Question Facing NATO’s Expansion

NATO was born in the crisis atmosphere of post-World War II Soviet subversion and expansionism in Europe and held together for more than four decades by the fear of Soviet military aggression. But with the Cold War over, the Soviet Union dissolved and a supposed era of cooperation and partnership now dawning over the continent, reasonable questions are being raised about NATO’s continued relevance and future. They deserve careful and credible responses.

NATO’s 16 members, led by the United States, insist that they intend to maintain the organization. What they seem to have trouble agreeing on--indeed, what they have hardly bothered even to address--is why. Certainly sharp policy differences growing out of the Bosnia debacle point to the urgent need for a fundamental rethinking of NATO’s purposes, and to the need for redefining where and how it should be ready to use military force. Certainly, too, the yearlong study that has just been ordered by NATO to set criteria for expanding its membership ought to deal not only with the mechanics of enlargement. It ought to explain as well why NATO believes it should undertake new security commitments in the absence of any clear cross-border threat to European security.

The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary all are eager to join NATO. Their reasons are obvious. All spent more than 40 years under Moscow’s control. All at one time or another rebelled against Communist rule and saw thousands suffer in consequence. All, Poland especially, which was partitioned by Russia four times over two centuries, have understandable historical reasons to fear for their future independence. All want the collective security NATO offers.

But what can’t be overlooked or dismissed as empty rhetoric is the unease among Russia’s leadership that NATO’s potential eastward expansion produces, and the wrath among Russian ultranationalists that it provokes. If the Cold War is over and Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia’s top leaders ask, why enlarge NATO and so move its eastern boundary closer to the borders of the former Soviet Union? The unspoken answer is that Russia’s experiment with democracy may give way at almost any time to a revived authoritarianism with imperial ambitions; in light of this, now well may be the best time to bring key and potentially endangered eastern European states under NATO’s protection. President Boris N. Yeltsin professes to be insulted by such an assessment. He accuses NATO, with America in the lead, of seeking to redivide Europe.

Of course that’s not Washington’s--or NATO’s--intention. But at this point it’s easier to infer what NATO doesn’t want than what it does. A compelling case for enlargement as something that serves the overall security interests of Europe--and of the United States--has not yet been made. Without it, it’s likely that the doubts about NATO’s purposes and its future will only grow.