EUROPE: FIVE YEARS LATER : Gorbachev’s Dawn: ‘Freedom of Choice for Every Nation’ : Last Soviet leader is out of limelight now. He recalls beginning of change in Eastern Europe.

The walls of Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s office are eerily bare, as though he does not plan to stay there long.

On one wall hangs a color photograph of Mt. Fuji, a gift from Japanese environmentalists, and in a corner stands a grandfather clock presented to Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, by a group of visiting South Korean legislators a few weeks ago. His tidy desk has a small lamp with a green shade, a modern version of the green glass lamp that graced the desk of the first Soviet leader, V.I. Lenin.

There are no photographs of Gorbachev with other world leaders, no holy relics of the history he helped reshape, no personal memorabilia, no sign that he was the central figure in Europe’s drama of five years ago. At 63, he looks fitter than his old rival, Boris N. Yeltsin, full of energy and anxious to end what amounts to an internal political exile in Moscow.

Aides say he is an unreformed workaholic whose days routinely end at 2 a.m. In addition to running the Gorbachev Foundation, a combination think tank and presidential library with about 120 employees, Gorbachev is also president of the Green Cross, the Russian branch of an international environmental group. Recently, he completed a 1,000-page, two-volume memoir that will be published in five languages next year.

After his fall from power, Gorbachev was allowed to move back into the dacha in the western suburbs of Moscow that he occupied when he first came to the city in 1978 as Central Committee secretary for agriculture, aides said. There he takes a long daily walk with his wife, Raisa. She has slowly regained her health, which was damaged during the failed coup of August, 1991.

Relations with Yeltsin remain poor. Gorbachev, who abhorred violence, denounced Yeltsin for resorting to shelling the Russian Parliament building last year to quash a hard-line revolt.

For his part, Yeltsin has stripped Gorbachev of most of his office space, almost all of his perks, and according to Gorbachev’s aides, much of his access to the media. Television correspondents tape interviews with the former Soviet leader that mysteriously never air. Aides blame an increasingly tame media for complying with an unofficial ban by the Yeltsin government on giving Gorbachev too much press.

Gorbachev won’t say whether he will run for elected office in Russia. But he has called for the formation of a centrist coalition of social democrats to provide a reformist alternative to Yeltsin.

In an interview with Times correspondent Sonni Efron, Gorbachev recalled the events that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall.

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Question. What were you thinking as it became clear that Eastern Europe was falling away from the Soviet Union, and how do you see those events now?

Answer. This was a time when our rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine (which declared Moscow’s right to intervene militarily to rescue a Communist regime under threat) was already being tested most severely. It began in the first days when I was organizing (Konstantin U.) Chernenko’s funeral (in March, 1985), and immediately after I became the general secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee.

I called for a meeting. It was not reported to the news media. We discussed--I told them--that we would make a statement firmly supporting the position that we had declared more than once before: equality, independence and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Every (Communist) party is responsible for what it does in its own country.

I think my colleagues were not paying proper attention to these words. Perhaps it was because at that time there had been so many similar statements and everything had remained as before: strictly controlled.

From that time on, this was our policy. Yes, of course we interacted. We took the initiative on many issues, especially on disarmament. But at the same time, we supported proposals from the other Warsaw Pact countries.

Of course, this was a novelty. Until then, usually initiatives had come from the Soviet Union. Well, except for an occasional eccentric move by (Romanian President Nicolae) Ceausescu. Sometimes, in order to demonstrate his independence, he would make some moves, as you remember. Yes, he made some proposals, but this was rather an exception, eccentric behavior.

In general, everything was canonized and directed by the Soviet Union. Not anymore.

But that was the beginning, the recognition of freedom of choice for every nation.

The other element of the new thinking was not to meddle. That a nation, whether it be the United States, the Soviet Union, China or any other country, should not impose its will, its interests, its model, on other nations, but should seek a balance and harmonization of interests, however difficult or complex that might be.

These are two elements of new thinking: recognition of freedom of choice for every nation and a balance of interests. This was the revolution.

From the beginning, people said it was a revolution. This opened the way for people to make use of their natural rights.

Yes, it was a very difficult choice, and people accepted this. They were influenced by perestroika (restructuring of Soviet society) and influenced by the changing situation in the world, and most of all, by the mutual understanding and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. . . .

The most critical moment was when, in Poland, the government had problems with Solidarity. I should say this was not a command, an order, or instructions from me to (the Polish leader, Gen. Wojciech) Jaruzelski.

We were, by the way, great friends. We were friends, and we remain friends. Very great friends. I have a very high opinion of the general. I think the Poles were very lucky that he headed their government at that decisive, difficult moment. He was a real Pole, but at the same time he was a man of a new background, with new views. For that reason, he did not use force (against Solidarity) and did not even introduce martial law. He tried to defuse the situation quickly and then open the road to democracy and changes and reforms.

This was a testing ground for perestroika.

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Q. Was Jaruzelski surprised when you told him he had to come to terms with Solidarity?

A. No. It came most of all from him. He understood that he had to find common ground. How else could he resolve the conflict with Solidarity?

Even if one of their political leaders irritates you or displeases you, still, this is the working class! These are the narod , the people! Jaruzelski understood this maybe even before I did.

We had a real discussion. We talked. We didn’t need translators, he speaks wonderful Russian, and we didn’t waste time.

As for the other cases . . . I could not order East Germany to do exactly what we did. Do perestroika ! They needed it, I’m sure. But they did not accept perestroika . (East German leader Erich) Honecker rejected it, and so did most of his close entourage. And they lost.

The process could have gone a different way if the GDR (East Germany) had changed, had opened up to the world, and allowed free contacts (with other nations). Then the process of rapprochement with West Germany also would have been different. But that’s water under the bridge now.

But I remember how they resisted reform even though we did not demand anything of them. This was the very nature of perestroika , that we should teach them by our example, the example of perestroika . I did tell them that, in politics, latecomers lose. And I cited my own experience, of how we failed in the course of perestroika when we acted too late.

I said this after I was at a candlelight march, when I saw young East German men demonstrating against the regime. As for the fact that you noted, referring to (then-Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula) Horn, he’s an old friend of mine. The issue was not that Horn had to consult with me. These contacts were conducted between our two foreign ministries.

But nevertheless, we discussed the situation all the time. We were in constant contact, not only with the Hungarians but with East Germany and others as well. We were all worried about how to untie the knot.

So many people were gathering, they demanded resolution of the conflict. What, should we kick them out with force? We continued to be involved with the problem, but it caused a lot of tension in Hungary itself. And it put the Hungarian leadership in a peculiar position, as if it were dependent, not sovereign, as if it could not make its own decisions on its own soil. This problem had to be resolved.

So at a certain moment, they decided to open their borders to the Germans. Yes, they did not consult with us. The situation had already changed.

They probably thought about it and decided not to put us in a very difficult spot, not to trap themselves in a situation where they consulted us and suddenly we might be against it (opening the borders), and then they would still have to find a way to solve the problem.

It was nothing dramatic. There were no sudden misunderstandings or any such thing. No, life had already changed. New winds were blowing and new flags were flying. This was the political context.

The most important thing was our loyalty to our ideals. To the very end, we were faithful (to our ideals.) We did not interfere in their domestic affairs. We discussed the situation, we exchanged opinions, but we did not give anyone any ultimatums.

Including the Czechs. The only thing we told the Czechs was that they should find a political solution and reject any use of force. But that was not a demand. It was friendly advice. We told them that any other policy would not have been accepted in Czechoslovakia or in the rest of the world.