cartels are, in effect, offering him both a carrot and a stick to slow down reform. The carrot is the vital support provided Zedillo in a difficult campaign. The stick is the implicit message delivered by recent assassinations. In the past year and a half, three men at the pinnacle of church and state have been killed: a cardinal, a virtual heir to the presidency and a congressional leader. If these could be hit, anyone could.

Zedillo thus cannot afford to hold on to his predecessor’s compromise. If he is to root out the web of corruption that enables mobsters and crooked party bosses to play politics, he will have to end the policy of impunity for Cabinet members. Measures that only affect subordinates just increase the danger to reformers. By investigating and, where necessary, indicting corrupt ministers, Zedillo can simultaneously remove key adversaries, reduce the influence of the drug cartels and deliver a powerful warning to all government officials about the costs of breaking the law. True, this risks splitting the party that carried him to the presidency, but he now has a broader mandate: that of political reform conferred by Mexicans of all political persuasions.*